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Abstract
This thesis is a study of scientific practice in computational physics. It is based on an 18 month 
period of ethnographic research at the Imperial College Applied Modelling and Computation Group. 
Using a theoretical framework drawn from practice theory, science studies, and historical 
epistemology, I study how simulations are developed and used in science. Emphasising modelling as 
a process, I explore how software provides a distinctive kind of material for doing science on 
computers and how images and writings of various kinds are folded into the research process. 
Through concrete examples the thesis charts how projects are devised and evolve and how they draw 
together materials and technologies into semi-stable configurations that crystallise around the objects 
of their concern, what Hans-Jorg Rheinberger dubbed “epistemic things”.
The main pivot of the research, however, is the connection of practice-theoretical science studies 
with the philosophy of Gaston Bachelard, whose concept of “phenomenotechnique” facilitates a 
rationalist reading of scientific practice. Rather than treating reason as a singular logic or method, or 
as a faculty of the mind, Bachelard points us towards processes of change within actual scientific 
research, a dynamic reason immanent to processes of skilled engagement. Combining this study of 
reason with the more recent attention to things within research from materialist and semiotic 
traditions, I also revive a new sense for the term “representation”, tracing the multiple relationships 
and shifting identities and differences that are involved in representing. I thus develop a theory of 
simulation that implies a non-representationalist concept of representing and a non-teleological 
concept of reason.
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 1 Introduction
  1.1 Beyond simulacra
This thesis argues against the relevance of the concept of simulacra for our understanding of 
simulations in contemporary science. It shows that processes of modelling are not about making 
copies of the world, but rather about transformative, creative engagements. That the term 
“simulation” harbours connotations of duplications is a relic of representationalist world views, a 
present-day version of what Heidegger called the “world picture”2. In this misguided frame, 
simulations appear as the ultimate objectifications of the world: going beyond the drive to map out 
and collect data, describing in fine detail every inch of the world, simulations would add a new level 
of rationalisation, that of prediction, extending our grasp to the future and the possible.
While post-positivism in its various guises displaced visions of science as producing one true 
representation of the world, it provides no guarantee against the return of positivist themes under 
different names. My account, in grandest terms, is a critique of correspondence, but it extends this 
critique beyond merely a critique of correspondence theories of knowledge and of truth, looking to 
also displace the kind of real correspondence, or technical correspondence, that lies behind the view 
of simulations as simulacra. But more than the negativity of critique, which is often left implicit in 
what follows, what I wish to accomplish here is to give a positive (not positivist) account of science 
as practice.
What replaces simulacra is a view of simulation in terms of simulating, practical engagements that 
seek genuine novelty, transforming ideas of their object while they transform their own technical 
foundations. This thesis sets out a view of scientific practice that stresses ontogenesis over ontology, 
becoming over being. What is important is not the present existence of a state of knowledge that can 
be forced into a relationship of correspondence with some world, but rather the immanent 
transformative potentials of research in the making, the intrinsic temporalities that render research in 
a state of suspension, of hope and anticipation. The simulation itself cannot be extracted from the 
practical milieux without losing sight of these dimensions. A simulation cannot be an object of study 
2 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’.
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on its own, but rather must be understood in a wider frame of its creation, manipulation and 
multiplication in research.
  1.2 Systems of investigation
This thesis is about research. It is about the research that gets done on computers, by scientists who 
build, run and analyse simulations. As a body of writing, it is the most tangible outcome of an 18-
month ethnographic study of the work of a large group of computational scientists at the Applied 
Modelling and Computation Group at Imperial College in London.
While research may seem a blindingly obvious topic for study, for many philosophers of science it 
has harboured little intrinsic interest. The possibility of taking research seriously, as a practical 
process of enquiry, emerged in the wake of post-postivism, buoyed by a loose cluster of approaches 
that moved past grand theories of science and preferred to look at the smaller-scale worlds of 
practice. Some inferences may extend outwards from these small scale studies to wider issues about 
science in general, but such expansion is not the goal. It may be allowed to occur in an ad hoc 
manner. To the extent that this thesis speaks to wider issues, it is to questions of creative practice and 
questions of software development as much as it is to science. In studying research in computational 
science, I am primarily interested in what it is to do science on computers. If I can vividly bring 
those practices to life, I have fulfilled an initial goal.
Placing this enquiry in context: as a result of the focus on practice, I am not very much interested in 
grand pictures of science that span all the multitudinous disciplinary and interdisciplinary sites 
where research gets done. Scientific theories take a back seat here, as does knowledge, to a great 
extent. Taking their place is the work done by scientists. In this respect, this study is post-
constructivist as much as it is post-positivist, participating what Karin Knorr-Cetina identified as a 
more recent interest “not in the construction of knowledge but in the construction of the machineries 
of knowledge construction”3. “Magnifying this aspect of science...”, she writes, “reveals the 
fragmentation of contemporary science; it displays different architectures of empirical approaches, 
specific constructions of the referent, particular ontologies of instruments, and different social 
machines”4. I am interested in the taking place of research in a major simulation laboratory. But I 
have to acknowledge that this remains a singular study. I do not have the comparative angle that 
Knorr-Cetina has been able to bring to bear. Comparison here remains largely implicit, and a project 
left for the future. This being said, the theoretical angles I bring to bear do lead me to pose, by the 
conclusion, some tentative but radical formulations of concepts of reality and truth, of reason and 
representation.
This thesis is a study of practical reason in research, the reason immanent to skilled engagements 
among people and things, worlds of intricately developed and deeply sedimented materials and 
3 Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures, 3.
4 Ibid.
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apparatuses. It is also a study of the very real, very concrete role that representation plays in these 
systems. It is empirical, but also draws on a great deal of extended theoretical discussion, drawing 
together social scientific theory, continental philosophy and philosophy of science. 
If these conceptions of reason, representation, truth and reality comprise my grandest level of 
engagement, and the descriptive goal of portraying computational science a more humble and 
empirical level, there is also a third, middle level of enquiry at play, which is to portray simulation as 
a material practice, and thus to contest conceptions based on the Greek concept of “simulacra”, 
which tend to idealise simulation as a question of models and copies, an issue of commodification 
and capitalism5. Simulation, in my account, is not abstract, immaterial, or theoretical. It is treated 
akin to experimental practice, and indeed I draw inspiration from science studies theorists best 
known for their studies of experimental research (Rheinberger, Knorr-Cetina, Pickering, etc.). If we 
can understand simulation as something that happens in concrete engagements with worlds of 
materials, then this middle level will have found satisfaction.
Chapter 2, 'Doing Science With Simulations', starts with an extended sketch of simulations in 
scientific practice. Chapter 2 does not try to offer any theoretical analysis, but aims to give the reader 
a good foundation for proceeding to the rest of the thesis. From here we move towards two core 
theoretical chapters, outlining practice theory, science studies, and their relationship with Gaston 
Bachelard's “new rationalism”. It is by reading scientific practice through Bachelard, that I aim to 
revive his “non-Kantian” concept of reason in practice. While this will be important for 
understanding the work of simulationists, it is also an argument about the heritage of science studies.
By chapter 5, 'Modelling and Representing', we start to return to the empirical material, and go 
through a series of empirical chapters that work these theoretical sources through the ethnographic 
site. 'Images in/of Simulation' uses images as devices to gain a handle on the accomplishment of 
research. 'Code and Writing' introduces the question of software as a material for doing science, and 
deals with questions of its ideality and relationship with other texts. 'Workability and Habitability' 
follows this thread further by exploring the materiality of systems of research in computational 
physics, looking at how they mutate over time, and embody certain characteristic conditions for that 
practice.
I aim to achieve an optimal balance between letting the empirical material speak for itself, while 
bringing it together with, and allowing it to speak to, key theoretical issues presented earlier in the 
narrative. The final chapter before the conclusion, 'Stability and Surprise' returns us to more 
philosophical matters, raising the question of what is scientific and what is technical in research, and 
introducing a conception of the object of study, twinned with an affective approach to the drives and 
inspirations that give research its momentum and texture. This chapter aims to integrate the several 
strands of argument, but also to push their implications further, setting out a reformulated set of 
5 The classic text in this respect is Baudrillard, Simulations.
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concepts appropriate to the creative and immanent ontological viewpoint that lies behind this theory 
of practice, and which is often implicit elsewhere in the discussion.
  1.3 A changing world
The questions that motivate my enquiry don't come from a hope of theorising Science as unity, or 
even science alone; the answers that emerge may bear on different objects altogether. Motivation 
instead arises from a changed world, a profoundly changing world. New forms of globalisation and 
connectivity have consequences across many domains of life. A changing climate threatens human 
existence through sea-level rise, desertification, ecological collapse. Rather than fall prey to an 
enlightenment preoccupation with science as a self-sufficient sphere, the pinnacle of human 
achievement, I turn to the demands of a wider world, an uncertain future, a rapidly evolving milieu, 
as a source of questions more appropriate to our times. The question is: “How do we act in a 
technically and environmentally precarious world?” “What is reason in such a world?” For the 
beginnings of such an enquiry I try to understand simulations, what they are and what they do.
Computational science is a loose association of practices situated at the heart of these matters. It is 
one of the most radically and rapidly transformed areas of science and engineering, conditional on 
new digital technologies and subject to the vicissitudes that these technical fields imply. The 
mediation of digital technologies opens the door to the generation and manipulation of vast 
mathematical systems, technical systems, and data-sets, but that which brings us closer to the 
gigantic also holds us apart, obstructing direct grasp of these things and placing new demands on 
manipulation and comprehension.
Computational science is essential to contemporary paradigms for the study of the climate, of energy 
generation, and of the study of natural disasters. It is a crucial tool in both policy and technology-
driven preparations for the future. It is only going to become more central to the existential issues 
that define the 21st Century.
My study sticks closely to the work undertaken in one particular site: the Applied Modelling and 
Computation Group (AMCG). Many different elements are at work here: many materials, many 
traditions and many spheres of sociality. It is science riding and driving the cutting edge of digital 
technologies, pursuing old and new questions, developing methods for the next generation of large-
scale, high-performance simulations.
What might a Science Studies look like in this context? Far from being an outsider among insiders, 
the locus of a difference that constitutes the inside and outside of the scientific field proper, the site 
reveals itself already to be internally divided. Many outsiders mingle among each other. Engineers, 
mathematicians and physical scientists, with very different backgrounds, histories, training and 
lexicons, together make up AMCG, a group defined by intense interdisciplinary collaboration. Far 
- 12 -
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from finding “trading zones”6 at the interstices of different scientific groups, the group here is a 
trading zone: creolisation not the exception but the rule. There is no straightforward identification of 
the ethnographer as the outsider, for he is one among many outsiders, and the object of study is 
defined by encounters across boundaries.
A radical version of this idea would position sociological and philosophical studies within rather 
than outside interdisciplinary (or as some would have it, “transdisciplinary”) science. The study of 
how research gets done in practice can be seen as one region of the general reflection on method that 
forms a hard core of many scientists' work (see section 2.14, 'Applied modelling and the science of 
method'). It may be a relatively exotic region of this territory, speaking often in strange dialects: far 
flung, but part of it nonetheless. 
This posing of a continuum between the observer and the observed is consistent with a general move 
towards interdisciplinarity within science studies. Ronald Giere, for example, draws on on cognitive 
science to help him understand the nature of scientific practice7. Sociology, anthropology, 
philosophy, psychology, various sciences, may all have something to offer, depending on how the 
question is presented. Embracing disunity of science means also embracing the fragmentation of 
disciplinary divides on the part of the social sciences and humanities, and a methodological refusal 
of any a priori determination of what strategies and traditions are relevant to a problem. This multi-
disciplinary openness is what science studies, at its best, can offer8.
  1.4 Towards a theory of practical reason
Having begun with the intention of shifting perspectives from the kind of enlightenment project that 
would sit science on a pedestal as the one true endeavour, it might seem strange that one of the 
central themes of this study is the affirmation of the dimension of practice that we might call its 
“reason”. For many recent theorists, reason warrants suspicion. From Nietzsche, to Freud, to critical 
theory, not to mention Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, contemporary theory in the humanities is 
marked by a general reaction against the enlightenment, inflamed with a desire to look into the 
cracks of reason, the shadows of the rational subject, bringing madness, dreams, the unconscious and 
desire into the foreground, bringing to light the less polished side of the coin.
These critiques, however, are oriented towards a broad cultural trope of reason: reason as a great 
symbol, as Science, as Spirit, as human progress, the inexorable advance of history toward its end. 
This trope has had a huge impact on culture in general, most notably in its exclusion of “others” thus 
constituted as irrational. Women, non-Westerners, the old, the young, the ill, have felt in whatever 
diffuse way the effects of being marginalia in a modern episteme. But it must be stressed that such a 
critique, however politically important, does not foreclose the possibility of developing a much more 
6 Galison, ‘Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone’.
7 Giere, Explaining Science.
8 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 215.
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modest concept of reason, one which does not privilege a certain kind of person, a certain type of 
society, or a particular sort of institution. 
I am not interested in treating reason as a faculty of the mind, as if there is some compartment of the 
cognitive apparatus within which lofty mental functions go about their business. In contrast, reason 
in this study is something worldly. It is the creativity of skilled practical engagements, working upon 
themselves toward transformative effect. The manipulation of concepts is here treated on a par with 
the manipulation of things. A broad historical trend points in this direction, from Bachelard's theory 
of phenomenotechnique9, Heidegger's treatment of being-in-the-world10, to Merleau-Ponty and 
Bourdieu's writings on the body11, as well as more recent theories of distributed cognition and the 
extended mind12.
Writing of a fellow ethnomethodologist's immersion in a chemistry lab, Garfinkel and colleagues 
point out that practical competence must be understood as the very instantiation of reasoning rather 
than a process separate from it. “Schrecker's handling of equipment was not merely an athletic 
accompaniment of chemical reasoning, it was part and parcel of chemical reasoning (in the same 
way that playing a musical instrument is not an athletic accompaniment of music but the existence-
in-the-production of everything that music could be)”13. The key point here is that in displacing 
intellectualist treatments of reason, we reinsert action itself into a complex nexus of practice, leaving 
no space for what could be described as “brute doings” considered apart from the meaning and 
reason their accomplishment embodies.
Practical reason, in this vein, is something embedded in complexes of technology and social 
interaction. Reason does not admit of a universal logic or a structure of thought. It is material, 
technical and bodily as much as it is cerebral. To study reason, in this case, is to study that complex 
domain I would call “practice”. Far from reason being a question of a commerce between concept 
and reality, practice undermines the very basis of this dualism, as Rouse has provocatively asserted:
“Cultural studies of science play a pivotal role... because of the importance of scientific 
practices within the contemporary dualism of intentionality and nature. If Descartes's 
account of mind and body is the paradigmatic dualism, then scientific practices are the 
pineal gland of contemporary philosophy: the proposed site for the magical reconciliation of 
what has been conceived irreconcilably”14.
It is necessary to point out from the start that the kind of rationalism advanced here does not provide 
any great grounds for intervention in the debates over rationality and relativism15. Such classic 
exchanges generally revolved around the giving of reasons for belief in certain propositions, from 
9 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind.
10 Heidegger, Being and Time.
11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception; Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice.
12 Clark and Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind’; Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild.
13 Lynch, Livingston, and Garfinkel, ‘Temporal Order in Laboratory Work’, 227.
14 Rouse, ‘Understanding Scientific Practices’, 443.
15 See, for example, Hollis and Lukes, Rationality and Relativism.
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witchcraft accusations among the Azande to the deductions of Western logicians16. Treating reason 
as a property of skilled practical engagements does not require commitment to any particular 
relativism or universalism because it is not first and foremost a question of belief or language. There 
may be universal features of certain forms of practice. There will certainly be elements of practice 
that are relative to their circumstances. But in either case, reason is part of the generative milieux, 
rather than an external method or faculty in a position of adjudication.
Furthermore, while a practical rationalism allows no absolute division between the rational and the 
irrational, it does permit relative distinctions to be made. Practical reason is strengthened by 
experience. Not by subjective experience, what some would call “sense perception”, but rather by 
experience in the sense of “being experienced”, what Germans would call erfahrenheit. “Being 
experienced enables us to literally embody the judgement in the process of making new experiences, 
that is, to think with our body... Erfahrenheit, that is, acquired intuition, is a form of life”17. 
Scientists' work works in, and thus upon, their fields of practice, a deep conditioning of intensities, 
reflexes and intuitions. This same work equally works upon the grain of the material and social 
environment, something not usually captured in the term “experience”. We could thus talk of well-
developed and less-developed fields of practice, not in the sense of there being some external metric 
against which they can be held up and compared, but rather in the sense that some fields have a 
persistence and coherence to them, developing internal dynamics unfolding trajectories and 
intensities, while other have no such longevity, are less coherent and much more fleeting.
This view of practical reason does not divide things up in the way that we are used to. For a start, 
while most circumstances of science in action involve highly developed fields of practice, so too 
would many other arenas of life. Art, craft and ritual equally often exhibit highly developed systems 
of practical reason18. But this is important, and it raises an open question: a practice theory must 
embrace cultural diversity, and avoid a priori assumptions that science is the primary or only forum 
in which reason is realised. Distinctions between science and non-science are made all the time, not 
least by scientists themselves, but while it is the business of social scientists to understand these 
distinctions, how they are made, what their effects might be, we also need to be open to the 
possibility that the continuities and commonalities between scientific practice and the practical 
engagements manifest in art, craft and ritual practice may provide the greatest source of insight into 
how experience, technology and the body form wider cultural complexes with intrinsic dynamics of 
their own.
16 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic; see also, Grieffenhagen and Sharrock, ‘Logical Relativism’.
17 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 77.
18 Cf. Rheinberger, ‘Experimental Systems’, 68, n. 11.
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  1.5 Towards a theory of representation
If there is any concept that rivals reason for its subjection to sustained fire from Cultural Studies and 
Continental Philosophy, it is representation. It should be obvious that I don't endorse a picture of 
science in which science on some grand level produces a representation of reality. With the 
displacement of scientific theory as the key locus for study, achieved by the “experimental turn” in 
philosophy of science19, it is no longer clear what part of science would be doing this singular task of 
representing. Once condemned as producing a “world picture”20, it is now clear that science can only 
be grasped in such a fashion through a framing that strips away the diversity and specificities of its 
practices, stamping it with an essence.
When continental philosophers such as Heidegger, Foucault, Ranciere and Baudrillard provide their 
various critiques of representation, their enemy is the grand cultural trope in which science is a 
powerful unified apparatus for the creation of a maximally adequate picture of reality, a “mirror of 
nature”21, a “world picture”, or what Paul Teller later came to dub “the perfect model model”22. 
Continental critiques often play on the political connotations of the term “representation”, offering a 
critique of the legitimating strategies of democratic political forms which draw on the notion of a 
government representing its citizens23. Ranciere, for example, would not only point out that there are 
gaps in representation, people who happen to be un-represented or mis-represented, but would go 
further and stress that a fundamental lack is necessarily present in any form of representation, that 
representation works through exclusion24. Similarly, in Heidegger's view of modern science as the 
culmination of metaphysics in its production of the “world picture”, it is not the specific adequacy of 
the picture that is to be scrutinised, but the dimensions of existence, that it excludes a priori: poeisis, 
for example25.
Continental philosophers may, however, stand to learn something from their English-speaking 
brethren. The problem of representation as it occurs within Anglo-American philosophy of science is 
rarely posed according to a big-picture narrative about pervasive cultural tropes spanning art, 
politics, science. We can find among some of these writers a concern constituted alongside that of 
the scientist, a general guiding principle that philosophy must stay true to the ways in which the 
concept is used in practice, rather than studying what is essentially the philosophers' own 
abstraction. Hence Mauricio Suarez will critique structuralists like Steven French for failing to 
account for the full breadth of kinds of representation we find in the world26. The object of study is 
19 See, for example, Hacking, Representing and Intervening.
20 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’.
21 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
22 Teller, ‘Twilight of the Perfect Model Model’.
23 For a history of the term’s usages, see Pitkin, The Concept of Representation; see also Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 27.
24 See, for example, Ranciere, ‘Democracy, Republic, Representation’.
25 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 34–35.
26 Suárez, ‘An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation’, 768.
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not an historical a priori or cultural unconscious. It is the diverse assembly of human endeavours 
that get called representation.
Within the context of scientific computing, it is very hard to see how you can understand everyday 
practices of description, depiction, simulation, modelling and visualisation, without getting to grips 
with the way in which many things represent each other, and how these relations are put to work. On 
this very much more mundane level, representation has little to do with producing a universal 
representation of the world. For a start, representations are not “outside” the world, and in most 
cases they work precisely because they are not true27. The laboratory does not produce, or contribute 
to, a single great picture of reality, but rather is the site of production of many different 
representations, which are folded into its circuits of practice in many different ways. Their formation 
and manipulation is an important axis of work in the laboratory and their multiplication and 
dissemination renders them one of the most important elements of the scientific material culture in 
which research gets done.
In chapter 5, I develop what could be called, following Suarez, a “deflationary” and “pragmatic” 
view28, but I try to combine this with insights from the “material semiotic” tradition in STS. Rather 
than offer some general theory of representation I find it more appropriate to give a theory of 
representing, one which refuses to take as its object a binary relation between source and target, and 
instead regards its object as a complex nexus of many elements: source and target, but also agents, 
communities, projects, uses, intentions, conventions. It is here that real representations are devised, 
posited, developed, sustained, worked through, passed on and discarded. It makes little sense to say 
that representations are “true”, but they can turn out to be “good” in many ways, in their various 
roles as materials for research. This being said, once I develop, in chapter 5, an account of 
representation, I go on to study images and texts in the following chapters as always more than 
representations. This excess is what the notion of practice is supposed to embrace. Representations 
in practice, just like objectifications of practice, imply an escape, an excess, and for this we turn 
beyond representation to materiality (chapter 8), temporality (chapter 6), and lack (chapter 9).
  1.6 Methodological considerations
This thesis is based on an 18-month period of ethnographic research with the Imperial College 
Applied Modelling and Computation Group, from August 2010 to March 2012. While I call this 
research “ethnographic” it must be noted that the intensity of contact was far less than what would 
be conventional for anthropological ethnographic studies. I did not live with scientists, nor did I 
spend every day with them. I visited once or twice a week, and attempted to become involved in all 
manner of routine activities. I attended weekly developers' meetings on Wednesday lunchtimes for a 
period of 8 months, and outside this time I attended less regularly, but enough to keep up to date. 
27 See, for example, Knuuttila, ‘Models, Representation, and Mediation’, 1263.
28 Suárez, ‘An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation’; Suárez, ‘Scientific Representation’.
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These meetings gave me a good insight into the longer term fluctuations in the mood of the group, 
the comings and goings of different staff members, and the seasonal differences in intensity between 
release dates, funding deadlines, term-time pressures, and vacations.
I also attended project-specific meetings for the multiphase flow research group and the nuclear 
transport research group over the summer of 2011. In November 2010 and November 2011 I went to 
the annual three-day training event for the “Fluidity” fluid dynamics code, on the first occasion as an 
observer, while on the second I enrolled as a new trainee, alongside external collaborators and 
scientists new to the group, during which I learned to create meshes, to compile the code, to run a 
variety of example simulations, to manipulate visualisations of the data I thus generated, and to 
modify the simulation set-ups I had been using. I also attended training sessions for the developers 
of Fluidity, in which I learned the architecture of the software and the basics of how it works. 
From the beginning I was connected to the community through digital means, and received daily 
updates from their email lists, for support and social issues. I logged in, on occasion, to the AMCG 
chat channel. All sorts of texts were available to me. I browsed the source code of their open source 
software, looked at descriptions of new commits and branches of the code. I examined bug reports 
and testing updates. All of these things helped me gain a good comprehensive knowledge of their 
research. I was also helped by having worked for a software company for a year prior to starting my 
own research, so I was already familiar with many of the software technologies and management 
systems, as well as with the general practical issues that surround working with code.
I went to about 15 public seminars in which members of the group presented their research, and 
attended a conference in which a few were doing the same. These were good places to hear about 
new projects, as well as to understand how research was being presented to outsiders. It was also 
very interesting to follow comments and conversations in these public events, and to reflect on how 
and why different features of the research are flagged up for comment or critique. I attended a 
seminar in which the group presented their work to the Natural Environment Research Council 
(NERC), as part of a project run by the research council in which they wanted to visit research 
groups to gather information on next generation methods. At yearly meetings to introduce the group 
to new PhD students and postdocs I was invited to introduce myself, which made me feel, after a few 
months, more of a part of things.
As well as these academic occasions, I went to lunch many times with members of the group, during 
which they would often discuss academic matters, as well as the social issues consequent of being 
part of a large group. I also joined in with coffee breaks when I was around. And I was very pleased 
to be invited, and able to attend, one of the group's Christmas dinner parties. These occasions helped 
greatly with my general understanding of this kind of science, but they were also hugely important in 
getting as many people as possible out of this very large research group to know who I am and to 
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accept me as an unthreatening presence. After a few months I became a somewhat normal presence 
within the group, rather than the curiosity I must have seemed at the beginning.
When I first started doing this research I was invited to give a seminar on my work, in which I could 
propose my project to the group, and hopefully muster enough enthusiasm that I would be invited to 
become a kind of resident ethnographer. Though I had thought this would be a small occasion, when 
I arrived and saw the size of the room and for the first time appreciated the size of the research 
group, I realised it was something much larger. It was daunting to address scientists at that stage in 
my research, but it was soon apparent that an exercise of this nature was absolutely essential for me 
to begin my empirical study. Because so much of my observation was done in communal settings, I 
felt it was necessary for everybody to know who I was and what I was doing. There are so many new 
PhD students in the group at that time of year that I would otherwise just be assumed to be one of 
them, and the scientists around me would be unaware that someone in the room had them as his 
object of study, an ethically uncomfortable covert presence.
I call this study ethnographic because it was on the basis of these long-term and diverse experiences 
that I started to feel that I understood something about what it is like to do computational science. 
The majority of the empirical “material” presented in this thesis, however, is excerpts from 
transcripts of interviews, of which I did 32, amounting to a total of over 50 hours of recorded 
material. I use this material in order to give voice to my informants and because it seems better to 
allow them to speak in their own words wherever possible. But I do not think of interviews as data-
collection enterprises. I do not think that interviews on their own are particularly effective as devices 
for gaining empirical understanding of research practice. It is only on the basis of the wider sweep of 
my ethnographic encounter that I could appreciate what was said in the interview circumstances.
Methodologically speaking, I want to distance myself from qualitative approaches in which 
interviews are the core focus, and in which transcripts are analysed for modes of expressions, words 
and phrases counted, the numbers crunched (this kind of “coding-based” approach is common in 
cognitive studies of science and grounded theory). For me, so much is already lost before we even 
get to the transcript. Each interview is wholly different in type and tenor. The different scientists I 
interviewed had very different stances towards me and towards each other, something that is only 
appreciated when observed over many months.
When I cite interviews I provide the text in a somewhat artificial format. Interviewees do not really 
speak for themselves, and I don't think it is right to present them as if they do. I speak for them, or at 
least, I give them the space for their expressions. I control these spaces, and I must take 
responsibility for this. I provide these snippets of conversation without the context of my questioning 
because I mostly quote small sections at a time, and because my interviews were very loosely 
structured. I tried to avoid questions that required a yes or no answer, and focussed on getting my 
informants talking on a topic, interjecting only to keep them going, to show that I understood what 
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they were talking about, and occasionally to guide the conversation towards other topics that I 
wanted to approach. I quote without giving my question because the interesting parts of the dialogue 
are often those in which the interviewee has gone “off topic”, so for most of the text I use, the 
question doesn't really help to give the context. I also do this because I want to avoid giving the 
impression of objective recounting of events. As the initiator and appropriator of these 
conversations, I take responsibility for their use, and it seems only right to embrace the authority that 
the ethnographer adopts in presuming to “speak for” his informants29.
My interviews do not form a set; they do not all follow the same pattern, and did not involve 
identical questions being asked. The scientists at AMCG are very varied in their professional 
interests, in their methods of working, their backgrounds, and in their philosophical interests. I was 
not particularly interested in comparing different views on the same question (as if the same question 
in different circumstances is ever really the same question). Rather, I wanted to explore a range of 
questions, tailored to the interviewee. I began all interviews by taking five minutes to explain my 
project and clarify any questions the interviewee might have about what I was doing. Then I went on 
to ask them what kind of research they are involved in, the history of their work on these kind of 
topics, what the work involved on a practical day-to-day level, and further open questions, for 
example about what the major issues or problems are that they are facing in their research at present 
or in the future.
It was not easy to find an appropriate empirical site, and it took some work to get it established. I 
began my fieldwork less than a year after the famous “Climategate” scandal involving the hacking of 
scientists' emails at the University of East Anglia. While the scientists at AMCG are not working in 
exactly the same field, there was a general sense of defensiveness about computational science, a 
result no doubt of the very public challenging of this kind of science in mainstream media.
My appearance at the group was made no easier by my informants' lack of prior knowledge of 
ethnographic studies of science. It has now been over four decades since laboratory studies became 
widespread, and it is not uncommon that in any scientific context, someone within the laboratory 
will have met, or will have known someone who has met, a social scientist involved in this kind of 
work. A preliminary interview with a scientist at University College London, which I conducted 
before selecting AMCG as my field site, was made much easier by the fact that this interviewee's 
father had been involved with Harry Collins' ethnographic studies many years previously. He 
therefore knew very well what it was that social scientists did when they studied scientific practice.
So despite having to begin from scratch in explaining what it was that I was actually proposing when 
arriving at ACMG, and despite a general wariness of public opinion of their science, and about what 
it was that I might be making public about their science, I was lucky to quickly gain acceptance. This 
was largely thanks to the effort of a small number of individuals who were prepared not just to allow 
29 See, for example, Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture, 13.
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me in, but to positively encourage me, and who went to the trouble of clearing my presence with the 
Head of Department, getting me an identity card, and thereby giving me some semi-official status as 
part of the group.
There was some resistance to my work from some quarters. One or two scientists clearly couldn't see 
what they would gain from my presence, but were well aware of the trouble I could cause. If I were 
to be in the business of criticising their practices, or misrepresenting them somehow, it could 
adversely impact their ability to gain funding and collaborators. There were some parts of the group 
to which I never gained much “behind the scenes” access, and in these cases, because they were in 
the minority, I didn't push too hard. Among the largest part of the group, those involved with the 
“Fluidity” fluid dynamics code, my involvement was facilitated by the fact that this software was 
just becoming open source while I was there, which meant that all the documentation, all the email 
lists, all the chat interactions, and so on, were to be made open to external users and developers. So 
the inner workings of the group would be publicly available anyway, and if anything, an 
ethnographer hanging around would help them come to terms with their new openness.
In some cases, individuals seemed slightly hostile to me, probably because of my audacity to think I 
could legitimately have something to say about their work. In these cases I found the best policy was 
to contact them for an interview as soon as possible, to give them a chance to interrogate me in 
private about what I am doing. Most scientists clearly enjoyed talking about their work, and to have 
an interviewer there who is primarily interested in them talking about what interests them (rather 
than reeling questions off a pre-set questionnaire) seemed to be compliment enough that no hostility 
persisted.
My strategy for gaining acceptance within the group involved reassuring my informants about my 
intentions. The most important dimension of this reassurance was the promise from the outset that I 
would use pseudonyms so that it would be very hard for anybody to track down who had said what. 
This tactic also had its downside, however, because it is only a small leap to conclude that if 
pseudonyms are necessary, I must be interested in scandal. I hedged against this by pointing out that 
it is standard practice in social scientific studies to maintain the anonymity of sources.
I developed a system of false initials, which I use throughout the thesis. This is not as personal and 
evocative as giving false names, but I don't stake much of my analysis on the ability to evoke 
personalities. Where names were mentioned in text taken from interviews or other sources, I have 
swapped them for these initials, without square brackets because the substitution is obvious. 
Anonymity could present a problem in some cases for the attribution of genuinely academic opinions 
to the person who has voiced them. This does not present too much trouble here, but it is worth 
bearing in mind that further studies into the nature of modelling and into the practices of simulating 
may well cross a line in which the ethnographic account blurs together with the kind of meta-
reflection on their practices that is occasionally published by computational scientists in their own 
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computational science journals30. In my case, I am satisfied that where the merits of scientists' 
reflections on their own practices are apparent, it is enough that credit be attributed to AMCG, which 
is not a pseudonym. It is the real name of the real group, and it stands for the arena in which these 
opinions have been nurtured and developed.
Computational science conventionally recognises the social nature of research with what are 
sometimes absurdly long lists of authors on their published papers. The scientists at AMCG are in 
some sense co-responsible for what I write here too, but we have no similar convention in which to 
embrace their participation, except for paying methodological lip service. Nevertheless, it is 
important to firmly maintain that this account emerges from a very specific set of interactions with a 
particular group of people. At points it perhaps speaks to a wider domain, to computational science 
in general, or to science in general, but the real centre of this study is that one group, that one place 
and time, and I don't doubt that any similar study conducted elsewhere would on so many pages put 
a somewhat different spin on things. But this particularity is not to be acknowledged as a limitation, 
confining the text to the particular rather than the universal. It is an asset, a grounding, a point of 
departure to which it is important to remain true.
30 See, for example Randall and Wielicki, ‘Measurements, Models, and Hypotheses’.
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  2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets the scene by introducing in broad outline what is involved in doing science with 
simulations. I aim to give an overall picture of the kind of science that has been the object of my 
study. I provide an overview of different kinds of simulations, how they are used, and the history of 
scientific computing. I also introduce AMCG, the work these scientists do, and the basic components 
of their laboratory. The theoretical chapters that follow will be more illuminating in light of this 
extended empirical introduction, and when we get to the empirical analysis that forms the latter half 
of the thesis, this chapter will have provided background needed so that we can jump straight in to 
more complex issues.
  2.2 What is simulation?
Stephan Hartmann listed five main reasons why scientists run simulations:
“1. Simulations as a technique: Investigate the detailed dynamics of a system
 2. Simulations as a heuristic tool: Develop hypotheses, models and theories
 3. Simulations as a substitute for an experiment: Perform numerical experiments
 4. Simulations as a tool for experimentalists: Support experiments
 5. Simulations as a pedagogical tool: Gain understanding of a process”31
Hartmann's categories give a good overall sense of the range of roles that simulations can play. They 
are not particularly useful as a typology of different simulation-situations, for the items in the list are 
found in combination. It is this combination that helps us gain an introductory grasp of the 
“epistemic culture” of a research group or research area32. The simulations I studied were most 
obviously used in the senses 1 and 3, which are often combined. Simulations allow the investigation 
of the detailed dynamics of a system because they are not limited by the practicalities of data 
collection that often constrain the set of data outputs of an experiment. For example, in fluid 
dynamics, an experimentalist may place a handful of temperature sensors at a certain points, 
31 Hartmann, ‘The World as Process’, 85–86.
32 Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures.
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typically at the edge, of a tank of fluid. On the other hand, a simulationist can obtain more detail, 
generating readings for temperature throughout the space. The investigation of detailed dynamics is 
also a question of exploring the many different possible states the system might go through under 
different initial conditions, and this is where simulation comes into its own in the third sense. 
Simulations can be performed where experiments are impractical. This often means cases where 
experiments can't be done, such as systems that are too large or too energetic to have experimental 
scale analogues. But it also includes cases where the experiment is to be run many hundreds of 
times, something that can be automated for simulations, but can be extremely costly for 
experimentalists.
The other three roles of simulations can also be found at work at AMCG. The theories, hypotheses 
and models that are developed in the second role can be “fundamental theories”, such as the Navier-
Stokes equations for fluid dynamics. But for my informants these are not usually at stake. They are 
taken for granted, a kind of resource used to explore other kinds of problems. They may well, 
however, be developing more empirically grounded theories, what often get called 
“phenomenological” theories, such as theories of the role of gyres in driving deep ocean currents. 
They may equally be used to develop theories of the apparatus, theories for example about the 
efficacy of certain algorithms in modelling. Many new techniques that are implemented in 
simulations are still largely hypothetical until they are realised in the computational apparatus, and it 
is in simulation projects that their properties can be explored. 
In some cases, scientists turn to simulations where their experiments prove impractical. But at 
AMCG, most scientists are full-time simulationists. They do, however, in some projects, collaborate 
with experimental scientists. For example, in industry funded projects for designing reactors, 
turbines, or coolant systems, AMCG provides the simulations which will form the preliminary stages 
of the engineering project, which the industrial partner will use in order to refine designs before 
going to the prototyping stage. In other cases, the relationship is reversed, and it was the 
simulationists who recruited experimentalists in order to supplement their practices.
“For instance they [two postdocs who ran experiments as part of an oil reservoir 
conductivity project] would be doing experiments with water of different salinities and they 
would be measuring how the electrical potential they measure changes as they change the 
salinity of the brine. That is a key parameter that I need to know when I run my model. And 
I literally just use the number from the lab experiments.” (QH)
Hartmann's fifth function of simulations is important at AMCG because it is by playing around with 
simulations that scientists hone their skills. It is often pointed out that scientific models play 
pedagogical roles. For example, models of molecules are commonly used to teach students of 
chemistry to think about the relationships between atoms and bonds33. But even a complex research-
33 Justi and Gilbert, ‘Models and Modelling in Chemical Education’; see also Chadarevian and Hopwood, Models: The Third 
Dimension of Science for several good case studies of the role of physical models in science.
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oriented computational modelling framework has a pedagogical role to play, as it provides a primary 
medium for thinking and manipulation34. Skills in using it can be developed, thus enhancing and 
extending the kinds of engagements possible. In chapter 8, 'Workability and Habitability', we will 
look at how software systems may differ or change in their capacity to allow freedom for such 
manipulations.
It is worth, at this early point, making some comments about terminology. I reserve the term 
“simulation” for computer simulations. Various commentators have discussed non-computational 
simulations35, but for present purposes for “simulation” read “computer simulation”. I use the term 
to describe concrete computational processes, the actual electronic happenings that occur in space 
and time, so I use the term for something very specific36. This is helpful because it ties our 
discussion down to the events in the laboratory around which this kind of scientific practice is 
organised. While simulations are the computational processes, practices of simulating are diverse 
and complex. The process of creating a simulation involves many different kinds of social processes, 
abstract reasoning, idealisation. But the simulation itself is a concrete empirical event. 
The main difficulty encountered in using the term “simulation” for actual electronic occurrences is 
that these happen at a scale and speed that is not amenable to direct perception. They are the kind of 
thing liable to incite debates about realism and anti-realism vis-à-vis unobservable entities. However, 
while acknowledging that we only have empirical knowledge of what has actually taken place, these 
electronic events we call “computation” are so thoroughly instrumentalised, and incorporated into so 
many kinds of scientific practice, that they are strong candidates for the kind of realism Ian Hacking 
proposed in Representing and Intervening37. To use a term that will be introduced in chapter 9, 
computation is not, in computational science, an epistemic thing. It is an aspect of reliable 
apparatuses, not a semi-mysterious thing motivating research. For simulationists, computation is 
mundane, part of the complex of apparatuses brought to bear on other kinds of problems; the locus 
of motivation is elsewhere.
Regarding a simulation to be an event in a digital computer requires us to distance ourselves from 
discussions of simulations in terms of the Greek concept of simulacra38. A simulacrum in this sense 
is a copy of something, and the term “simulation” has been enlisted into a philosophy of images and 
commodities which prefers to retreat into abstract philosophical territory, with no real concern for 
how real simulations figure in fields such as science. One recent treatment defines it thus:
34 The term ‘framework’ is used here to describe a technical system, so is used in a very different way to the usage established by 
Carnap and his followers to talk about theories. Carnap, ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’; see also Galison, ‘Computer 
Simulations and the Trading Zone’.
35 For example Parker, ‘Does Matter Really Matter?’.
36 Similar views are expressed by Humphreys, Extending Ourselves, 109; Hartmann, ‘The World as Process’, 83.
37 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 22–25.
38 For example, Baudrillard, Simulations.
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“Simulation: a copy without a source, an imitation that has lost its original. The theory of 
simulation is a theory about how our images, our communications and our media have 
usurped the role of reality, and a history of how our reality fades”39.
Firstly note that it makes no sense to begin from a presumption that the etymology of the term will 
guide us on a productive path of enquiry. Whether simulations might be regarded as copies is an 
issue that will be dealt with in chapter 5, 'Modelling and Representing'. They are certainly not copies 
of anything in any straightforward sense, and to the extent that they represent, they represent many 
different things in many different ways, something that must be understood through their position in 
a practical nexus of concern. If representation is already multiple, the question of the original is no 
longer pertinent. And finally, the concept of reality will also be something we should return to, 
following an analysis of practice, rather than pre-empting it. While my account is a 'cultural studies' 
account, and thus leans more heavily on the theoretical element of analysis than on the empirical, it 
is important to temper this orientation by refusing to take voguish theoretical trends as an initial 
guide, situating my study primarily in the empirical and working from there.
I have no similar desire to narrow down the meaning of the terms “model” and “modelling”. I don't 
think it is necessary to start with an idea of metaphors or analogies, as has been a strong tradition in 
philosophy since Mary Hesse's early studies40. Modelling, conceptualised as a practical process, is 
something much broader, and captures the complexity of what it is that scientists are doing when 
they are building and running simulations, and help to tie these kinds of scientific work to the variety 
of kinds of physical and ideal models that are also used throughout the sciences41. I keep the term 
modelling broad because it captures something of what we want to talk about when we talk about 
“practice”, and as we will see in chapter 3, this term is also characterised by considerable, and 
useful, semantic flexbility.
  2.3 The history of computer simulation
The history of simulation is closely associated with the history of the digital computer. The 
foundations of computing were laid at the interface of engineering and the study of logic. Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz made an early attempt at a mechanical multiplying machine in 1672, a precursor to 
Charles Babbage's famous Difference Engine of 182242. Both relied on cogs and gears to produce 
their mathematical calculations. It was only, however, with further formalisation of logic and algebra 
by George Boole, that the foundations were laid for figures such as Charles Peirce, Claude Shannon, 
John Atanasoff and Konrad Zuse to make the connection between Boolean algebra and the workings 
of electronic circuitry43. By the late 1930s, circuits had been constructed that could perform addition, 
39 Cubitt, Simulation and Social Theory, 1.
40 Hesse, Models and Analogies.
41 For a similar view, espoused for a different kind of agenda, see French, ‘Keeping Quiet on the Ontology of Models’.
42 Kaufmann III and Smarr, Supercomputing and the Transformation of Science, 26–27.
43 Ibid., 28.
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subtraction, multiplication and division. It was, however, the Second World War that provided the 
greatest stimulus to this endeavour, as newer weaponry required greater and greater numbers of 
calculations for artillery shell trajectories, and for cracking enemy ciphers44. John von Neumann and 
Stanislaw Ulam's famous work on Monte Carlo methods also emerged from these military 
concerns45. Following the war, the US nuclear programme pushed further the development of 
computing, and another breakthrough came in the 1950s with the replacement of vacuum tubes with 
the smaller, more reliable, and more efficient transistors46.
Computer simulations are among the oldest applications of digital computers. Some of the earliest 
computers were devised to solve complex mathematical equations in the fields of nuclear physics 
and climatology. Norman Phillips performed some of the earliest simulations of the earth's climate 
system in the mid 1950s, on a computer with only 5 kilobytes of memory47.
It took, however, several decades before computational methods had been adopted across the many 
disciplines and sub-disciplines of the scientific fields, and before “computational science” was 
recognised as an approach that potentially spans all the sciences, rather than a niche area of 
computing48. The term “computational science” is often attributed to Nobel Laureate Kenneth 
Wilson, said to have coined the term in the early-mid 1980s49. 
In the early days, all computers were extremely bulky and expensive. Today's fastest computers are 
still bulky and expensive. But computing has diversified, and with this diversification comes more 
ways of integrating computers into research. At AMCG, researchers run simulations on the full range 
of hardware, all the way up to supercomputers. But much computational science around the world 
does not use advanced hardware, and is done using the much more modest equipment of a desktop 
PC. As several commentators have noted, while much talk about “e-Science” or computational 
science treats it as a homogeneous approach, in fact the ways in which computers are used in 
different epistemic cultures is highly variable50.
The growth of computational science is not solely a technical story. It is also social. One of the major 
factors influencing the pace of uptake of these new methods was a generational divide, with many 
professors remaining suspicious of simulation until they retired and were replaced by a younger 
generation who had grown up with it. Sherry Turkle has studied scientists' attitudes towards 
simulation from the 1980s to the present day, and the generations feature as an important theme in 
her account. “For physicists [in the 1980s], using simulation when you could be in direct touch with 
the physical world was close to blasphemy”51. “An older generation,” she writes: 
44 Ibid., 29–30.
45 Goldsman, Nance, and Wilson, ‘A Brief History of Simulation’.
46 Kaufmann III and Smarr, Supercomputing and the Transformation of Science, 34.
47 McGuffie and Henderson-Sellers, A Climate Modelling Primer, 63.
48 Hine, ‘Computerization Movements and Scientific Disciplines’.
49 See, for example Denning, ‘Computing Is a Natural Science’, 13.
50 Merz, ‘Embedding Digital Infrastructures’; Fry, ‘Coordination and Control of Research Practice’.
51 Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents, 30.
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“fears that young scientists, engineers, and designers are “drunk with code.” A younger 
generation scrambles to capture their mentors' tacit knowledge of buildings, bodies, and 
bombs. From both sides of a generational divide, there is anxiety that in simulation, 
something important slips away”52.
For my informant NK, the divide maps onto ongoing tensions between computational methods and 
established theoretical and experimental approaches to science. The most prevalent view among my 
informants is that these different approaches are not really in competition, that they can never 
replace each other, and that they have settled into a position of complementarity. But there remains a 
sense in which simulationists are the usurpers of traditional methods.
“Some theoreticians are quite negative about computation. They look down on it... 
Discussions have been had in the past about whether computation could in principle 
completely do away with experiments. From the experiment side people say there are always 
bugs, you can't quite trust the computational model. But then from the numerical [i.e. 
computational] side people say that they have verified it, they know the equations, they 
know they have solved it, and that it is going to be more accurate than something done in a 
laboratory. If you want to model a system the idea that that model might be more accurate 
than a laboratory [experiment] is not often obvious and does not make laboratory people 
very happy...” (NK)
NK continued with an example:
“If you said you wanted to study the flow in a cup of 10cm size I can model it to an insane 
amount of accuracy. But if you want to do it in a lab, there is always a manufacturing 
tolerance on these things. Some people would argue that the computational model is more 
accurate. But you could debate that for a hell of a long time. One of the problems is that with 
the laboratory and the computer things can go wrong in both and things do go wrong in 
both” (NK)
Today, it is rare to hear claims that simulation will do away entirely with other ways of doing 
science. The picture is more one of complementarity, and it is common to hear computational 
science referred to as “the third pillar of science”, what Galison calls a “tertium quid”53. A recent 
review of computational science in the UK defines it like this:
“Computational science, the scientific investigation of physical processes through modelling 
and simulation on computers, has become generally accepted as the third pillar of science, 
complementing and extending theory and experimentation... Computational Science and 
Engineering (CSE) today serves to advance all of science and engineering, and many areas 
of research in the future will be only accessible to those with access to advanced 
computational technology and platforms.”54
52 Ibid., 7.
53 Galison, Image and Logic, 747.
54 Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, ‘International Review of Research Using HPC in the UK’, 1; see also, for 
example, Kaufmann III and Smarr, Supercomputing and the Transformation of Science, 4; Rohrlitch, ‘Computer Simulation in 
the Physical Sciences’; Ostrom, ‘Computer Simulation’; Godfrey-Smith, ‘The Strategy of Model-Based Science’.
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But despite its widespread use across the sciences, simulation has often been regarded as a neglected 
area of study in science studies55. This is at least partly because computational science is more 
difficult to ethnographically observe than laboratory sciences, which formed the bastion of early 
sociological accounts. Similarly, it was only in the late Twentieth Century that instrumentation and 
experimentation started to be given adequate space in philosophical accounts of science56. The 
philosophy of simulation, as another practical method for carrying out research, has been bolstered 
by this trend, yielding many philosophical treatments attempting to philosophically compare 
simulations with experiments57. As Sismondo put it: “In their focus on examining the warrant for 
fundamental theories, philosophers of science have almost completely neglected the processes 
involved in applying such theories”58. Because of this new trend looking at processes of applying 
theories, “modelling” has become a concept of great philosophical interest, and simulation as one 
prevalent way of doing modelling has consequently received a great deal of attention too59.
  2.4 Types of simulation
To gain a handle on the breadth of types of simulation, it is useful to think about some basic 
distinctions. Simulations of discrete problems versus continuous problems form one axis. Uses of 
simulation frameworks that also extend those frameworks versus those that just put pre-made 
software to use is another. Thirdly, the kind of scientific practice in which the simulation is used 
depends on whether the software in question is a big project, involving many people and a lot of 
code, or whether it is a smaller enterprise.
All simulation is discrete, in the sense that all digital computational processes are described in 
discrete mathematics. A simulation, inasmuch as it can be thought of as a series of logical operations, 
consists of a finite set of such operations. As CE put it, “there is no continuum on a computer chip”. 
An initial sub-classification of simulations would divide them into those that simulate processes that 
are themselves described by discrete mathematics, and those that are described by continuous 
mathematics involving infinities/infinitesimals. The latter are what concern me in this thesis60. They 
include the vast array of simulations of problems that are theoretically described by differential 
equations, which have to be “discretised” to run on a computer. But it is worth pointing out at the 
start that there are also problems that more “naturally” fall into a digital computer because of their 
discrete nature, and these include, for example, agent-based modelling and network analysis.
The simulations that I studied are under active development, being used for research by the same 
people who write their code. Developers and users are for the most part the same people. With 
55 Merz, ‘Multiplex and Unfolding’, 294.
56 Radder, ‘Toward a More Developed Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation’.
57 See, for example Morgan, ‘Experiments Without Material Intervention’; Guala, ‘Models, Simulations, and Experiments’.
58 Sismondo, ‘Models, Simulations, and Their Objects’, 256.
59 Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators; Magnani and Nersessian, Model-Based Reasoning.
60 But see Rohrlitch, ‘Computer Simulation in the Physical Sciences’, 515–516 for an interesting discussion of potential crossover 
between the domains.
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Fluidity, however, the biggest model developed at AMCG, the group is just beginning to see uptake 
by a new category of scientist, which are often referred to as “pure users”. These people use the 
software but don't develop it. They need to understand what it does and how it does it, but they are 
sheltered from the intricacies of the source code, and from the “bleeding edge” of its development. 
They work largely through other programmes which provide interfaces through which the code is set 
up and its outputs analysed. But at the moment pure users are a minority group. They have generally 
appeared as a result of the Fluidity software becoming open source, freely available over the 
internet. This also means that the group has little knowledge of who they are and what they are doing 
with the code, except in those cases (at a rate of about one or two a week) in which an external user 
uses the mailing lists to make a technical query. But while Fluidity has very little by way of a pure 
user base, other software packages are very well established in this respect, having many pure users. 
In the geophysical fluid dynamics field, for example, the American model the MIT GCM 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology General Circulation Model) is widely used in this way, as is 
the French model NEMO (Nucleus for European Modelling of the Ocean). 
Connected with the division between developer-based science and user-based science is a distinction 
between small and big software. This division is hard to make exactly because there are no absolute 
measures of size for software (see chapter 8, 'Workability and Habitability'). Much developer-based 
science is carried out with small software applications written by the research team for a particular 
project, and this kind of “cottage industry” software production is very different to the bigger scale 
endeavours needed to develop a large and complex software system on the scale of Fluidity, not least 
because the latter requires a much bigger team.
  2.5 Computational laboratories
Here I provide a brief outline of the core equipment that furnishes the computational science 
laboratory. This will give an initial picture of the resources that are essential to this kind of work. 
Accounts of scientists and external commentators can easily place such stress on the simulation 
software that it can seem like this somehow exists independently and works on its own. It is too easy 
to think of a computer as just one thing, and equally easy to lump together very different software 
systems. Part of the goal of this thesis is to produce a much more nuanced account. A complex web 
of apparatuses exists in and between computers, deployed in many different ways at different stages 
of the research process. The following table describes the major software equipment that is used with 
the Fluidity code.
Software
Modelling 
framework – e.g. 
Fluidity
I call the core code a “modelling framework” because it can be used to create 
many different simulations, and many kinds of simulations. A modelling 
framework like Fluidity is not a model in any straightforward sense. It has 
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many different options that can set it up to create simulations that model 
physical systems, ideal systems or mathematical systems, but it is always 
bigger than any particular simulation. It has the potential to model such a vast 
number of very different systems that calling it a model in the singular does 
not to do it justice.
Code editor – e.g. 
gedit
Working on the source code requires an interface. Programmers have their 
favourite editors, which are essentially text editors with additional capacities 
designed to help work with code, highlighting syntax, for example, or 
comparing different versions of the same file.
Set-up interface – 
e.g. Spud/Diamond
Setting up a modelling framework like Fluidity requires a lot of options, 
parameters and boundary conditions. Spud is the GUI (Graphical User 
Interface) for Diamond, the options set-up system. Together they allow a user 
to easily edit and validate an FLML file (FLuidity Markup Language), a 
format based on the widely used XML format, which is fed to the Fluidity 
programme in order to run a simulation. A “schema” file contains the 
information about what format and structure that XML needs to have in in 
order to be a correct set of options for the particular modelling framework that 
is being used (what settings are dependent on other settings being set in certain 
ways, which settings are mutually exclusive, what is necessary and what 
optional). It also includes meta-data about settings to inform a user what they 
are used for, problems to watch out for, and so on. Spud takes this information 
and creates a user interface that displays all the options as a tree, allowing 
them to be changed via text fields, drop down menus, highlighting settings 
that must be given values, and so on.
Mesh generator – 
e.g. GMesh
One of the main things that is needed to run a simulation is a mesh file. This 
describes the shape of the domain, as well as the way in which the domain is 
to be divided up into a grid. Software like GMesh allows you to generate and 
manipulate these meshes by specifying rules and by manipulating them 
through a visual interface.
Compiler – e.g. 
GFortran
In addition to the set up files, for Fluidity to be run, it is necessary to obtain a 
compiled version of the code. This is an executable binary file that has been 
generated from the source code. Compilers are highly complex pieces of 
software that, via a series of stages, turn source code into something that can 
be executed on a computer. They can be set up in many different ways, 
allowing for different forms of optimisation. You have different compilers for 
different kinds of target platform. For example Fluidity is compiled with 
Gfortran for running on Linux workstations, but is compiled with the Intel 
Fortran compiler for running on the Imperial College cluster.
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Adjoint software – 
e.g. Libadjoint
The adjoint of a differential equation is an alternative formulation that 
rearranges its terms in a way that is useful for certain kinds of problems, 
including certain kinds of optimisation problems. Once those equations have 
been discretised for the computer, this becomes a very complex operation. An 
adjoint system writes key data to disk while a simulation is processed, and 
computes the adjoint afterwards.
Parallelisation 
library – e.g. 
Zoltan
The modelling framework will draw on a variety of libraries. These are 
external software systems with which it interfaces in order to use a variety of 
techniques. For parallelisation, Fluidity uses algorithms from the Zoltan 
library.
Solver library – 
e.g. PETSc
A solver library contains algorithms used to solve the matrices that are 
generated as part of the simulation. Which solvers are used will depend on 
how the model is set up and the properties of the matrices in question.
Debugging tools – 
e.g. gdb
When a simulation goes wrong, which can mean it causes a crash or that it 
produces erroneous results, scientists usually re-run the program, but this often 
requires re-compiling it to make its operation easier to follow. De-bugging 
tools help them to follow the computational process and identify where it is 
getting into trouble, ideally thereby indicating what part of the set-up or source 
code is at fault.
Post-processing 
tools – e.g. 
Paraview
Once the simulation has been run and an output generated, it is necessary to 
look at that output. Only in a small minority of cases is the output data 
meaningful when read directly from the file. Post-processing techniques such 
as visualisation suites convert that data into a visual representation through a 
user interface which presents the user with an array of settings and filters. 
Diagnostic tools similarly convert the data into a more usable form by 
calculating averages, comparisons with other data-sets, and so on. But 
diagnostics are often “hand-coded”, little sections of code written by the 
scientist in an interpretive code like Python, rather than relying on an 
externally developed product.
Operating system – 
e.g. Ubuntu
All simulations are run on computers, which require operating systems to 
manage their hardware. Fluidity, for example, is supported on current versions 
of Ubuntu Linux, but it has also been run successfully on Debian, Red Hat and 
Suse. When run on HECToR, the UK National Supercomputer, it runs on CLE 
(Cray Linux Environment). Each of these has their own characteristics which 
can affect the simulation, and each is regularly updated, producing a stream of 
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new versions which developers and users need to keep up to date with.
Source code 
repository – e.g. 
Bazaar
The source code for a modelling framework is not simply saved on a hard 
disk. It is managed by a software system that records all changes made to it, so 
that particular simulations and bugs that occur in them can be referred to a 
particular version of that code and so that any changes can be dated and traced 
to the developer who made them.
Automated testing 
suite – e.g. 
Buildbot
Other software systems couple with the repository in order to facilitate 
development. One of these is automated testing, which runs a set of tests on 
new versions of the code, in order to identify problems with it. These tests can 
test the code on different hardware set-ups, with different compilers, or can 
test that the functionality within the code is still operational.
Other software – 
e.g. bug tracking 
software, chat 
clients, etc.
Further software facilitates the smooth working of the group. One example is 
bug tracking, which is essentially a database of problems, with associated 
metadata (description, symptoms, which person is responsible, conversations 
about the bug, etc.) and a user interface. Code review systems put new 
sections of code up for review by other scientists. Chat channels and email 
lists facilitate communication. Online wiki software organises a website with 
“how to” guides for the software.
  2.6 Sub-models and coupled models
There is diversity within and among modelling frameworks. The core algorithms of a modelling 
framework like Fluidity give approximate solutions to partial differential equations. This core, 
however, is supplemented by a great many other components. Software libraries have already been 
discussed above. Parameterisations can be regarded as sub-models which provide approximate 
solutions to parts of the system in question that for one reason or another are not resolved by the core 
algorithms. The system needs to be tweaked to compensate for this basic deficit. This is a fact of life 
for most kinds of simulations, but it has also been regarded as a sign of weakness, an admission of 
failure.
“It is (unfortunately) necessary to represent a distinct part, or more usually many distinct 
parts, of the complete system by imprecise or semi-empirical mathematical expressions. 
Worse still is the need to neglect completely many parts of the complete and highly complex 
system. This process of neglect/semi-empirical or imprecise representation is termed 
parameterization”61.
But for most simulationists, parametrisations are inevitable, and such charged language is not 
necessary if they are done well. They are add more approximations on top of the approximations 
61 McGuffie and Henderson-Sellers, A Climate Modelling Primer, 72.
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already generated by the core of the code. They are not necessarily troublesome, but clearly need 
close attention to make sure that they are behaving properly when integrated into a given code.
“Because you discretise things on a grid there are certain things that you can't represent... In 
that jump from the continuous system to the code some things are lost, such as turbulence. If 
it is important, you need to have sub-models [i.e. parameterisations] that represent stuff that 
isn't being explicitly solved for” (NK)
Turbulence parameterisations are a good example, because they are needed in a lot of fluids models. 
They are like little models within the main code which compensate for the effects of the discretised 
simulation being “grainy” at some level, that there are processes going on at smaller levels which 
cannot be explicitly resolved, but whose effects on higher level mixing needs to be factored in.
On a larger scale, bringing different models together is a common tactic for simulating phenomena 
that involve different kinds of processes. Climate models are examples where this has been pushed 
to an extreme, with oceans, ice, atmosphere, ecological models, etc., all coupled together. AMCG 
has long been at the forefront of fluids/radiation coupling. The geophysical applications of Fluidity 
are also being extended in collaboration with the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge, 
coupling the ocean model with their ice shelf model. Processes of modelling can thus involve the 
combination of several models in interaction and nested within each other.
  2.7 History of the Applied Modelling and Computation Group
Having sketched an outline of computational science, we turn now to introduce in detail the group 
that has been the focus of my research. The Applied Modelling Group at Imperial College has been 
around since the 1960s. Its early story is best told by GT, who was the director of the group for many 
years, before retiring from the job in the early 2000s to become a part-time senior investigator. At 
this point CK took over as director.
“The group began as part of a nuclear power section in the Mechanical Engineering 
department back in the 1960s. But the critical point was [in the late 1980s] when two people 
came together who had general applications interests in two complementary areas, both 
using the same underlying mathematical tools, and that was the particular felicitous thing 
that happened. These were CK and he was preceded by a guy called CW. They were both 
enthusiasts for this finite element method, which was really a structural modelling tool 
developed from fairly empirical roots by civil engineers, for designing bridges and things 
like that, with an emphasis on models which conform to the structure, and putting that first 
and foremost in the approach. It turned out that here we had CW with an interest in applying 
this to nuclear radiation... and CK who was a bit of a pioneer in applying it to fluids 
modelling. At the time it wasn't really accepted generally for modelling fluids; other 
techniques called finite difference models were much more generally employed.” (GT)
The group was still very small at this point: around a dozen researchers. One of the most significant 
events for its future path was its movement between different departments during the 1990s. The 
- 34 -
- Doing Science With Simulations -
group's journey was driven by wider trends favouring different disciplinary areas, from a significant 
decrease in funding for nuclear power research, to the changing fortunes of environmental science.
“The group started in explicit nuclear power... In the early 90s it was clear that nuclear was 
quite out of favour [with funding bodies]. So with the help of the then deputy rector we 
engineered a move of the group from Mechanical Engineering to the Centre for 
Environmental Technology as it was called at the time. This was in the early '90s. Then that 
led us to be incorporated into a new environmental department called the T. H. Huxley 
School of the Environment...” (GT)
“Then things happened and that collapsed completely... and we decided to attach ourselves 
to [Earth Science and Engineering] so we could continue our diversification and bring 
application of nuclear modelling tools to environmental subjects... We managed fortunately 
to attach ourselves to it because we helped to get a 5* RAE rating for the department almost 
straight away. And the pure environmental department [the T. H. Huxley School] was 
actually dismantled by the college and the residue is the Centre for Environmental Policy 
which still exists: the residue of a difficult time when the pure environmental work had to be 
downsized from a departmental scale to a centre scale.” (GT)
“So what started out as a nuclear power section in mechanical engineering and decided it 
would call itself AMCG, and followed this “wandering tribe” path from mech. eng. to the 
Centre for Environmental Technology to the T. H. Huxley School to Earth Science and 
Engineering; that was quite fortunate for AMCG. We ended up with the best of all worlds in 
a department with the explicitly earth science part of the college's environment interests.” 
(GT)
While all this structural change was shifting the disciplinary coordinates of AMCG's research, a 
major research project was being formulated that was eventually lead to a massive expansion in the 
population of the group towards its current situation, with 58 full time staff, and 36 affiliates 
working from other departments at Imperial College or at other universities.
“Towards the end of our stay in mech. eng., CW and CK and I met the only oceanographer 
in Imperial College, at least the only numerical oceanographer, who worked in the 
mathematics department. He is now dead: an enormous tragedy. And NK was to be his 
chosen protégé. He was diabetic and suffered a diabetic collapse at a conference in France. 
He was very young. His legacy was a wonderful joint proposal with CK, CY and myself 
aiming to support NK as a postdoc... and this was awarded just before he died but before it 
actually started... We all met around about 1990 in the quadrangle out there and talked about 
making a finite element model of the world. That illustrates really the role of the chance in 
all this, the element of chance in including people of complementary abilities... We had a bit 
of trouble with the research council because we had lost the principle investigator but we 
managed to convince them that if I was the nominal PI we would get an eminent advisory 
committee together, of people from Southampton, Reading and Liverpool to oversee the 
project.” (GT)
From this initial foundation, the group gradually increased in size as more grants were won in order 
to further develop the ocean model.
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“It all has been built up from scratch, to a large extent due to CK's ferocious dedication, at 
that time working 24/7 really to create the ocean model, which we then called ICOM 
[Imperial College Ocean Model] and which has been patiently ramped up through various 
NERC [Natural Environment Research Council] grants and getting people like NK and TT 
and others involved, to consolidate the whole thing and get it well established.” (GT)
Chapter 8, 'Workability and Habitability' will return to this story at the end of the thesis, showing 
how this big project unfolded and the new pressures it put on the group. Note that “ICOM” is 
another name for Fluidity, which is also sometimes called Fluidity-ICOM. The reason for this 
plurality is simply that it is unconventional for a code to be used for both small scale and large scale 
fluids processes. The ICOM brand was created in order to better promote the large scale work that 
the group was doing. 
The major codes developed at AMCG are:
Fluidity/ICOM/Fluidity-ICOM: Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)/Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
(GFD)
EVENT: Radiation Transport (an older formulation of the transport equations)
RADIANT: Radiation Transport (a newer formulation of the transport equations)
FETCH: Coupling code linking EVENT with an older version of Fluidity to solve coupled 
fluids/radiation problems
FETCH 2: New coupling code linking RADIANT with the current version of Fluidity to solve 
coupled fluids/radiation problems
iSALE: Multi-material impact modelling code
  2.8 Interdisciplinarity
Some writers have claimed that rather than treat this kind of science as interdisciplinary in the 
conventional sense, a more radical term, “transdisciplinarity” is required62. At AMCG, research is 
transdisciplinary where not only the techniques, but also the problems themselves, exist outside 
conventional disciplinary frameworks. But it is important not to get carried away. While 
transdisciplinarity reveals one face of research, a great deal of computational science remains 
interdisciplinary, putting computers to work in order to study problems that can be traced to 
conventional disciplines: oceanography, engineering, or physics, for example. But even if these 
problems have a history that stretches back beyond the introduction of computational techniques, the 
way that computational scientists tackle them has a distinctive character which is stamped upon the 
future evolution of these problems as objects of scientific concern. 
62 Gibbons et al., The New Production of Knowledge.
- 36 -
- Doing Science With Simulations -
“I did hear him [NA – a professor from a traditional geology background] say once that it 
was a kind of revelation to him how people [in computational science] thought... people like 
AF, people like CK, TT: the way they approach problems, working in a synthesis including 
the mathematical, numerical and application sides.” (GT)
What GT highlights is the mixture of disciplines in the work of computational scientists, something 
that is largely social rather than just being an attribute of single individuals; it gives the group its 
distinctive style of research. People from very different backgrounds bring their different 
competencies to bear on problems studied through simulations. This diversity exists not just because 
the group recruits from a diverse range of disciplinary areas, but because the work is necessarily 
interdisciplinary. It is necessary to bring together mathematicians and computer scientists with 
applications specialists such as oceanographers and geologists. While each consequently learns a lot 
from the other, there is no expectation that the difference will be overcome. No computational 
science generalists exist. Everyone is specialised in complementary ways. But it can be hard to learn 
to interact with people from such different backgrounds. KT, an oceanographer, explains his entry 
into the group:
“I got involved in this because I was interested in a problem and I thought that the model 
could be used to solve this problem. So I started talking to CK and NK and through a series 
of conversations we eventually learned to speak each others' language. I think it is like an 
artillery range: you are firing shells and it was about three of four meetings before we finally 
started having good conversations. We discussed a project, which got funded, and while we 
were doing that we had an MSci student who did the proof of concept and we got that 
published. CK asked me to get involved with the consortium proposal and eventually I got 
heavily involved in the group, because I can find out an awful lot about the oceans from this 
computational approach.” (KT)
It was interesting to see that almost all my informants tended to affiliate themselves with their 
original discipline from their undergraduate years, even if they had spent many years since then 
working in this field. “Computational scientist” is not a label as easily adopted as “I am a geologist 
who works in computational science” or “I am a mathematician who works in computational 
science”. The reason for this is probably simply that there are many different kinds of scientists 
working together in computational science, so saying you are a computational scientist doesn't 
clarify what kind of work you actually do nearly so much as referring to your background in your 
original discipline.
AMCG involves a mixture of mathematicians, engineers, computer scientists, physicists, geologists 
and oceanographers. By far the biggest group are the mathematicians, who at any one time account 
for between a third and a half of the group. Computer science and physics are less well represented 
than one might expect, with more applications specialists coming from the applied physical sciences 
(geology, oceanography, engineering), and most developers having a mathematics background. 
Fewer than half of new arrivals have programming experience before joining the group, and those 
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that have worked with software have generally worked with much smaller scale systems than 
Fluidity or RADIANT. Once scientists have been there a while, they tend to line up on one side of 
the principle divide, between those who consider themselves programmers and those who don't.
“I think of myself as a programmer and a scientist, and a mathematician. You can't separate 
them. They are all interrelated. I am a very specialised, very educated kind of programmer. 
But if you ask UU or CK are they programmers, they will say “no”: they don't know how to 
program. They happen to program in the course of their duties but they don't do it “right” 
and that is a big divide” (KU)
“I try and attend all the development meetings, but I also try and keep up to date with the 
earth and planets side of things. That is really where my research lies but I know I can't 
really do that without the tools, so I am kind of stuck in between two worlds” (IW)
The interface of different disciplines is an extremely productive location, something that is 
recognised by philosophers who are sceptical that science is a meaningfully unified enterprise. Both 
Galison and Hacking stress that disunity is not a problem for science. It does not undermine its 
efficacy. Quite on the contrary, “it is precisely the disunification of science that brings strength and 
stability”63. “It is precisely the disunity of science that allows us to observe (deploying one massive 
batch of theoretical assumptions) another aspect of nature (about which we have an unconnected 
bunch of ideas)”64. This is also something Rheinberger has stressed: “To bring alternative spaces of 
representation into existence is what scientific activity is about, and this is why the question of 
reality as an attribute of alternative representations, and the question of representation as an attribute 
of its alternative uses, will continue to stay at the centre stage of the scientific enterprise”65. 
The articulation of relatively independent bodies of knowledge, practice and skill can be very 
productive. A research group such as AMCG thrives on such a difference. It draws together scientists 
of radically different persuasions, who have very different backgrounds and who publish in entirely 
different fields. But in the actual time of research, prior to their publications, they work very closely 
together. The articulation of different fields is not limited to linguistic exchange (as in Galison's 
trading zones66), but is also achieved through the techniques and things they have in common, what 
Star and Griesemer named “boundary objects”67. The objects of study, but also the models and 
modelling technologies, are hinges between the different orientations of the community.
  2.9 The finite element method (FEM)
AMCG is distinctive for its specialism in the finite element method (FEM). This is a method for the 
approximate numerical solution of partial differential equations. It is the method used by both 
Fluidity and RADIANT. The spatial domain is divided into a mesh, usually of triangles (if two-
63 Galison, Image and Logic, 781.
64 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 183.
65 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 113.
66 Galison, ‘Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone’.
67 Star and Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology’.
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dimensional) or tetrahedra (if three-dimensional). The solution to the equations is represented by a 
series of “basis functions” on this mesh. Although the mesh divides the domain into discrete units, 
these basis functions provide a variety of ways to represent (for each variable) what is going on 
between the vertices. It may be represented by linear, quadratic, or higher order polynomials. Which 
is chosen will depend on the application. The solution is commonly represented by “continuous” 
basis functions, which means that neighbouring functions have the same value at the vertex they 
have in common. But for some cases, particularly those in which large changes in a variable occur 
below the scale of the mesh, it is preferable to use “discontinuous” basis functions, in which the 
solution is not forced to “join up” when approached from different sides of a vertex.
The difference between numerical methods is something that can be studied on a fundamental 
mathematical level. All I can deal with here is a more heuristic level of understanding. The main 
rival to the finite element method for geophysical problems is the finite difference method, which is 
well known because it is currently used in the majority of climate models. A rough and ready 
distinction between the two can be expressed in terms of the approximations they make. Finite 
difference decomposes the partial differential equations into a set of difference equations, thus 
primarily working from an approximation of the equations to be solved, and working through to a 
solution. Finite element, in contrast, starts by approximating the solution to the equations, setting up 
a “solution space” by positing a mesh of basis functions with a given number of degrees of freedom, 
and algorithmically searching within this space for the best approximation. 
On the other hand, it is common to hear finite element enthusiasts point out that, mathematically 
speaking, finite difference is equivalent to a sub-set of finite element discretisations. Any finite 
difference model could theoretically be rewritten as a finite element one, while the inverse 
translation is not always possible. Mathematical differences and relations aside, the difference 
between the two methods is usually immediately obvious because finite element models tend to 
utilise triangular or tetrahedral meshes, whereas finite difference requires square or quadrahedral (or 
higher).
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The use of tetrahedral meshes is particularly good for representing complex topography, where the 
mesh is unstructured. Triangles/tetrahedra can be arranged in all sorts of complex patterns to 
represent the domain, as well as adapting to represent the complexities of the solution within that 
domain. “The underlying principles of Fluidity is that we use an unstructured mesh that can 
represent things like coastlines and bathymetry better than squares – which is intuitively obvious – 
and that gives you a better answer” (QS). 
Figure 2: Excerpt from poster about the functionality of the Fluidity code
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One of the other advantages of the finite element method is that it is amenable to being used with 
adaptive meshes. These meshes evolve as the simulation runs, using predefined rules to concentrate 
resolution where it is needed. This means that areas in which complex phenomena are being resolved 
get more elements and thus more computer resources, whereas less interesting areas of the 
simulation can be represented by coarse, large elements. The ability of adaptivity to make 
simulations efficient goes some way toward compensating for the complexity of FEM. “Fluidity,” 
says QS, “has the advantage of speed because of adaptivity but the downside is that because we are 
using finite element that is inherently slower than finite difference that most other models use. So we 
are already a factor of ten-ish slower for the same resolution”. Part of the overall mission of the 
group is to demonstrate that this trade-off is worthwhile.
The combination of unstructured and adaptive meshes allows resolution of small-scale phenomena 
within a domain, such as gyres within an ocean, which are very important oceanographic 
phenomena, areas of powerful upwards and downwards mixing which are extremely small compared 
with the ocean as a whole. It is hard to say where these phenomena will emerge so it is extremely 
helpful to have a computational system that can automatically concentrate resolution when and 
where such phenomena appear.
Figure 3: Excerpt from poster displaying functionality of Fluidity
Many of the same kinds of advances that have made Fluidity a significant code have also been 
worked into the radiation transport codes developed at AMCG, which are also implementations of 
the finite element method. RADIANT also has adaptive unstructured meshes, but it is a much 
younger code developed by a smaller group. The older code EVENT, which RADIANT is to replace, 
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is no longer under active development and as such is no longer a focus point for these researchers' 
enthusiasms for the future.
  2.10 A multiplicity of simulations
I now give a preliminary account of how simulations get made and run. We will return to this 
question throughout the thesis, but it is important to give an initial sketch so that the relationship 
between modelling frameworks and simulations is made very clear.
One of the first things to note is that a simulation on its own is wholly out of place. NK, introducing 
Fluidity to new users at the 2011 training event, said: “Remember that a single simulation on its own 
is almost certainly useless”. Simulation is always multiple in scientific practice. There are several 
axes along which simulations multiply. 
Firstly, a set of simulations is usually run under different initial conditions to explore the behaviour 
of the system that is modelled in different circumstances, to build up a picture of its behaviour in 
terms of a set of possible scenarios. For example, in industrial coolant pipe engineering, the 
temperature of the fluid might be changed, the velocity of the fluid, and the amount of drag on the 
pipes' walls.
A second set of simulations is generated by a variation in the properties of the model that do not 
correspond to any empirical reality of the target system. There is no analogy in these cases to the 
variation in initial conditions of an experimental set-up. For example, the error metric used in order 
to specify the rules for adaptivity might be modified, or the rate at which adaptivity is to be applied, 
or a maximum or minimum limit imposed on how fine or coarse the mesh can get. The exploration 
of these sets of simulations tells the scientist something about the behaviour of parts of the modelling 
framework, about how sensitive its results are to the specifics of its set-up. The most common set of 
simulations in this respect is generated by varying the number of elements in the simulation, to see 
how coarse it can get, and thus how fast the computer can process the simulation, while maintaining 
the desired degree of accuracy.
Further sets of simulations are generated by the process of building the software and generating the 
model set-up. Scientists rarely dive straight in to complex problems, but seek a route through 
simpler, often idealised or experimental-scale problems in order to find the settings that they are 
confident with. Where new bits of software are being developed in order to create the new 
simulation, this process is even more important, in order to test out the new components in a range of 
well-studied cases before applying them to new problems. This trajectory will be fleshed out in more 
detail with a case study in chapter 4, 'Reason in Practice'.
On a small scale, multiple simulations are generated by the kind of “tinkering” that software 
developers routinely engage in as they try things out, gain confidence with them, and move on to put 
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their software to work in ever new ways. While we need not subscribe to her views of simulations as 
mathematical models, Dowling eloquently writes about this “hands on” aspect of working with 
simulations. “A sense of direct manipulation encourages simulators to develop a "feel" for their 
mathematical models with their hands and their eyes, by tinkering with them, noticing how they 
behave, and developing a practical intuition for how they work”68. The key thing here is the forwards 
path forged by processes of generating and manipulating simulations. In Sismondo's view, “[m]odels 
become a form of glue, simultaneously epistemic and social, that allows inquiry to go forward...”69.
But more than simply being a feature of individual research projects, the whole enterprise of 
building a modelling framework, and doing research with it, is one of many steps paving the way for 
further studies. Not only do individual research projects take an iterative approach to developing 
software and exploring possibility spaces. So too does the research of the group as a whole, insofar 
as it is bound to the iterative development of software, and the iterative validation of that software's 
functionality.
“Problems are like stepping stones or rungs in a ladder. You really can't sit with a group of 
people for ten years and work out an ocean model and then apply it. You need to apply it all 
the way along with different problems” (HP)
Funding tends to be tied to smaller projects, so these piece by piece add up to a larger trajectory of 
model development. “There is [in AMCG] a model developmental strategy in that there are some 
things that can't be done until other things are done, so there are some things that have to be done in 
order. And then there are other things that can just be done whenever the money is available” (KA). 
While some extensions can be added whenever there is funding, the more complex applications can 
only be funded if many necessary components of their realisation are already in place, studied and 
tested, serving as proofs of concept for future extensions.
In 2010 the group was commissioned by an oil company to build a simulation of a particular oil 
reservoir they were interested in. They had some flexibility in how they went about it. The oil 
reservoir simulation would require “multiphase” capabilities, the interaction of different fluids; for 
example, the interaction of the oil with gasses, and of the interaction of fractions of oil with different 
densities. This multiphase functionality had been designed and planned. It had actually been part of 
the older version of Fluidity, but had been dropped during the early 2000s when the group instigated 
a major rewrite (see chapter 8, 'Workability and Habitability'). When this project was won, senior 
staff met to discuss the idea of using it as an opportunity to finally integrate multiphase capabilities 
back into the main Fluidity code. Not only would this functionality then be usable by a much wider 
range of users, it would also be integrated with the cutting edge element types, solvers and 
parallelisation routines. 
68 Dowling, ‘Experimenting on Theories’, 269.
69 Sismondo, ‘Models, Simulations, and Their Objects’, 258.
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“We had been talking about this for ages. It is something CK is obsessed with, for years even 
before I arrived... So we talked about this for a long time, and several parts of the group had 
been working on different bits of the grand scenario for doing the project: the new DG 
[discontinuous Galerkin] formulation WS works on, the new element types he and CE work 
on, the new discretisation formulations that I have been working on for some time... Then 
when we had this green light, money for one project that we weren't expecting. We all sat 
down and planned out how it would go.” (QT)
Because research is funded by these small to medium sized projects, the larger vision for the group 
and for the technologies they create has to be created and maintained out of smaller building blocks. 
The multiphase capability could have been tacked on just for this project, but in using the space of 
this research to achieve full integration, the way is paved for future projects that will rely on it to 
expand the framework in still further directions.
A final aspect of the iterativity of simulating is pedagogical. It is these processes of multiplying 
simulations along a temporal axis that gives simulationists their practical knowledge of their 
software and of the systems that its simulations represent. Building simulations from smaller 
component parts is regarded as an epistemological good in itself.
“If we included everything we would learn nothing. You have got to build it up or else you 
really don't know what is controlling what: what the model is doing. What you really don't 
want to do is chuck a whole load of parameters in, get a result, and say “look this is the 
result” - you want to be able to say “this is the result because...”” (IW)
From the point of view of science in practice, we must take IW's remark not just as recognition of 
the role of multiple simulations in justifying claims that can be made about them, but also as an 
expression of the way in which repetition and multiplication establish the kinds of sensitivities 
through which scientists learn to work, through which they learn their trade and through which they 
end up making any such linguistic claim in the first place (we return to these ideas in chapter 6).
  2.11 Visualisation and diagnostics
Visualisations, graphs and diagnostic variables are the key modes in which scientists are able to 
encounter the data they generate in a form which is amenable to manipulation. They are the ways in 
which scientists encounter their simulation, the way in which they are confronted with their own 
practices. Chapter 6, 'Images in/of Simulation' will address these themes in much greater depth. This 
section merely points to the absence of direct encounter with an original “output” of a simulation, in 
order to press home the point that no simulation is encountered outside of wider systems of practice.
“In doing the work I have to take the big data file and reduce it to something that means 
something. You can't just look at a picture of a flow field and know whether what you have 
got is what you want. If it is a pipe there are obvious things [to look at] like the velocity 
profile across the pipe. Or with turbulent flows you can do various statistical measures to 
find out if you have a statistically steady flow and what fluctuation there is about that. Then 
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there is my favourite test which I have been working on for about a year now – the backward 
facing step – the flow leaving the edge of something and reattaching to the surface 
downstream. So you measure the distance from the step to the reattachment and that is a 
well measured, well reported number in the literature and you can say if it is longer or 
shorter you can say what that means” (QY)
Simulations do not have a simple and unambiguous output. Computational processes do not write to 
disk every step they take. There is no record of the computation outside of the results of specific 
instructions to write data to disk at certain points in the process. These are already determined by the 
scientist according to what kind of reduction of that data (visual, numerical) is going to be 
appropriate. You might need different data outputs depending on whether you are wanting to 
generate a rich graphic of the whole domain, or a statistical measure of a certain part of it. Which of 
these is appropriate depends on the application, with many outputs in published literature being 
driven by precedent: you create a graph analogous to one in a previous paper to facilitate easy 
comparison of your results. Graphs in general are considered a reliable way of seeing key 
mathematical relationships such as convergence.
“If I say I have a graph for error on this axis and number of elements on this side then you 
think it should go in that direction, and if it does, you are fine, and if it doesn't then you 
know its wrong. So a simple graph is often much more intuitive to understand than some 
much more complex beast. Like when someone has tried to cram everything onto one graph 
and you just can't interpret it; it is just impossible” (QS)
It is important to give proper emphasis to these post-processing stages. There is no raw form of 
encounter between scientist and simulation. The closest they tend to come is during some debugging 
processes and in some analytical projects when they write to disk the maximum data from every step 
of the simulation: every variable, at every time step, for every point on the mesh. But this is rare 
because it tends to be enormously expensive in terms of disk space, limits processing speed by 
constant writing to disk, and because for most purposes such a vast data-set is too unwieldy to be 
useful. Most simulations will never be encountered like this. They will be encountered through 
translations of data into other forms, which themselves will have been written into the model set-up 
from the start.
  2.12 Verification and validation
Verification and validation is one of the core topics in the theory of numerical simulation. In essence, 
they are the operations that are supposed to demonstrate that the simulation is a good representation 
of the mathematical equations (verification) and the target system (validation). They are often treated 
together, but it is worth pointing out that there are differences of meaning in how the terms are 
applied in practice. There are three distinctive kinds of verification, and two ways of treating 
validation. I go through each in turn.
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The first sense of verification is a mathematical activity which is carried out on paper, with no 
computers involved. At AMCG there is a handful of mathematicians whose research revolves around 
the development of numerical methods and the study of their properties. For the finite element 
method, this is often a matter of developing new element types to solve partial differential equations, 
which themselves are often reformulated or simplified for this purpose. It is possible to prove 
various results solely “on paper”, about the relationship between the continuous mathematical 
system and the discretisation you have come up with. We will see one such paper proof in chapter 9. 
These proofs are always partial with respect to any actual simulation because there is a lot more 
input required to implement that discretisation in code, which might also influence the goodness of 
the solution. There is no straightforward equivalence between what we could call the “mathematical 
model” and the computational system used by simulationists70. But by addressing the question of the 
basic methods at the heart of the software this kind of verification exercise represents a first step 
towards assuring that the simulation itself is doing what it is supposed to be doing.
The second sense of verification is the one more familiar to computer scientists, but which actually 
gets very little mention among computational scientists. Here verification is the question of whether 
the software that has been written really encodes what it is supposed to encode (or whether there are 
errors in its implementation). In this case verification is a question of the relationship between some 
specification for the program, and source code, and it is a general issue for software development, 
rather than anything specific to scientific software or simulation. My informants rarely concerned 
themselves with this side of verification because they do not work to specification. They simply do 
not have one side of the relation. While the broad outlines of projects are agreed in advance, the vast 
majority of the details of implementation are worked out during the process of coding, and are never 
separated from that process such that a comprehensive description of the software could be obtained. 
The user guide is more about how to use the software and its descriptions of the actual processes are 
schematic. There is thus no statement of the software's function that is remotely detailed enough to 
be compared against the source code. So computational scientists tend to turn to the third sense of 
verification in order to check their code.
The third sense of verification is the comparison of the simulation output with mathematical results. 
This is only possible where what is being modelled is a mathematical function with a known analytic 
solution. In the process of developing a model, therefore, it is standard practice to set up a simulation 
to solve mathematical equations with known analytic solutions. In one sense these checks are very 
strong because there is very high confidence in the mathematical data the simulation output is 
compared to. In HU's words, “the best thing you can have is an analytical solution”. But in another 
sense it is weak because in something like fluid dynamics you have to model a highly idealised 
system in order for there to exist a known analytic solution against which to compare. So verification 
only applies to a very special sub-set of systems you might want to model.
70 This point has been argued by Gramelsberger, ‘What Do Numerical (Climate) Models Really Represent?’.
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Some philosophers have taken all verification to be a mathematical operation, a matter of “purely 
mathematical problems, which, as such, have to be solved at a formal level”71 and it is easy to see 
that this territory is that of the first and possibly also second senses of verification. But there is an 
empirical side to the third sense of verification which is quite distinct from its purely formal 
dimensions. The first sense compares with the mathematical theory of the equations to be solved, the 
second sense with the specification. But in actually building software, a lot of additional input is 
required, drawn from a variety of sources. In contrast with the first two, the third sense requires real 
working code, and the actual running of a simulation. Once the software is operational, it is not so 
easy to conceptualise it as a formal structure on analogy with theory or specification. This dimension 
has been well emphasised by Eric Winsberg:
“While these models generally incorporate a great deal of the theory or theories with which 
they are connected, they are usually fashioned by appeal to, or inspiration from, and with the 
use of material from, an astonishingly large range of sources: empirical data, mechanical 
models, calculational techniques (from the exact to the outrageously inexact), metaphor, and 
intuition. In the end, the model that is used to run the simulation is an offspring of the theory, 
but it is a mongrel offspring. It is also substantially shaped by the exigencies of practical 
computational limitations and by information from a wide range of other sources”72.
When TT describes verification as a “test that your software does exactly what your PDEs do”, the 
term “test” is well advised. It is a test of the software, of the equipment. Some of the raw material for 
this test comes from formal mathematical proofs of the answer to the case to be compared with. But 
the testing itself is about finding out about what it is that has been made when the scientists have 
built their code. In this sense, HU suggested this third sense of validation could be called “analytical 
validation” rather than verification. 
We turn now to validation. Validation involves using statistical measures of fit between simulation 
output data and empirical data to build confidence that the simulation is correct, or at least that no 
major errors are affecting results. 
“When we started doing this work... there was not much in terms of applications and 
validation. There were lots of numerical proofs but there wasn't so much in the way of real 
world validation. It was never stated in this way but I took it as being part of the bargain that 
if those guys help me to do my science then I would make sure that my science helps them 
as validation” (KA)
“There are different types of validation – the best is where someone has done an experiment 
and tells people what the experiment involved but you don't tell them what the result is, and 
then they go away and run their models and come back with their results and you compare 
them – in some fields that might work depending on how simple the model is and how many 
numerical stability or numerical accuracy knobs you have in your model.” (TX)
71 Frigg and Reiss, ‘The Philosophy of Simulation’, 602.
72 Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, 30–31.
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One of the fundamental tensions in validation is captured in this statement by TX. In his view, the 
data against which the simulation output is to be compared should ideally be completely cut off from 
it until the very last moment. That data is a precious resource, and must be kept separate to get the 
maximum validation. Randall and Wielicki, both atmospheric physicists, complained for this reason 
about “tuning” and “calibration” of simulations, which in their eyes “artificially prevents a model 
from producing a bad result”73. They are critical of attempts to adjust a model that is producing a 
wrong result, so that it will produce a correct one. But in many cases the current state of knowledge 
about the thing to be modelled is not nearly exhaustive enough for a scientist to be able to build a 
working model without going through an iterative process of testing, comparison, tweaking and 
indeed calibration. And those cases where such exhaustive knowledge is available are rarely the ones 
generating the most scientific interest. What Randall and Wielicki point out is an overstatement, but 
it is quite true that where processes of calibration have been part of a simulation's genesis, stronger 
justification is needed, a stronger collection of validation and verification results74. The question is 
not merely whether the simulation is producing the right results, but rather whether it produces the 
right results for the right reasons. This is where it is important to distinguish between two different 
meanings of validation.
The first sense of validation is the validation of a simulation, which is direct, holistic and specific to 
that simulation. This is the straightforward, more intuitive use of the term: what is validated is the 
simulation. On the other hand, what scientists are usually interested in when they do validation is not 
just that simulation, but rather the modelling framework that has been used to build it. This is 
indirect and partial validation. Two simulations built with the same framework may use different 
parts of its functionality and what functionality they do have in common is likely to be stressed in 
different ways in each case. So the validation of the modelling framework is indirect, operating 
through the intermediaries of the various simulations that are generated using it. It is partial because 
each validation only tests part of the framework, and does so in its own way. And it is piecemeal, 
built up from many different overlapping validation projects that all add up to different levels of 
confidence in the different aspects of the framework. Some are common to many projects, and thus 
will have been thoroughly tested many times. Others may only recently have been developed, and 
have only been deployed in one or two projects. “It is a cumulative process of validation,” says IW. 
“You can increase your confidence in your results and your confidence will increase over time as 
you try different things and validate different aspects.”
73 Randall and Wielicki, ‘Measurements, Models, and Hypotheses’, 404; see also Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 14, 20–21 
for a more positive spin put on the metaphor of tuning.
74 Data that could be used for validation is also a precious resource for building the simulation in the first place. In cases where the 
phenomena being modelled are not thoroughly understood, the builders need all the resources they can get their hands on. But 
this creates a potential problem for validation. A colleague of TX's, PH, accepted that it would be better if data was hidden until 
the last minute, but it is not practical in the nuclear engineering community, where information about the systems in question is 
often quite scarce. As a half measure, some scientists partition their data, such that half is used in order to build the simulation, 
and half are left unseen to be compared with for validation once things are up and running.
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“The validation stage is quite a critical stage I believe for Fluidity-ICOM. If I publish this 
validation, and SS has published her validation, you can say that “Fluidity-ICOM can do 
this”. And they are necessary steps in the development of a model, because from this, from 
flow past a cylinder [a key test case], people can say “MA did this, so I can then do a more 
complex model with the wind and temperature and so on”.” (MA)
The wider sense of validation is not directed towards particular simulations, but rather towards the 
parts of the software framework and the various techniques embodied in it. For Fluidity, validating 
its adaptivity algorithms was a key outcome of the lock-exchange project (discussed at some length 
in chapter 6, 'Images in/of Simulation'). Just as modelling frameworks are loose assemblages of 
techniques, put to work in different combinations for different problems, and tested to different 
degrees by different problems, validation and verification in general is a matter of bringing a loose 
assemblage of successes to bear on the future reliability of that system. This is something Winsberg 
expressed eloquently:
“Whenever these techniques and assumptions are employed successfully – that is, whenever 
they produce results that fit well into the web of our previously accepted data, our 
observations, the results of our paper-and-pencil analyses, and our physical intuitions; 
whenever they make successful predictions or produce engineering accomplishments – their 
credibility as reliable techniques or reasonable assumptions grows. This is what I meant 
when I said that these techniques have their own life; they carry with them their own history 
of prior successes and accomplishments, and, when properly used, they can bring to the 
table independent warrant for belief in the models they are used to build”75.
In this quote we can see the piecemeal picture of validation extended even further. Further to all 
these different validations, there are many different sources of legitimacy, which are drawn together 
around a modelling framework and attach to the elements within it. These range from predictive 
successes, to mathematical proofs, to the reputation of the community that built it. We will encounter 
many factors, through the argument that follows, that have a bearing on the legitimacy of modelling 
frameworks, and it is important to recognise that these do not add up to a single homogeneous 
whole, but rather a miscellaneous assemblage of different sources of justification.
The final point to make in this section is about benchmarking because that has a slightly ambiguous 
status.
“I have... been working with people across the globe to run all our codes for the same 
problem and see if we all converge towards the same solution: a kind of community 
benchmarking” (IW)
While validation and verification confront the simulation with mathematical results and empirical 
data, benchmarking uses these encounters in order to bring a modelling framework into articulation 
with other computer models. These usually involve comparing their respective verifications or 
validations. There are many different ways of doing benchmarking, from attempting to reproduce a 
75 Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, 122.
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result that another group has already published, to a combined project in which several groups 
attempt to simulate the same experiment at the same time, with the experimental results revealed 
only when their various simulations have been run. Benchmarking is in these cases is a question of 
validation, but what matters is the co-ordination of the validation of different simulations and 
modelling frameworks so that they can be compared.
  2.13 Beyond verification and validation
In an influential critique, Oreskes et al. showed that no verification and validation could be 
complete, against the truth-implying connotations of the terms76. But rather than take this to 
undermine the legitimacy of simulations, we should take it as inspiration to look instead at the 
dynamic of simulation practice, in which we can see validation as an ongoing, partial, and piecemeal 
process, one which strives to move beyond its domain, and makes chancy moves out into what 
cannot be validated.
“If you are talking about a really complex system then it is more important just to validate 
each one of the separate components, make sure they match up with what you know 
experimentally. Then you can go on from there and do something much more complicated. 
Typically your ambition there is to go beyond what could possibly be done by experiment” 
(TT).
All validation and verification is limited because it only compares to specific cases, and these are 
often not the ones that my informants tended to most want to find out about. There is a generalising 
inference, or as HU puts it below, a “hope”, that as successful validations are accumulated, grounds 
are established for more confidence that simulations can carry some of this legitimacy with them 
into the domain of problems that are not so easily tested.
“I run several simulations and I check whether the solution converges to the analytical 
solution – so if somebody decreased the level to an infinitely small number then eventually 
you would get the right answer. You can't show that this is therefore valid for all domains; 
you only show that for that specific example it converges. One hopes that it implies 
something more for other domains” (HU)
This “hope” is the bread and butter of computer modelling; the straightforwardly validated cases are 
those that have experimental analogues, and are thus already amenable to experimental study. It is in 
pressing beyond these that simulation goes further than experiment. But even while simulationists 
push beyond what can be validated, there is a creative requirement to think of analogous cases that 
can provide the best route to take you out into the unknown.
I always get my PhD students to try and think of a scaled down version of their projects that 
can be or has been produced in the lab. For example I had a student who was looking at how 
much heating you get when two asteroids bang together. You can't do this in the lab. But 
what you can do is take a powder and whack it with a lump of metal, and you can work out 
76 Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette, and Belitz, ‘Verification, Validation, and Confirmation’.
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how fast you need to whack the powder in order to melt the powder. So I got my student to 
try to reproduce that experiment. (TX)
Having validated based on an experiment in which powders were melted by a projectile, a “rung in 
the ladder” is established, in the words of HP, one which validates the key aspects of the model that 
will be stressed in the asteroid simulation. Quite what indirect validation is appropriate for a given 
case is an important question. In a recent project of KA's, he makes the claim that validation for 
simulation of ancient oceans is better done by running another simulation of the present oceans 
because while there is lots of empirical data about the ancient seas in the study of rock formations, 
there are aspects of oceanography that will not be reflected in the sediments at the bottom of the 
ocean. “We are arguing that if you look at the rocks you can't validate because the rocks aren't telling 
you what the water body was like” (KA).
“I would say that the way to validate for an [ancient] ocean problem is that you validate in 
the modern, which I think is the most important... so I am not too worried that we can't 
validate in the ancient... That is the point of using a model; sometimes the model should be 
telling you things that the rocks can't” (KA) 
Simulation science moves out on a limb, bringing with itself a collage of different kinds of supports. 
It is not an exact science, but a practical endeavour, developing its techniques in a variety of 
domains, hoping they hang together, and taking its chances. 
  2.14 Applied modelling and the science of method
“Everybody is always looking for new methods because that new method gives you a new 
insight – there is this whole class of problems that they can't get at because they haven't had 
the device” (KA)
The final feature of scientific practice in a simulation laboratory that I want to treat in this 
introduction is the divide between two orientations of research: towards applications and towards 
methods. When I talk about applications, I mean studies of empirical or ideal problems (for example, 
ocean problems, or cases like flow past a cylinder, backwards-facing step, and many others we will 
encounter). When I talk about methods, I mean studies of the techniques used in making simulations, 
which are also often studied through running simulations.
“It is a classic chicken and egg situation with the mathematical/numerical/computational 
methods and applications: which drives which. There is obviously a lot of intellectual 
curiosity about things at each of these levels because the basic mathematical algorithms have 
their potential originality: the computational numerical methods integration with parallel 
computers, they have their originality. The applications have their own highly original 
elements as well. The nature of academics is such that if they have the ability there will be 
the drive to exploit them.” (GT)
Applications and methods are interdependent, methods being tested out by being applied, 
applications being realised through the trying and testing of methods. The shifting of techniques 
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from being objects of analysis to being tools to be deployed as “black boxes” in the investigation of 
some other object, is the kind of thing Merz calls the “multiplex” nature of models. She points out 
that it is therefore always necessary to pay close attention to how the research is oriented77. It has 
been too easy to follow the intuitive view, which would allow the applications side to stand for 
simulation science in general, making the false assumption that what scientists want to find out about 
when they run a simulation is the system that their simulation represents. This is indeed true in many 
cases, but in many other cases, the research is better understood as being set up in order to use this 
relationship between the simulation and its target to find out about the properties of the algorithms 
and techniques that have been integrated into the model. For a model under development, such as 
Fluidity, this work on simulation methods is a major output, and the contribution that the researchers 
who build Fluidity are making is not just to the applications areas that Fluidity can be applied to. It is 
to the wider community of simulation builders, who are interested in what techniques work well in 
what circumstances. Techniques can travel, apart from the modelling frameworks in which they are 
implemented, and can come to be integrated into many different systems for doing computational 
science.
The main divide at AMCG is between “applications people” and “methods people”. Those who 
identify with the empirical sciences tend to fall into the former category, while the mathematicians 
tend to fall into the latter. There is a significant amount of tension between the two orientations 
because while a model under development is very much under the control of the methods people, 
there was a general resentment that the funding for all computational science research largely 
revolves around applications instead.
“This is one of the biggest issues of the computational science area and we discuss it a lot 
round here... What we [methods people] are really passionate about is getting nice software 
and then studying the algorithms and proving the results and things like that. We enjoy 
looking at applications but we are not experts in the applications, yet we spend all our time 
writing proposals that are about the heart, or about the earth, etc. It is frustrating because it is 
much easier to get funding for people to run your code than to develop new ones... It is very 
hard to provide the supportive infrastructure to study a new finite element method. You have 
to say “I want to make a better wind turbine”. It is cool to be involved in those kind of 
projects and it is really important but it is just that it is not where most of the work is going 
in. It is not recognised by the scientific community or the management of the college as 
being important. Quite often what happens is that these proposals get written, then funding 
arrives for postdocs and PhDs, and then we try to hire good programmers and hope that they 
can get to grips with the application and do that and do some of what we are interested in as 
well.” (CE)
One of the advantages of looking at science in practice is that it helps to undermine quick 
assumptions that would otherwise condition the analysis, premises that are shared between 
philosophers who study simulations in terms of their applications, research councils who fund 
77 Merz, ‘Multiplex and Unfolding’; Sismondo, ‘Models, Simulations, and Their Objects’, 256.
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research, and management structures which concern themselves with the distribution of people and 
things in the research organisation. Instead of following this premise, we instead start with an open 
perspective which takes into account the duality of orientation that defines what kind of thing is the 
locus of interest, and what counts as merely a practical device used to investigate it.
  2.15 Conclusion
This chapter has built up a general picture of the kind of scientific work that is involved in making 
and running simulations. What is left under-studied here, however, is what exactly it is that we mean 
by “practice” in scientific practice. We are studying research in computational physics, but more 
needs to be said about the status and significance of this domain that is the centre of attention. These 
issues are fleshed out in the next two chapters, which will prepare the way for the remainder of the 
thesis.
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  3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an initial theoretical discussion of “practice”, a concept which will be 
indispensable in what follows. The first section locates practice within science studies. The middle 
of the chapter goes into some detail about the philosophical stakes of a commitment to practice. The 
final few sections draw out some of the consequences for our analysis.
The concept of practice is extremely useful for formulating what it is we are interested in when we 
study science. One of its most significant assets is the fact that no single school of thought or 
discipline can claim ownership of it. A whole constellation of approaches loosely gather around its 
theme. This is an asset, but it is also a potential problem, for these approaches are not unified in any 
straightforward way. There are many different theories of practice, and many routes we can take. The 
good thing is that there is no dogma to be accepted, and thus great freedom to use the concept of 
practice according to the exigencies of the empirical site.
This chapter sets up practice as a category through which to understand science. The chapter that 
follows this, chapter 4, will identify ways in which we can read a theory of practice as a certain kind 
of rationalism, and thus revive a concept of reason as a tool with which to understand simulation.
  3.2 Why practice?
Science studies is in a state of theoretical aftermath. During the 1990s, this field of study was 
defined by big debates. Battles were fought over issues of social construction in what became known 
as the “Science Wars”, while more private but often very hard fought struggles carved out the 
contours of stylistic and theoretical schools of thought78. Although science studies has its origins at 
least two decades earlier, with the first big wave of scholarship in the 1970s79 and much theoretical 
78 See, for example, Collins and Yearley, ‘Epistemological Chicken’; Callon and Latour, ‘Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath 
School!’; Gingras, ‘The New Dialectics of Nature’; Pickering, ‘In the Land of the Blind’; Gingras, ‘From the Heights of 
Metaphysics’.
79 Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory; Barnes and Shapin, Natural Order; Bloor, Knowledge and Social 
Imagery.
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novelty emerging through the 1980s80, the 1990s saw it come to maturity as an emerging discipline 
in its own right. These tumultuous times have now died down, their initial force weakened, not 
necessarily because scholars moderated their positions or compromised, but rather because they 
came to accept their differences as irresolvable. 
Most of the ideas that drive contemporary work in science studies have their origins in the 1980s and 
'90s. With much less novel theory in play at the moment, it must be asked whether the discipline no 
longer has quite the vigour of the years of its coming of age, for with maturity comes heritage, and 
current writing must situate itself within a tradition, flesh out the consequences of inheritance, or 
forge something new. But if science studies' youthful vigour has waned slightly in the last few years, 
at the same time it became the focus of increasing outside interest, as a source of fresh theoretical 
inspiration for many scholars not directly interested in science. Science studies approaches have 
enjoyed such a prolific diffusion across disciplinary boundaries that they seem now to rival post-
structuralist philosophy as a generic source of “theory” in the humanities and social sciences81.
In emphasising the concept of practice, I want to take a step back and advocate a wider perspective 
on science studies theory. The danger with any theoretical movement is that it overplays its hand and 
portrays itself as a radical break with the past, a complete overturning of traditional categories. In 
time, it will always be possible to reflect on such moments and show them on the contrary in their 
continuity with established modes of thought. This is very much the case now with Latour's 
posthumanism, his radical rethinking of what it means to be modern82, and to a certain extent with 
Pickering's desire to initiate an appreciation of a “new ontology”83. These theoretical moves, 
however radical, can always be read as part of an historical tradition, not as a break from it, or, if a 
break, a break within it. 
While the big debates between the Edinburgh School (Bloor, Barnes, etc.), Bath school (Collins, 
Pinch, Yearley, etc.) and the French “actor-network” theorists (Latour and Callon) raged over 
questions of the meaning of the social, the construction of knowledge and the nature of interests and 
constraints, a quieter consensus was being built in the background, not quite equated with either, but 
stimulated by the insights of both. Similarly, while philosophers found themselves at odds with 
social scientists on the question of reason and construction, an approach started to emerge which 
promises, if not reconciliation, at least some common ground on which to agree or disagree. This 
was the foregrounding of “practice” as the central category of analysis, “scientific practice” as an 
object of study both for philosophers and for sociologists84. The concept of practice successfully 
navigates between the twin perils of post-positivism, the cultural construction of science and the 
80 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump; Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life; Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of 
Knowledge.
81 For example, Bennett, ‘The Force of Things’; Harman, ‘The Importance of Bruno Latour’.
82 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern.
83 Pickering, ‘New Ontologies’.
84 Pickering, ‘From Science as Knowledge to Science as Practice’.
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theory ladenness of observation. It allows us to appreciate each, but without reducing the real 
complexity of doing science to simplistic viewpoints. Pickering reflected on the emergence of this 
current in the 1990s:
“In retrospect, then, I can see much of my own work as an exploration of this neglected side 
of pragmatism, an inquiry into practice in its own right, without a pregiven presumption that 
the end of enquiry has to be an argument about knowledge. And, to put it simply, the upshot 
for me was a gestalt switch into what I call the performative idiom. The argument of The 
Mangle of Practice was that if there is a sun around which all else revolves, it is 
performance, not knowledge – knowledge is a planet or maybe a comet that sometimes 
participates in the dynamics of practices and sometimes does not, and the discovery, for me, 
was that practice has its own structure that one can explore and talk about – as a dance of 
agency, for example”85.
This chapter introduces practice as the major theoretical frame for the thesis. It will also set up 
chapter 4, 'Reason in Practice', for it is on the basis of an appreciation of practice that we might turn 
back to the great ancestor of science studies, Gaston Bachelard, and see in his writings not just an 
early glimpse of what would come some decades later, but a wider interpretation of scientific 
practice as a rationalism, an interpretation of science in practice in terms of what he would call 
“phenomenotechnique”. With his recent studies of historical epistemology, Rheinberger has already 
suggested this as a productive line of enquiry86. I would claim that not only does it give us some 
excellent tools with which to approach science in action, practice also provides us with a broader 
frame with which to appreciate the greatest advances of science studies, opening up the question of 
what scientists actually do to critical scrutiny, and thus inviting us to seek reason in the actual sites 
of accomplishment. Putting more recent scholarship in the context of this older tradition is not a 
matter of doing it down by claiming it was reiterating what was said before, but rather of showing it 
to be part of a bigger, more powerful historical movement in thought, a general move to practice.
  3.3 Humans and non-humans
One of the key features of the practice-based view is that it moves from an “anthropocentric” 
epistemology in which knowledge is textual and theories linguistic, to one in which technologies and 
bodies share the stage as indispensable aspects of what it means to do science. This is particularly 
important for present purposes because simulations raise questions of anthropocentrism with great 
force. These vast technical systems easily eclipse the cognitive capacities of individual humans, of 
their creators and manipulators. For Paul Humphreys this is simulation's most philosophically 
significant aspect. “The computations involved in most simulations are so fast and so complex that 
no human or group of humans can in practice reproduce or understand the process”87. He 
consequently argues that humans are displaced from the centre of the scientific endeavour:
85 Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain, 380–381.
86 Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology; Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete.
87 Humphreys, ‘The Philosophical Novelty of Computer Simulation Methods’, 620.
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“For an increasing number of fields in science, an exclusively anthropocentric epistemology 
is no longer appropriate because there now exist superior, non-human, epistemic abilities. So 
we are now faced with a problem, which we can call the anthropocentric predicament, of 
how we, as humans, can understand and evaluate computationally based scientific methods 
that transcend our own abilities”88.
Simulations cannot be directly understood. They are too fast and too complex. In chapter 7 I will 
show how big software places us in a situation in which conventional paper media are irredeemably 
insufficient to “capture” the movement of this research. We move, with simulation, to a world of big 
technologies, of directly transmitted systems of code, humans working inside such a wider frame, 
not masters of it, but dwellers within it.
It is important on this point to acknowledge a major theoretical distinction that is implied by the 
concept of practice. While we may draw a lot from the actor-network school of thought, practice 
theory remains, despite its de-centring of the human, too anthropocentric to be classed as part of that 
movement. The human, in a theory of practice, may be enmeshed in a concrete world of bodies and 
things. But the human does remain special. The key thing to grasp is the difference between the 
extreme symmetry of the semiotic orientation of Latour and Callon89, and the practice orientation of 
other scholars such as Pickering. Pickering outlines the difference:
“Semiotically, as the actor-network insists, there is no difference between human and 
nonhuman agents. Semiotically, human and nonhuman agency can be continuously 
transformed into one another and substituted for one another. I am not alone in thinking that 
there are serious problems with these ideas when it comes to the analysis of science... I find 
it hard to imagine any combination of naked human minds and bodies that could substitute 
for a telescope, never mind an electron microscope, or for a machine tool, or for an atom 
bomb (or for penecillin, heroin, …). Semiotically, these things can be made equivalent; in 
practice they are not”90.
In the narratives provided by Latour, perhaps most notably in his We Have Never Been Modern, 
practice theory will appear to be the less radical option, more modest and indeed more “modern”, 
than semiotic approaches91. But from the point of view of practice, we are interested in the 
fundamental constituents of human existence, and semiotics, however eloquent its analyses of signs, 
however flat its networks of hybrids, can only provide one component. As Schatzki puts it, “the 
nominalism of actor-network theory bars recognition of any wider entity that actions make up or of 
any constitutive context in which actions take place. Actor-network theory thereby fails to capture a 
key feature of human social life, namely, the practices that are tied to arrangements and help 
constitute social phenomena”92. This is not to say that the semiotic tradition cannot provide deep 
insight into the role of relations and things in science. In chapters 5 and 6 I draw substantial help 
88 Ibid., 617.
89 Callon, ‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation’, 200.
90 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 15.
91 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern.
92 Schatzki, ‘Materiality and Social Life’, 135.
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from semiotics, but always return to practice, for the former can only really tell us about the relations 
of things, and cannot give insight into the motivations, inspirations and rhythms of research in the 
making.
It is worth following this discrimination from actor-network theory with a comment on 
heterogeneity, a term commonly used in science studies. Scientific practice is extremely complex, 
involving many different elements. It is this that makes it interesting. But it is important not to 
fetishise heterogeneity, as if saying that a situation is heterogeneous is to say anything of interest, 
beyond the fact that it is interesting. As analytical tools, the term suffers from a troublesome 
ambiguity. A truly mixed up hybrid is homogeneous, and an understanding of the system of 
differences that underlies its composition requires additional empirical insight, such as the 
observation of the processes of its creation. On the other hand, anything whose constituents are 
distinctive enough to be identified as different elements in a heterogeneous whole is not really a 
hybrid at all93.
Another key co-ordinate in the contemporary theoretical landscape, which helps us to locate 
practice, is “assemblage theory”, espoused by thinkers such as Paul Rabinow and Manuel de 
Landa94. de Landa's recent book on simulation attempts to draw out an ontological vision of reality 
based on emergent properties, of the kind that are commonly accessible to simulation studies95. From 
this kind of viewpoint, there is little place for practice. The world is a complex and chaotic system of 
systems and there is to be no privileged level of analysis. While this project may have admirable 
goals for understanding reality, de Landa singularly fails to get to grips with the kind of science 
through which we explore such emergence. The irony is that while he wants to develop a 
sophisticated emergentist realism, he does so only by adopting a naïve realist standpoint towards the 
simulation science he relies on. There may be, as will be clear in what follows, a space for 
understanding the contemporary social field in terms of assemblages, because this concept 
foregrounds the materiality of the social. But again, this materiality must be nested within a broader 
consideration of practice.
Having gained an initial feel for where practice sits within science studies, we now look further 
afield, and start to identify its advantages for a comprehensive analysis of research.
  3.4 The significance of practice
One of the initial advantages of the concept of practice is the possibility it offers for drawing on 
resources in the philosophy of science as well as in the sociological traditions of science studies. The 
concept gained wide currency in philosophy of science in the second half of the Twentieth Century. 
Indeed, the general movement away from formal studies of scientific theories in the philosophy of 
93 Gingras makes similar points using the metaphor of cake. Gingras, ‘Following Scientists Through Society?’.
94 Rabinow, Anthropos Today, 49–56.
95 De Landa, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason.
- 58 -
- Practice in Theory -
science has been described as a turn towards looking at “science in practice”, a more “case study” 
inclined kind of philosophy. The “Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice” counts among 
its founding members several very significant figures in contemporary philosophy of science, of 
which Nancy Cartwright and Hasok Chang are perhaps the most famous96. While by no means 
uncontroversial this turn toward practice is now a mainstream position. Furthermore, its salience to 
the present study is clear from the fact that a lot of the trend towards practice was equally a trend 
towards foregrounding the role of models and modelling in philosophy of science97.
What is not so clear in the philosophy of scientific practice, however, is what we might call the 
“ontology of practice”. For too many of these philosophers, practice is treated as something of a self-
evident concept with little need for philosophical scrutiny. It is simply “what scientists actually do”.
But “what scientists actually do” is an empirical question, requiring empirical study. As should be 
evident to any philosopher, there is no straightforward way to understand any empirical 
phenomenon, and this is especially the case when that phenomenon, being social, is highly complex 
in nature and deeply affected by methods of observation and intervention. The great benefit of the 
social sciences is that it has long been recognised that methods require as much attention as the 
objects to which they are applied. Perhaps it is because philosophy has not traditionally 
conceptualised itself as empirical study, that we have seen less similar attention to these reflexive 
methodological questions. But this has to change if a philosophy that looks at “what scientists 
actually do” is to be sustainable.
It is also necessary to point out to philosophers that the availability of the term “practice” cannot be 
taken for granted. Its currency is relatively recent in social science, becoming prevalent only after 
the 1970s98. This history is significant to its use. Social scientists have not always studied practice 
and many still would resist conceptualising their object of study in these terms. It does not sum up 
empirical research in general. The most notable alternative tradition, of which Durkheim, Parsons 
and Luhman are often evoked as representatives, involves a much more “holistic” view of society, in 
which “what scientists actually do” is only a passing concern, one significant only for what it tells 
you about the logic and function of social systems or social structures99. Structuralism involved 
similar kinds of holism. The other major rival to practice theory is methodological individualism100. 
Like practice theory, individualisms also favour a local rather than holistic level of explanation, but 
they go much further in this direction, and tend to idealise complex contexts of action in order to 
model them according to simple mechanisms of decision and choice101.
96 See http://www.philosophy-science-practice.org/
97 Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators; Gelfert, ‘Model-Based Representation’.
98 See, for example, Ortner, ‘Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties’.
99 Schatzki, ‘Introduction: Practice Theory’, 14.
100 Schatzki, Social Practices, 6.
101 See, for example, Becker, ‘A Theory of Social Interactions’; and more recently, works such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 
War and Reason.
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Practice doesn't name a specific school of study, but rather a diverse constellation of approaches 
united by their twin refusal of holism and individualism, and a desire to focus attention on an 
irreducible level found in between. Somewhere between the abstractions of the individual and 
society is the field of practice, and this is the primary reality to which practice theorists address 
themselves. Bourdieu and Giddens are often named as prominent practice theorists, as is Foucault, 
when he isn't being tarred with the brush of “postmodernism”. Charles Taylor, Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe and Jean-Francois Lyotard are also commonly mentioned102. It is, in fact, as a strong 
alternative to postmodernism that practice theory gains its greatest contemporary relevance. But its 
greatest asset is also its greatest challenge: the sheer diversity of the resources at its core. This is 
something apparent from its two most commonly named ancestors: (late) Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger, both of whom provide in their own ways some of the most profound resources for 
thinking about the accomplishment of action within concrete circumstances, and about the 
background against which such actions are performed, while also exhibiting deep differences in style 
and in substance.
Practice theory is not just one theoretical option for studying the same basic object as its rivals. For a 
practice theorist, there is no such reality as “society”, no transcendent social realm. Similarly, there 
is no reduction of the embeddedness of action in concrete circumstances that will provide a 
meaningful concept of the “individual”. The difference between these theories there is a fundamental 
disagreement about what kind of thing it is that we are studying. This choice is not about choosing 
one option over another for studying the same object. It is a matter of choosing the basic orientation 
that defines the field in the first place. Because the question is so fundamental, we need to be able to 
ask: What kind of reality is there to practice?
  3.5 The reality of practice
“It is my belief that all theories of social life either explicitly contain and maybe also 
discuss, or constitutively presuppose ontological understandings”103
The fundamental ontological issue at the heart of practice theory is hard to avoid. One of the central 
strands of the critique of holism, often the reason for dissatisfaction in the first place, was the 
question of the ontological status of society. For Durkheim society exists on a level transcending 
everyday reality, a level from which we gain our categories and institutions, which is the source of 
laws, sanctions, prohibitions, and hence of religious reverence104. To him, there is a reality called 
“society”, existing above and beyond the interactions and psychologies of individuals. Sociology as 
a discipline is distinct from other social sciences (especially from psychology) because its object and 
its explanations are located at this transcendent level: how is society possible? Structuralists, such as 
Claude Leví-Strauss, would reformulate Durkheim's project, but would retain this higher level: What 
102 Schatzki, Social Practices, 11.
103 Schatzki, ‘Materiality and Social Life’, 124.
104 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
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structures govern language, myth or kinship105? What you are studying is the system, and this is the 
reality of concern. The systematicity of structure and the functional interdependence of institutions 
provided explanations for cohesion at all levels.
When Bourdieu develops his theory of practice, he questions this transcendence, asking what kind of 
reality these systems and structures actually have106. In seeking to answer this question, he looked to 
the theoretical practices of the analysts who derived these concepts. Holistic transcendent domains of 
order, said Bourdieu, are an effect of the abstractions made by a distanced observer: “in taking up a 
point of view on the action, withdrawing from it in order to observe it from above and from a 
distance, he constitutes practical activity as an object of observation and analysis, a 
representation”107. Such objectifications are second-order phenomena, not a primary reality of social 
life. They are real in the sense that they are genuinely to be found in the armchair or office of the 
social scientist, but not real in the sense of operating independently in the field, with a transcendent 
reality. Bourdieu will accept the fact that these kinds of wider systematicity can be derived from 
empirical analysis of social life, but for him this potentiality to yield systematic description is 
something to be accounted for, not something to be assumed already in operation under the surface 
of events.
The major challenge for any holistic social science is to provide an adequate account of the ontology 
of the whole. Latour's famous critique of the concept of society is in this respect not particularly 
novel, and this critique is not specific to his theoretical approach108. His rhetoric is eloquent and 
stirred many scholars up towards a fresh wave of critique of the historical legacy of their disciplines. 
But what is for him was principally an attack on the Durkheimians of the Edinburgh School is a 
reconfiguration of this older challenge. If society is a thing about which it is appropriate for us to 
talk, which admits of explanations and questions, then what kind of thing is it? In what sense does it 
really exist outside of the objectifications of the social scientist? Having raised these challenges, any 
theory of practice must equally rise to the challenge of explaining the ontology of this quite different 
sort of thing, this field of practice, which it holds up instead as a more solid ground for social 
scientific enquiry. This ontological challenge is to be embraced, for it is here that we might explore 
some of the most profound features of a theory of practice. 
The emphasis for me here will be on the reality of the field of practice, the concrete multiplicity 
through which action is accomplished109. Several prominent theorists of practice tend to take a 
slightly different stance, in which the primary objects are practices, conceptualised as distinct items 
105 Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship.
106 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice; I am more interested in Bourdieu’s classic analysis of practice than in his later 
applications of his ideas to science. For example, Bourdieu, ‘The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason’.
107 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 2.
108 For example, Latour, Reassembling the Social, 27; cf. Ingold, Key Debates In Anthropology, 55–98.
109 An interesting analogy may be found here with the concept of the ‘situation’ in pragmatism. For example, Brown, ‘John 
Dewey’s Logic of Science’, 268–273.
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within a social universe110. These practices, however, seem to be already abstracted from their site, 
and this is not the kind of approach I would take. I would talk about practice, not about practices, as 
if they are entities. What is real is the field of practice, not objectifications such as practices.
A first element of the reality of the field of practice is comprised by the bodies that dwell within it, 
through which interactions occur. The greatest effect of Bourdieu's theory of practice was to bring 
the body centre stage. It allowed us to start talking about the role of embodiment in social 
interactions. There is an important parallel with Foucault's writings on discipline, on how social 
institutions act upon the body111. It opened up a whole field of research into how different kinds of 
discourses, situations and institutions make people into certain kinds of people112. But for Bourdieu, 
it is not just that power acts upon the body. The body is fundamental to the regularity of action, it is 
generative. Embodiment captures the real processes of sedimentation of complex strata of 
dispositions that condition what is done, how it gets done, and how situations are felt and 
perceived113.
It is, however, necessary to push Bourdieu further. It is too easy, in his account, to regard the body as 
a substrate onto which social forms are stamped. This is encouraged by the schemes that Bourdieu 
drew up in his early work, diagrammatic systems that were supposed to represent the orientations of 
a culture114. There are two problems with this. Firstly, there is no “blank slate” of the body (in the 
manner than Locke had proposed for the mind)115. We might like to draw on Deleuze's account of 
bodily organisation and disorganisation for a more nuanced view. For him, the unity of the organism 
is undone by its limitless folds116, or by productive flows of desire that connect and disconnect in 
manners subversive to unification117. It is always intricately textured. Secondly, as Stephen Turner 
has forcefully pointed out, practice theory cannot rely on any theory of dispositions that requires that 
dispositions somehow be “shared” by many individuals118. Were such an assumption to be made, and 
it is arguable whether it is or is not implicit in Bourdieu's account, we would be forced to account for 
some sort of mechanism by which dispositions can be transferred between individuals, and it is hard 
to see what such a “copy and paste” mechanism would be.
The beginnings of a consistent view of practice emerge when we start from the principle that the 
kind of sedimentation we are talking about does not exist on the level of the individual body. If this 
is granted then the above problems fade away. Individual bodies are always part of larger 
configurations of learning. While individuals can practice skills on their own, there is always a 
110 Schatzki, Social Practices.
111 Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
112 Hacking, ‘Making Up People’.
113 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 78.
114 Ibid., 157.
115 Thrift, Non-Representational Theory, 61.
116 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 8–9.
117 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus.
118 Turner, The Social Theory of Practices, 44–77.
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communal component. Actions are done and demonstrated in many ways from childhood onwards. 
Habits are formed together, and they are varied down to the smallest scales. The reality of practice is 
not the reality of a singular body, but a field of many bodies. Skills and dispositions are not 
transferred between bodies, but co-constituted in a field of becoming. Such fields will clearly 
overlap and change, and have very fuzzy edges. Practice is something that occurs in an arena of 
bodies that is always multiple and mutable119. Their coherence will vary, as some co-ordinations are 
long-established, others emerging on the fly.
The most substantial reality fields of practice have is one and multiple. It is always possible to find 
other contexts, to divide and multiply. Marilyn Strathern points out that social phenomena display a 
curious “fractal” property, in which each scale of analysis exhibits a similar level of complexity120. If 
one were to “zoom in” from a grander consideration of science to a more detailed analysis of its sites 
of accomplishment, a new terrain would emerge, which would in turn invite scrutiny at new levels. 
This is something that my informants at AMCG are well aware of, for modelling is always a matter 
of choosing a resolution. Whatever the scale of your grid, there are always below grid-scale 
phenomena that are impossible to explicitly resolve.
This may appear to be a flimsy reality, but the reality of social phenomena can hardly be expected to 
be analogous to the reality of a stone121. It takes a sophisticated social theory to handle the 
complexity of social life without distorting the object of study. The body is a particularly difficult 
aspect of practice to talk about. As François Sigaut put it: “[t]he knowledge built into a machine can 
always be retrieved, at least in theory. But we still seem ill-equipped to identify the skills embodied 
in our own nervous system”122. Despite the decades of study dedicated to the phenomenology and 
sociology of the body, work remains to be done. We must not mistake the fuzziness of the field of 
practice for a deficiency of the theory, for it is precisely this fuzziness that we endeavour to grasp. 
The social nowhere exists neatly, and attempts to tidy up its edges, to theorise for example closed 
and independent cultures, are only destined to failure. To this end, I draw together many different 
sources of theory: poststructuralist philosophy, phenomenology, philosophy of science, social theory, 
in my attempt to work out a theory of practice capable of doing justice to the empirical material.
The question of what kind of role the body should have in a theory of practice is one of the most 
important, but it is important to stress that the many other kinds of materials of the laboratory also 
play a fundamental role. Embodied action is always action within a world of materials123. Things 
play an active role124. Nersessian writes of devices in science as “hubs” around which the different 
dimensions of practice are co-ordinated125. Once we can talk about embodiment, it is a small step to 
119 Thrift, Non-Representational Theory, 8.
120 Strathern, Partial Connections, xxi.
121 But see Ingold, ‘Bringing Things to Life’, 19 for an admirable attempt to complexify the reality of even a stone.
122 Sigaut, ‘Technology’, 438; see also Latour, ‘How to Talk About the Body?’.
123 Ingold, ‘Bringing Things to Life’, 19–32.
124 Carusi, ‘Computational Biology and the Limits of Shared Vision’.
125 Nersessian, ‘How Do Engineering Scientists Think?’.
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point out that wherever dispositional milieux are developed, so too is developed a distribution of 
ever changing materials, modifying them, using them up, combining them, wearing them out, a 
complex world of interactivity. As with bodies, the relevant fields in which practice occurs will be 
vague, multiple and overlapping. The material reality of practice is not one of a singular objective 
world, but rather of assemblages drawn together into a zone of relative consistency.
One of the best ways to start thinking about the depth of conditioning of bodies and things would be 
to draw on Leibniz's philosophy, albeit read through very contemporary eyes, such as we find in 
Deleuze's interpretation126. Leibniz wants to establish a rationalism, in the sense that he wants to 
claim that innate forms exist, but he is wary of describing these as a distinct finite set (such as 
Cartesian Ideas or Kantian categories). For Leibniz, the spirit is infinitely textured, and so is the 
material world. “Thus it is that ideas and truths are for us innate, as inclinations, dispositions, habits, 
or natural potentialities, and not as actions although these potentialities are always accompanied by 
some actions, often insensible, which correspond to them”127. Furthermore, Leibniz anticipates the 
importance of the unconscious, for “acquired habits and the stores of our memory are not always 
perceived”128.
When looking at scientific practice, phenomenology provides another angle on the accomplishment 
of research129. Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world that he gives us in Being and Time 
provides a way to think about the structuration of a world by concerns and commitments, and thus 
about the way in which fields of projects are held together along the lines of projects130. Heidegger's 
vivid descriptions of the primacy of the existential phenomena of being-in, being-in-the-world, 
being-with and thrownness capture the way in which the person is never primarily present to him or 
herself, but rather is already tangled in a world, is already thrown into commitments, and never 
exists in the abstract, but rather is only insofar as he or she fundamentally is there: Da-sein. A theory 
of practice must follow this lead, and refuse any decisionist theory of the human in which the person 
first of all assesses the world, then acts. The actor never “arrives at” a world in which to act, but is 
immersed in involvements that tangle any intentional moment in a wider web of significance.
The use of Heidegger is here most significant for its ability to insert this dimension of motivation 
into the discussion of practice, to respond the question that Knorr-Cetina poses: “how can we 
theorize practice in a way that allows for the engrossment and excitement—the emotional basis—of 
research work?”131 Pickering, too, pointed to the role of desire in scientific practice132. We could 
emphasise for example the Heideggerian theme of care to talk about the intensive attention my 
informants devote to their technologies, their digital systems through which they do their work, a 
126 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.
127 Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, 46.
128 Ibid.
129 See, for example, Krieger, Doing Physics.
130 Heidegger, Being and Time.
131 Knorr-Cetina, ‘Objectual Practice’, 184.
132 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 1.
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care that goes well beyond a mere utilitarian concern for keeping them functioning so that science 
could get done. So much is personally invested in these things that they are emotionally laden and 
the work of carefully tending to them is an end in itself. I also use the term anticipation to talk about 
the future-bound concern of work within real projects, projects which may have a plan, yet will 
rarely be determined by it, which are profoundly open in their possible development, yet retain a 
very tangible sense of “going somewhere”, an already thrown going somewhere beyond any plan133. 
We can relate this, using Rheinberger, to the effect of the juxtaposition of fields of practice, each of 
which in its own way partially grasps some aspects of an elusive and constituently vague object, the 
epistemic thing towards which practice is oriented134. This will be explored more when we get to 
chapter 9, 'Stability and Surprise', which seeks to return to the more theoretical themes, and explore 
further the question of motivation and concern in research practice.
  3.6 Skill
We now move on to deal with the question of what a theory of practice might have to say about 
action, and what conversely it might say for the accounts of action that can be produced alongside it.
The analysis of a field of practice is a difficult operation. What we want to capture are precisely 
those dimensions of what happens that are not easily described, that cannot be reduced to a prior 
tabulation of the sequence of steps to be carried out or a teleology based on the final result. In both 
cases, we gain some understanding of the practical activity, but still remain at considerable remove 
from its actual occurrence. In both cases, objectifications of practice loom large over its actual 
accomplishment.
Tim Ingold has been a vocal critic of these kinds of approaches in the anthropology of skill. In this 
area of study a theory of practice is very pertinent because skill transmission has often been regarded 
as a matter of passing on rules, of codes for conduct, to new learners. Skill is therefore often treated 
in a dualist manner, with the actions conceptualised separately from their accomplishment. In 
contrast, Ingold deems it necessary to embrace the constitutive enfolding of mind and body in 
practical engagement.
“Merely to witness the finished works, or even the successive steps in their construction, 
does not suffice to enable novice observers to copy these steps for themselves. My 
contention is that to explain how they manage to do this requires us to shift our analytic 
focus from problem-solving, conceived as a purely cognitive operation distinct from the 
practical implementations of the solutions reached, to the dynamics of practitioners' 
engagement, in perception and action, with their environments”135.
In addition to this critique of abstract understandings of action, Ingold writes of the necessity of 
“reversing a tendency, evident in much of the literature on art and material culture, to read creativity 
133 While Heideggerian in inspiration, this use of anticipation departs from his analysis of being-toward-death.
134 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things.
135 Ingold, ‘Beyond Art and Technology’, 29.
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‘backwards’, starting from an outcome in the form of a novel object and tracing it, through a 
sequence of antecedent conditions, to an unprecedented idea in the mind of an agent. This backwards 
reading is equivalent to what Alfred Gell has called the abduction of agency”136.
Gell's work has been hugely influential in the anthropology of art. For Gell, the central problem is 
social interaction, and the role of objects in interaction137. He is only really interested in the actual 
creation of things insofar as that process is important for the role they play in social interaction. 
Ingold's critique arises from his feeling that this perspective obscures creativity, something that he 
wants to understand on its own terms, as something of interest quite aside from the social role of 
objects that may or may not be thus created.
It is illuminating to note that the two anthropologists are not so much disagreeing about the nature of 
practice, but about what questions about practice it is interesting to ask. If we are interested in action 
as a creative becoming, then it is counterproductive to look at finished objects or rules for the 
procedure, because of the danger of establishing a retroactive teleology. But if we are interested in 
the role a created thing plays within a field of practice, as an element conditioning further action, 
then Gell's approach is very informative. For Gell, the cognitive significance of art objects derives 
from their indexicality, and from the way that as an index an art object supports complex 
configurations of abductive reasoning.
“Abduction,” Gell explains, “covers the area where semiotic inference (of meanings from signs) 
merges with hypothetical inferences of a non-semiotic (or not conventionally semiotic) kind...”138 
Gell uses the example of the friendliness inferred from a person's smile139. This is a precarious 
inference. It is logically illegitimate. But it is practically efficacious, and abduction enables us to 
appreciate the complex web of agencies that can be evidenced by created objects, as various 
producers, recipients, commissioners and subjects are woven together in the play of agency manifest 
in the existence of the particular object.
The advantage of abduction is that it lets us talk about inferences that are not governed by systems of 
convention, so they are broader than the kind of meanings that we get from theories of language. 
Abduction cannot be wholly appreciated from within a rule-bound understanding of meaning. It is 
inherently open and operates within spaces of inference that have no determining principle. But there 
is a fundamental incompatibility between this theory and Ingold's. We can never appreciate the 
indeterminacy of creativity through a concept of abduction because with the latter we always start 
with a finished object, and read backwards towards its origin. In this direction we inevitably loose 
something of the potentiality that was manifest in the actual creative process.
136 Ingold, Being Alive, 215.
137 Gell, Art and Agency.
138 Ibid., 14.
139 Ibid., 15.
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  3.7 Temporality
The two-fold of Gell and Ingold reflects the asymmetrical temporality of practice140. It is important 
to grasp sites of practice in terms of their temporalities. Time here is not an external metric, a co-
ordinate system, within which practices are accomplished, but an intrinsic property of practical 
fields, which have their distinctive rhythms, cycles of fast and slow, pauses, stoppages, and 
harmonies with neighbouring systems141. Pickering will stress that it is within the unfolding of 
practice that major features in the landscape of possible research futures emerge. He dislikes the 
language of constraint and of other Durkheimian theories of science because they posit external 
forces imposing on practice, as if the latter were to be pressed into their mould. “... let me emphasise 
that unlike constraint – which seems to me somehow “already there” – resistances emerge in the real 
time of practice...”142.
The time of research practice is of course regularly objectified in write-ups of method, plans and 
proposals, and such objectifications, while they stultify the perception of the flow of practice, are 
important means by which scientists grasp what has happened in the unfolding of their actions. 
Much research gains its tempo from looking ahead at what is demanded by a representation of the 
future course of action. As Pickering says, “I find I cannot make sense of the studies that follow 
without reference to the intentions of scientists, to their goals and plans...”143 But he goes on to 
“stress the temporal emergence of plans and goals and their transformability in encounters with 
material agency”144. While plans and goals are extremely important objectifications, they are 
mutable aspects of research, liable to change according to the unfolding dynamic145. They don't 
predetermine what is going to happen. “There is no algorithm that determines the vectors of cultural 
extension, which is as much as to say that the goals of scientific practice emerge in the real time of 
practice”146. In these quotes, we grasp the essence of Pickering's departure from “sociology of 
scientific knowledge” approaches – for these, it is the accounts that are the focus-point, to be 
explained via an analysis of practice, but in the end they are the primary object of study. Here, 
instead, it is practice in all its breadth and diversity that is the primary object, within which processes 
of accounting and the artefacts they produce are only one feature147.
It is extremely important to grasp the interplay of objectified representations of practice and the 
transformability of their being put into practice. The explicit goals of research processes do not 
predetermine the route or eventual destination. This is, in Rheinberger's words “...a movement that is 
140 See Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 176.
141 Schatzki, ‘Materiality and Social Life’, 135; Urry, ‘Complexity’, 112; On resonance, see Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 225.
142 Pickering, ‘Beyond Constraint’, 51.
143 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 17.
144 Ibid., 18.
145 Callon, ‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation’, 207.
146 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 19–20.
147 Ibid., 12–14.
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not goal directed, but nevertheless anything but chaotic for that reason”148. While practices are not 
predestined this is far from a case of “anything goes”. It takes a lot of regulation and close co-
ordination to achieve a balance between order and chaos, a question we will return to at the end of 
the thesis, in chapter 9.
The time of practice was also a major feature of Bourdieu's theory. His critique of functionalism and 
structuralism was a critique of their external standpoint, from which they would only be giving post-
hoc objectifications of what happens. Instead, Bourdieu wants to embrace strategies. He builds on 
Marx's insight, that “[m]an's reflections on the forms of social life, and consequently also, his 
scientific analysis of those forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical 
development. He begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand 
before him”149. Bourdieu writes: “To substitute strategy for the rule is to reintroduce time, with its 
rhythm, its orientation, its irreversibility... For the analyst, time no longer counts: not only because – 
as has often been repeated since Max Weber – arriving post festum, he cannot be in any uncertainty 
as to what may happen, but also because he has the time to totalise, i.e. to overcome the effects of 
time”150. A similar temporality to practical circumstance was recognised by Michel de Certeau, when 
he wrote that a tactic, operating outside of propriety, “is always on the watch for opportunities that 
must be seized 'on the wing'”151. There is a basic indeterminacy in the unfolding of practice to which 
it is immensely difficult for any account (including this) to remain true.
The operation of objectification, of accounting for what happens with maps, plans, descriptions and 
schemes, thus working counter to the temporal unfolding of action itself, is a characteristic feature of 
Western epistemic practices. But this by no means implies that it is the only possibility, or even the 
most appropriate. Strathern sums this up succinctly:
“To describe one's social world as apart from the actions which constitute it, to set up 
procedures which deal with events as already enacted and closed to further modification, to 
see adjudication as not itself participating in the events under scrutiny all participate in a 
common philosophical position within western cosmology. Life is understood in terms of a 
split between representations (descriptions) of it, and as it really is”152.
The point of any theory of practice is to open to question the form of description practised by the 
analyst, to ask what its effects might be, and how it might affect the objects that are rendered within 
its terms. The point is to set into interaction the forward and the backward, a dynamic emerging from 
the inherent lack in any retrospective account.
148 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 183.
149 Marx, Capital, 1:46–47.
150 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 9. What is excluded from this quote is the sentence: ‘Science has a time which it not 
that of practice.’ This is excluded because Bourdieu is using the word ‘science’ to denote the objectifying viewpoint, rather than 
to denote the empirical domain of scientific practice.
151 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xix.
152 Strathern, ‘Discovering “Social Control”’, 128.
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  3.8 Objectification
The critique of objectification is a critique of the social scientist's knowledge. But it is also an 
account of the real interplay within the fields of practice we are interested in studying, between 
improvisation and processes of planning and accounting native to them. We can expect that 
scientists, like social scientists, have trouble perceiving the indeterminacy of their research once it is 
obscured behind a totalised account. “Epistemic things, let alone their eventual transformation into 
technical objects and vice versa, usually cannot be anticipated when an experimental arrangement is 
taking shape. But once a surprising result has emerged, has proved to be more than of an ephemeral 
character, and has been sufficiently stabilized, it becomes more and more difficult, even for the 
participants, to avoid the illusion that it is the inevitable product of a logical inquiry or of a teleology 
of the experimental process”153. What Rheinberger describes is the trouble we have with abduction. 
When given an object to view, abductive reasoning provides the plausible causal explanation for its 
coming into being, and hence from this perspective, that becoming is filtered through the immediacy 
of its outcome.
Research in the making is a “groping movement which, from an anachronistic perspective, tends to 
be seen as a master 'strategy'”154. Using Derridean terms, Rheinberger will stress that “[t]here is, as a 
rule, no unique perspective that could account for the research movement with all its possible turns, 
no definite direction to its “blind tactics,” its “empirical wanderings””155. By giving a practice-
centric account of research, we are not looking for a new totalising perspective, but rather a door 
onto the openness and indeterminacy of projects. We want to understand something of their raising 
of hope, of striving and searching156. No totalising perspective can do these processes justice, but 
plenty of totalising perspectives are available, as scientists routinely craft narratives of what they did 
when they did their research, in order to present an account of their method. These idealised 
accounts strip away the contingency, the strategy, and the tempo of research and provide instead an 
idealised description of the sequence of actions undertaken. The “tinkering” process is “lost and 
forgotten” in retrospect157.
“This way of conceptualizing the "actual events" in the sequence may seem plausible, 
natural, and even irresistible. Nevertheless, it is not an accurate historical description, if by 
"historical description" is meant an account that identifies the significance historical agents 
"attach to" the events in their life-world at a particular time. Instead, what we might call a 
"transcendental” vantage point equips the reader with a fore-knowledge of what was 
determined afterwards; a fore-knowledge that consequently acts as a backdrop for defining 
what the speakers in the transcript were "really" seeing”158. 
153 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 74.
154 Rheinberger, ‘From Microsomes to Ribosomes’, 72.
155 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 184.
156 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 45.
157 Dunbar, ‘How Scientists Think’, 488.
158 Lynch, ‘Allan Franklin’s Transcendental Physics’, 482.
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Michael Lynch here aptly summarises the issue, which is a great problem for creating a history, or 
for a philosophy of scientific process. But for scientists whose own accounts of their research 
provide such perspectives, it is not a problem. They are not historians. They are not attempting to 
describe in the methods section of their papers the indeterminacies of their practice. They are 
providing an objectified description, and it is our job as outsiders not to get carried away with it.
“The retrospective view of the scientist as a spontaneous historian is not only concealing but 
in many respects also revealing. It reminds us that an experimental system is full of stories, 
of which the experimenter at any given moment is trying to tell only one”159.
By paying attention, therefore, to the dynamics of objectification, and the interplay of accounting 
practices, we no longer have to view the “scientist's version” of events as a false history, as an 
opponent, against which science studies must fight in order to establish the legitimacy of a more 
contingency-centric viewpoint160. Geoffrey Bowker has recently made this kind of move, by shifting 
the terms “from the telos of recall and fold[ing] it into a reading of ways of being in the present”161. 
The important thing is to embrace the asymmetric interplay of practice and account within any 
present, a fundamental feature of our object, of scientific practice in general.
  3.9 Conclusion
Theories of practice help us grasp what is at stake in the accomplishment of research. The next 
chapter looks to expand the broader theoretical significance of this practice view. By connecting 
scientific practice with the concept of “phenomenotechnique” we can draw on the history of 
rationalism, to develop a theory of practice into a theory of practical reason, one which can do 
justice to the epistemic character of the temporal unfolding of research and its self-articulation, its 
encounter with itself through its objects and objectifications. With Bachelard, we can embrace that 
process as rational, while avoiding the positivist trappings of the notion of progress.
159 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 185.
160 Pickering, Constructing Quarks, 3–7.
161 Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences, 21.
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  4.1 Introduction
This chapter argues that a theory of scientific practice can be understood as a certain kind of 
rationalism. I make the case for the advantages of rescuing the concept of reason from the cutting 
floor of the science studies toolkit. 
By looking at the philosophy of Bachelard, we can appreciate reason as something immanent to 
skilled practice, reviving the sense of research as a rational enterprise. This proves powerful because 
it allows us to conceptualise research as something dynamic, with its own integral temporality, one 
different, perhaps, to those of other fields of skilled practice. This temporality involves a self-
articulation, a dialectic of self with self, in which concepts exist in their realisation in systems for the 
creation of novelties, which fold back upon themselves for transformative effect.
Having written much of his epistemological work during the 1920s and 1930s, Gaston Bachelard is 
in many ways a lost ancestor of science studies. The philosophy he developed can be read as a 
philosophy of scientific practice, and thus starkly in contrast with Anglophone philosophies of 
science conventional at the time, which tended to detach theory from its sites of application 
according to Reichenbach's famous distinction between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. Although he was not an ethnographer, Bachelard was exceptionally well informed of 
scientific practice, and formulated his philosophical project explicitly in a deep engagement with the 
radical developments in science that were going on around him (especially quantum theory and 
relativity). In returning to Bachelard's philosophy of science I am following the lead of several 
thinkers who have suggested that it is strategic to do science studies under the name of historical 
epistemology, a school of thought for which Bachelard was a central figure162.
One of the consequences of bringing this longer-term view to bear on science studies is the 
possibility of formulating an approach that revives a certain kind of rationalism, a surprise in the 
162 Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology; Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete; It is interesting to note that 
Rheinberger’s colleague at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Lorraine Daston, has also proposed the label 
‘historical epistemology’ for her historical analyses, but in contrast to Rheinberger, Daston is not intending to refer to the 
French school also known by that name. See Daston, ‘Historical Epistemology’.
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context of the Science Wars, in the wake of which science studies gained something of an anti-
rationalist label. Rationalism under Bachelard's influence takes on a new tenor, and is substantially 
redefined. This redefinition emerges from a reformulation of Kant's critical philosophy within the 
context of developments in Twentieth Century physics. By situating his approach in terms of the 
major narratives of rationalism, I claim that the spin that Bachelard gives things avoids the major 
pitfalls in this history while maintaining itself in the position of heir to critical philosophy, one of the 
most important intellectual traditions of modernity.
I situate rationalism in terms of its two great dichotomies, in the process delineating my position. 
Then I move on to more explicitly outlining a Bachelardian science studies, showing how it 
articulates with more recent scholarship, how it may inform a theory of scientific practice. The aim 
is to obtain a broad theoretical framework for discussing reason in practice, a stepping-off point from 
which to grasp the empirical studies of simulation that form the substance of the chapters that follow.
  4.2 Internalism and externalism
There are two major narratives about rationalism in tension during the Twentieth Century, one which 
sees it opposed to constructivism, and the other opposing it to empiricism. To appreciate Bachelard, 
it is necessary to unpick both.
Rationalism forms a context for contemporary science studies in terms of the internalism/externalism 
debate that pits sociological claims that social and political factors intrude on scientific activity 
against positions that maintain that scientific rationality operates by excluding such factors, casting 
them outside its legitimate domain, and thus proceeding down the single path of truth. In the debate, 
for example, between Michael Lynch and Allan Franklin, “reason” is treated as a pure domain of 
logical thought and action that becomes no longer reasonable as soon as extrinsic social or political 
values come into play163. In this light, the social sciences study social phenomena which are by 
definition outside the proper domain of the rational, so the very enterprise of a sociological study of 
scientific practice would therefore imply its object's irrationality. There would be no possibility of a 
social rationalism.
From a position more distanced from the Science Wars, however, Alan Nelson showed these 
opposed positions to be empirically irreconcilable: no example can ever be sufficient to furnish 
conclusive proof of the truth of the rationalist position nor of the constructivist position164. For any 
instance of scientific research, Nelson points out, it will always be possible for constructivists to 
maintain that conclusions were drawn in the way that they were because of contingent social 
conditions, in other words, if those conditions had been different a different outcome would have 
emerged. On the other hand the rationalist can always claim that if such influences did have an 
effect, it would only be short term and will be cancelled out in the long run by science's convergence 
163 Lynch, ‘Allan Franklin’s Transcendental Physics’; Franklin, Experiment Right or Wrong.
164 Nelson, ‘How Could Scientific Facts Be Socially Constructed?’.
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to the truth. As Hacking later put it: “Rationalists, at least retrospectively, can always adduce reasons 
that satisfy them. Constructivists, with equal ingenuity, can always find to their own satisfaction an 
openness where the upshot of research is settled by something other than reason”165.
From the Hacking/Nelson point of view, the best resolution that can be expected is an agreement to 
disagree. However, both the original debate and Nelson's proposed resolution are premised upon the 
fact/value distinction. In each case, the dividing line between the internal facts (upon which reason is 
based) and the external values is regarded as anterior to the issue. The debate can easily be reframed 
once it is pointed out that what we might (as philosophers or sociologists) be interested in is how this 
division comes to be established. The two sides from this point of view become mixed. For 
Bachelard, value is at the heart of reason, for a science works though producing “its own norms of 
truth”166. Furthermore, rationality is a social phenomenon. “Individuals hesitate... but the school – in 
the sciences – does not. The school... drives research forward”167. 
Bachelard's pun popularised by Latour, “un fait est fait” – roughly “a fact is an artefact” – runs 
against the idea that a fact is something “out there” waiting to be discovered, already opposed to the 
values that are the artefacts of our relation to the world168. Far from isolating a world of facts and 
reason from a world of values and irrationality, Bachelard points us towards the cultural nature of 
reason itself. He did this, however, not in order to undermine the legitimacy of scientific truth, but to 
understand the nature of the real and radical scientific progress he perceived around him.
The opposition between reason and society (or, equally, reason and culture) must be overcome, and 
this much has been clear within science studies for quite some time, even without going back to 
Bachelard. Godin and Gingras argue that “one can transcend such a ruinous opposition... by seeing 
that argumentation is an essentially social practice inside a scientific field that is the product of 
previous history (that is, of previous argumentation and experimentation)”169. They point out that 
“there is no reason for any reference to 'logic' and 'argumentation' to be taken as epistemological 
rather than sociological”170. This argument for the relevance of sociology to logic is not a claim that 
epistemological ideas of reason should be abandoned in favour of a pure sociology of groups and 
interests in the vein of the Strong Programme of the Edinburgh School. To do this would be simply 
to retrench the opposition between reason and society. It means that neither a pure sociology nor a 
pure asocial epistemology will do, and in this respect Rheinberger takes a similar stance to Godin 
and Gingras, though he wishes to reclaim the term “epistemic” in the process: “epistemicity is one of 
the modes by which we humans enter into a particular relationship with the material world around 
165 Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, 91–92.
166 Tjiattas, ‘Bachelard and Scientific Realism’, 206.
167 Bachelard, quoted in Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete, 32–33.
168 Latour, ‘Force and the Reason of Experiment’, 63.
169 Gingras and Godin, ‘The Experimenters’ Regress: From Skepticism to Argumentation’, 149.
170 Ibid., 150. Note that ‘epistemology’ need not be isolated from sociology. In contrast to Godin and Gingras’ use of the term, 
Bachelard and Rheinberger both understand epistemology as something already sociological.
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us”171. Epistemology does not, therefore study something detached from the wider domain of 
practical goings on of human activities. 
Reason is a primary marker of the core epistemic values of any scientific community, a target for a 
great deal of work aiming to uphold its rigour (“that seems reasonable”). Far from implementing a 
singular transcendental logic, scientists engage in a variety of strategies of argumentation and 
experimentation, each with a particular history and tied to material engagements with the 
environments they construct and maintain around them, what Pickering dubbed “disciplinary 
agency”172.
In fact, while he has come into conflict with science studies, Franklin also proposed a more 
pluralistic conception of reason, outlining a number of different strategies through which scientists 
give rational weight to their findings and their arguments173. Hacking, too, drawing on Crombie, has 
been influential in looking at the historical emergence of different styles of reasoning “that settle 
what it is to be true or false in their domain”174. Once the apparent antagonism between reason and 
the social is defused, it becomes clear that each of these strategies will have their own particular 
histories, something that is especially familiar to those working within the field of computational 
physics. KA, now one of the most senior scientists at AMCG, had earlier in his career established 
himself within the field of palaeo-oceanography, and had no experience with computational methods 
before getting involved with the group. He explained his entry into this new area as an engagement 
with a radically new way of doing his science, but one which is situated in a history of many similar 
precedents.
“I think geologists are always looking for new tools and I remember when the scanning 
electron microscope was first being rolled out. There were palaentologists using it to look at 
the structure of shells, and that was going on in the '60s... About a hundred years ago people 
first started using Uranium series data to date the age of the earth. People are always looking 
for a new technique that they can import in. There is a lot of history of doing that.” (KA)
New instruments came along periodically and opened up new possibilities. With them come new 
ways of making and justifying claims, new reasons for such work to be good or bad. For someone 
interested in prehistoric ocean circulations and tides, the use of computational modelling represented 
a new set of possibilities, but possibilities inseparable from the argumentative strategies through 
which they are brought into the academic fold175. KA elaborates on the forms of reasoning that were 
introduced with the new techniques: 
“Traditional geologists work backwards, from rocks, understood to be the result of an 
experiment that took place millions of years ago – working from the effect to the cause. But 
with the introduction of computational methods it was possible to start working in the other 
171 Rheinberger, ‘Reply to Bloor’, 409.
172 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 114–115.
173 Franklin, The Neglect of Experiment.
174 Hacking, ‘Language, Truth and Reason’, 50.
175 Cf. Weisberg, ‘Who Is a Modeller?’.
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direction, constructing a model in which you can vary the initial conditions to see what will 
happen.” (KA)
Quite aside from their individual strengths, however, it is the combination of computational with 
traditional geological techniques that KA regards as the most productive manner of science. A 
diversity of elements that can thus be drawn together into a specific research project, and these are 
mutually supporting. Just as a simulation may support KA in making his claims about ancient 
oceans, the degree of success of these claims reflects back on the integrity of the many elements and 
strategies that go into constructing his simulation. Past successes, reliable methodologies, numerical 
evidence, analytic proofs and community reputation, are all among the motley of strategies mustered 
around a simulation to back up its validity. A singular logic is ever elusive176.
Writing of the use of Monte Carlo methods, Galison asks: 
“How should one class this type of... simulation? As experimental theory? Theoretical 
experiment? Is it a case of induction from data? Deduction from theory? Each such attempt 
to force the argumentative form back into the older categories strikes me as awkward, a 
rearguard action unable to capture the novelty of procedure. Once again, I would suggest 
that the Monte Carlo is best seen as expanding the spectrum of persuasive evidence, a 
tertium quid”177.
Strategies are historically contingent and bound up with the communities that foster their legitimacy, 
and the techniques by which they are implemented. But the objectification of such strategies can 
never do justice to the processes of their application. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is always 
going to be possible to map out legitimate techniques for argument and for conduct in the laboratory, 
but these must be understood in interaction with the tempo of real research, rather than obscuring it. 
A scientist is expected to put these sanctioned strategies into practice in the performance of research, 
but the measure of success is as much the particular “practical mastery” of this performance as it is 
the legitimacy of the strategies that make it up. 
Bourdieu talks in the context of gift giving of “strategies exploiting the possibilities offered by 
manipulation of the tempo of the action – holding back or putting off, maintaining suspense or 
expectation, or on the other hand, hurrying, hustling, surprising, and stealing a march, not to mention 
the art of ostentatiously giving time (“devoting one's time to someone”) or withholding it (“no time 
to spare”)”178. A similar account can be given of the practices of implementing strategies of 
reasoning – to talk about the social aspect of epistemology is not simply to talk abstractly about 
norms but about the activities in which those norms are made concrete. Behind the legitimation of 
rules and strategies, reason can be located in terms of the actual practice of their effective 
deployment. Rheinberger, drawing on the writings of Claude Bernard and Ludwig Fleck, puts it 
eloquently:
176 Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, 21; Galison, Image and Logic, 747.
177 Galison, Image and Logic, 747.
178 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 7.
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“As Bernard... has put it, “one must have felt one's way for a long time... have been 
mistaken thousands and thousands of times, in short, have grown old in the practice of 
experimentation.” To feel one's way requires Erfahrenheit on the part of the experimenter. 
“Being experienced,” as Fleck uses the expression, is not simply “experience.” Experience 
enables us to judge a particular piece of work or a particular situation. Being experienced 
enables us to literally embody the judgement in the process of making new experiences, that 
is, to think with our body. Experience is an intellectual quality. Erfahrenheit, that is, 
acquired intuition, is a form of life.”179
Reason is something developed in scientific practice, not an overarching a priori faculty or method, 
for reason will change as methods change. Bachelard argued that the notion of a unitary method 
presents a great obstacle to reason, for reason progresses by working against itself. 
“For Bachelard a method is static by its essence. It sheds a distorting light. In fact, every 
single science forms its own method and permanently adapts it to its field, to its object, 
according to the hurdles it needs to get over in order to impose its rationality”180. 
“Scientific culture”, Bachelard wrote, “must bring about profound modifications of thought”181, 
modifications that are expressed historically by the grasp of the past as error. It is not a matter of 
mechanically applying a fixed reserve of legitimate techniques, but pushing towards the greatest 
modifications. “For science, truth is nothing other than a historical corrective to a persistent error, 
and experience is a corrective for common and primary illusions. The intellectual life of science 
depends dialectically on this differential of knowledge at the frontier of the unknown”182. 
At this point, we need to pause, and address an important critique of Bachelard, which may 
otherwise obstruct his relevance to contemporary science studies. In their review of French 
epistemology Bowker and Latour claim that Bachelard's theory relies on a far too strict opposition 
between science and non-science183. Bachelard's rhetorical style is indeed of this nature, constantly 
phrasing his understanding of scientific practice in terms of what distinguishes it from non-scientific 
or pre-scientific practice. But if we read the demarcation of science and non-science in terms of a 
“differential of knowledge at the frontier of the unknown”184, it is clearly not a difference that can be 
decided by an outside observer. Rather, it is internally produced, as scientific practice articulates 
itself against itself. Summing up this view of reason as an intrinsic dynamic of practice, against any 
objectification of method, Bachelard enigmatically tells us that “[r]eality is never 'what we might 
believe it to be': it is always what we ought to have thought”185.
179 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 77; as the reference to forms of life indicates, very productive parallels can be drawn between 
this practice-oriented theory and the later work of Wittgenstein. Charles Taylor has analysed the connections between Bourdieu 
and Wittgenstein to great effect: Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 165–180.
180 Bolduc and Chazal, ‘The Bachelardian Tradition in the Philosophy of Science’, 81.
181 Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind, 10.
182 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 172.
183 Bowker and Latour, ‘A Booming Discipline Short of Discipline’, 723–724.
184 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 172.
185 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 24.
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In other words, it is unnecessary for philosophers and sociologists to constitute an inside/outside 
boundary between the rational and the irrational; scientists are already at work doing just this. If this 
is part of their practice, the internalism/externalism debate breaks down, because there is no prior 
topology capable of defining the difference. Working on and with an evolving milieu of styles of 
reason, scientists are constantly dividing things (ideas, arguments, data, equipment) into what is 
legitimate and illegitimate.
The question of boundary maintenance is one which inflames Isabelle Stengers against both 
externalism and internalism. For to claim that the difference between science and non-science is 
“socially” or “externally” constructed requires the analyst to disregard scientists' own procedures of 
demarcation, and indeed to claim that while these procedures are real, they are nevertheless 
attempting to demarcate something which from the outsider's privileged perspective can be seen to 
have no ultimate justification.
“If the response to the question “Is it scientific?” is a construction of scientists, it is not the 
fruit of an agreement among scientists, deciding among themselves something a detached 
observer can recognize as always undecidable. The gaze that sees the same, the undecidable, 
where those he is observing have as their raison d’etre to create difference, is the gaze of 
power”186. 
Just as Stengers is unimpressed with the perspective of an observer claiming to occupy a position 
transcending the level of actual research, a theory of practice implies a critique of approaching the 
analysis according to any a priori problematic. For Rouse, the problem with many modern 
standpoints: positivism, historicism, instrumentalism and constructivism, is that they all take for 
granted that there exists a problem of legitimacy raised by science as a whole187. For him, a focus on 
practice might offer a way beyond these trends, by looking at research without framing the enquiry 
in monolithic terms, without assuming that the key issues are already predefined. Legitimacy may 
come to be an issue at certain moments, but the science/non-science boundary does not frame 
practice in general.
None of this amounts to a denial that there are many social and political issues peppering the 
research of a group like AMCG, and these are negotiated as and when they emerge. Climate change 
and mitigation agendas, oil and nuclear industry agendas, government priorities all feed in to the 
way in which work is funded, prioritised and publicised. My informants did not carry on with their 
work in blissful ignorance of intervening factors, but worked hard policing the boundary.
The political priorities that govern research council grants have at times exerted significant influence 
on the direction and composition of AMCG. The nuclear team, for example, was very significantly 
pared back by funding cuts in the 1990s and is only now starting to grow again with recent renewed 
political interest in nuclear energy from programmes such as “Keep the Nuclear Option Open”188. 
186 Stengers, The Invention of Modern Science, 73.
187 Rouse, Engaging Science, 8, 21–25, 53–68.
188 It remains to be seen what effect the political fallout of the Fukushima disaster of 2011 will have on this kind of research.
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Meanwhile, the oceanography and climate side experienced a huge boom in resources. While there is 
more industrial funding in nuclear engineering than climate science, this often has strings attached. 
The tolerance of industrial caveats on research varies on an ad hoc basis, generally according to 
whether it impedes what is recognised to be the appropriate freedom for a proper scientific 
investigation. In one case, for example, of a simulation of a medical isotope reactor, they “can 
publish on the cooling coil and the fissile solution, but not on the actual reactor that [the client is] 
making” (AY). Publishing certain details of industrially funded projects would give away their 
secrets to their competitors, but a complete block goes against the openness that scientists usually 
demand189. Furthermore, working on a project without being able to publish would seriously 
compromise the career prospects of the researcher in question. But sometimes a balance is struck. 
KA said:
“If a company came up and said “we would like you to do X but we don't want you to 
publish it” then it is almost like that is a pointless bit of work. But if we were not bothered 
about publishing it then we might take it on. It can be worth the money. Recently for a 
30,000 quid [industry project with a publication restriction] we persuaded the department to 
give it to us without overheads and that employed a post-doc for a two months, during which 
he was also able to get some other stuff done as well.” (KA)
Other significant issues are deeply engrained in the research at AMCG. For example, a lot of the 
information about nuclear reactors that is used for making nuclear safety simulations is kept 
confidential. This research therefore contravenes the widely held value of reproducibility. It is 
impossible to reproduce results of a simulation of a nuclear reactor if the design of that reactor is not 
published. But industrial intellectual property stands in the way, as do political interests in 
controlling international access to these technologies. Nuclear simulationists tend to point out that 
their work is important, and needs to be done, despite the limitations that these factors impose. There 
is therefore an internal/external division at stake in science, but one which is produced and 
reproduced inside the laboratory, rather than being an abstract division between the rational and 
irrational, accessible only to analyst-spectators looking in from the outside.
  4.3 Empiricism and rationalism
In its other great dichotomy, rationalism finds itself opposed to empiricism as reason is opposed to 
experience. This is very different to the opposition with constructivism, and indeed from this point of 
view, constructivism can be read as a particular form of rationalism, for the constructed nature of 
scientific knowledge implies active intervention within its formation, as opposed to the passive 
reception of data from experience190. 
The opposition to empiricism concerns the origin and foundation of knowledge, and we owe this 
distinction largely to Kant's legacy, his critical philosophy carving a third path between the 
189 Cf. Galison, ‘Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone’, 140.
190 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 102; see also Knuuttila, ‘Models as Epistemic Artefacts’, 25n.
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rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) and empiricists (Locke, Hume, Berkeley). The debate is 
often stated in terms of the origin of ideas: Locke's famous “tabula rasa” view of the mind traces 
every idea back to some originary experience, whereas rationalists, including on this matter Kant 
himself, maintain that there is some innate structure to the mind, and thus that ideas are possible that 
do not come from experience, but are “built in”, so to speak. While the empiricist would therefore 
have to base every legitimate claim to knowledge on its relation to experience, the rationalist would 
assert that in some cases it is possible to gain knowledge from reason alone, as in Descartes' 
ontological argument for God's existence according to the inherent necessity of the idea, or 
transcendental knowledge from the necessity of the form of any possible experience, in Kant's 
synthetic a priori.
While there are certainly problems with grouping philosophers into these two camps, different 
nuances of each of their positions, and indeed many influences crossing these boundaries, the 
opposition carried great weight through to more recent times. Foucault, for example, argued for the 
continuing significance in the middle of the Twentieth Century of a “line that separates a philosophy 
of experience, of sense and of subject and a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality and of 
concept”191. In other words, the phenomenological and existentialist traditions were to be opposed to 
the historical epistemology of Bachelard, Canguilhem, Cavaillès and to a great extent, Foucault 
himself192. Far from being an objective fact of philosophical orientation, this division is always 
invoked for certain polemical purposes, but its polemical power derives nevertheless from the fact 
that it is effective as a method of organising positions193. 
Like Kant before him, Bachelard's philosophy can be regarded as a new kind of rationalism forged 
as a third way between empiricism and older rationalisms; the “chief characteristic” of Bachelard's 
middle way is “a strong union of experiment and reason”194. Kant had restricted rationalism to the 
conditions of possibility of experience and knowledge, thereby opening a space for knowledge of a 
priori rational structures, knowledge that while a priori is nevertheless synthetic because it is only 
obtained through experience195. Bachelard rejects the fixity of the a priori that we find in Kant but 
his rationalism similarly proceeds through experience, according to his strict requirement that a 
scientific concept must be applied. If for Kant, we discover the transcendental concept through 
experience, for Bachelard, we overturn the concept through experiment. Echoing Kant's dictum that 
transcendental knowledge is always synthetic, for Bachelard a legitimate scientific concept cannot 
be unshackled from its application in an experimental set-up. In a famous passage that is worth 
quoting at length, Bachelard states:
191 Foucault, ‘Introduction’, 8.
192 See Gutting, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason.
193 Salanskis, ‘Phenomenology and Epistemology: War and Marriage’; see also Dosse, History of Structuralism, Volume 1, 3–9.
194 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 69.
195 See, for example, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 48–49.
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“Conceptualisation [in science] totalises the history of the concept and actualises it. Beyond 
history and driven forward by history, it gives rise to experiments deforming a historical 
stage of the concept. What it seeks in experiment is opportunities for complicating the 
concept, for applying it despite the concept's resistance, and for realising the conditions of 
application that reality did not bring together. It is then that we understand that science 
realises its objects without ever just finding them ready-made. Phenomenotechnique extends 
phenomenology. A concept becomes scientific in so far as its becomes a technique, in so far 
as it is accompanied by a technique that realises.”196
There is no place for concepts divorced from their being put into practice. While the form of this 
rationalism is similar to that of Kant, being immanent to the combination of reason and experience, 
the order is reversed. Rather than innate concepts structuring all possible experience, Bachelard is 
interested in the deformation of concepts opening new empirical domains. Whereas for Kant, the 
categories are fixed and immutable, for Bachelard they are under a process of perpetual revision. 
“Science is a discipline of active empiricism, which, rather than rely on whatever clear truths 
happen to lie ready to hand, actively seek its complex truths by artificial means. Innate truths 
naturally have no place in science. Reason has to be shaped in the same way as 
experience.”197
Bachelard thus will call his “new rationalism” a “non-Kantism, that is to say... a philosophy inspired 
by Kant which transcends the classic doctrine”198. Bachelard undoes the immutability and closedness 
of the Kantian categories, in favour of an “open-ended philosophy” in which concepts indeed give 
form to scientific experience, but in so doing are put into a historical process of mutation199. 
This non-Kantism was inspired by the disturbance to Kantian philosophy brought about firstly by the 
development of non-Euclidean geometries, and secondly by their application in Einstein's theory of 
relativity. Even the structure of space, which for Kant was a transcendental condition of outer 
sensibility, and absolutely necessary, turned out to be revisable in light of new experimental findings. 
For Bachelard the crucial scientific movement is not the elaboration of the knowledge of a closed 
system, but the overturning of such a system. In his opinion, non-Euclidean geometry “'freed' 
rationalism by severing its psychological ties to a closed and immutable system of logic”200. Mary 
Tiles expressed it well when she claimed that Bachelard's philosophy is a “natural consequence” of 
the combination of Kantianism with “a rejection of the givenness and immutability of the structures 
of rational thought”201.
Bachelard took a stand against the empiricisms of his day because he did not believe scientific 
objects are ever simply found in experience. They must be created. He will reject the founding of 
science on experience in general, while asserting that technically and rationally produced experience 
196 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 69–70.
197 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 171.
198 Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind, 12.
199 Tiles, Bachelard, 34; Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind, 7.
200 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 20.
201 Tiles, Bachelard, 17, 204–211.
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is something very different, and mustn't be assimilated into an everyday empiricism in which every 
empirical object is “given” in the same way. “The traditional philosophical notion of a datum or 
given is highly improper to characterise the result of the laborious determination of experimental 
values”202. Hacking will later echo this sentiment in his claim that phenomena, in the sense that 
scientists use the term in their laboratory practice, are not the stuff of everyday experience. They are 
noteworthy, painstakingly created. They are rare203. 
But again, because of the distance between us and Bachelard, it is important to adapt his thought to 
contemporary conditions, and even more so to let it respond to the lenses through which he has 
tended to be read in the intervening decades. Bachelard is commonly associated with Kuhn. 
Although Kuhn's work postdated much of Bachelard's, the reception of Bachelard in the English 
speaking world was conditioned by Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and consequently 
Bachelard's thought was seen in this guise204. His other route into the Anglophone world was via the 
philosophy of Louis Althusser, whose Marxist and materialist reading of Bachelard also played up 
the revolutionary connotations of the notion of the epistemological “break”205. Both readings are no 
doubt productive, but they are particular readings that push Bachelard's thought through specific 
agendas. Most importantly, both stress the side of Bachelard's theory that emphasises the 
revolutionary nature of scientific practice. He was indeed living in tumultuous times for physical 
theory. But does that mean he would be less suited to times of less radical change? Or that he cannot 
be informative for understanding more everyday scientific practice? It is crucial to note that as much 
as he works from historical examples of theoretical revolutions, Bachelard's concept of the 
epistemological break equally applies to the much more mundane practice of being a scientist and 
learning to be a scientist, where it is necessary to continually work against the obstructions of 
everyday metaphors and intuitive abstractions. Bachelard was at least as interested in pedagogy as he 
was in the history of revolutions, and the overcoming of obstacles via a break need not be a moment 
of great historical significance, but may form the small moments of renegotiation in practice. A great 
historical moment may well have provided the impetus for Bachelard's break with Kant but it does 
not therefore follow that his philosophy is inappropriate for times of fewer such moments.
Bachelard's philosophy is a rationalism premised on the mutation of concepts and the application of 
concepts within experiment, so his rejection of empiricism nevertheless incorporates a fundamental 
role for experience as experiment. This direction takes rationalism a long way from connotations of 
the power of pure thought, and takes us to a powerful idea of the rationality of self-articulated 
empirico-conceptual engagements, the reason of scientific practice.
202 Bachelard, quoted in Tjiattas, ‘Bachelard and Scientific Realism’, 204.
203 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 221–222.
204 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
205 Althusser, ‘Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists’; Balibar, ‘From Bachelard to Althusser’; Fraser, ‘The 
Category of Formalization’, xvii.
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  4.4 Phenomenotechnique
The concept of phenomenotechnique has been hailed as one of Bachelard's most important 
contributions to philosophy206. The term captures the applied nature of his rationalism, a rationalism 
that asserts that scientific activities have their own inherent but open logics, logics of practice not of 
thought. Reason cannot be understood as a subjective faculty. For Kant, the categories through 
which we know the world can be discovered through a transcendental philosophy of our knowledge 
and experience, discovering the architecture of the transcendental subject. But for Bachelard this 
architecture becomes worldly and open. We make a move from the subject to worldly practices as 
the locus of the conditions for the possibility of science. Bachelard will repeat Kantian worries about 
the excesses of pure reason, about a dangerous tendency when unshackled from experience to depart 
on a flight of fancy, but for him this is the possibility for any concept deemed immutable, or any 
concept that does not “incorporate a concept's conditions of application into the very meaning of the 
concept”207. “A concept is scientific not on the basis of inductive derivation, but only if it is 
accompanied by an appropriate realization technique”208. Bachelard in this sense prefigured the 
“experimental turn” in the philosophy of science209.
At the heart of phenomenotechnique is a dialectic between theory and technique, but this is not a 
Hegelian dialectic. It is an interdependency and a process of mutual revision, rather than formal 
contradiction. On the other side to his assertion that any scientific concept must be applied, is 
Bachelard's famous claim that any scientific instrument can therefore be seen as a “reified 
theorem”210, that “the instrument of physics is a realized, concretized theory, rational in essence”211. 
The production of phenomena that occurs in experimental science cannot be understood as a special 
case of ordinary empirical experience. The production here operates at the level of the noumenon, 
producing a new real. “We can therefore say that mathematical Physics corresponds to a 
noumenology that is greatly different to a phenomenography within which scientific empiricism 
claims to encase itself. It is this very noumenology that elucidates a phenomenotechnique through 
which new phenomena are not simply found but invented, constructed and built from all parts”212. 
We will return to the contrast between a creative practice producing a real with a revelatory practice 
discovering reality in chapter 9.
One side of his opposition to empiricism is philosophical, and here he is contesting philosophers' 
views about the basis of scientific knowledge. But on the other side, Bachelard wants to draw out the 
perils of empiricist tendencies within scientific practice itself. Ordinary experience, he advises, must 
206 Castelão-Lawless, ‘Phenomenotechnique in Historical Persepective’, 45.
207 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 69.
208 Tjiattas, ‘Bachelard and Scientific Realism’, 207.
209 E.g. Hacking, Representing and Intervening; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump; Galison, How Experiments 
End.
210 Bachelard, quoted in Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete, 31.
211 Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind, 21.
212 Bachelard, ‘Noumena and Microphysics’, 76.
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be cast aside in order to initiate proper scientific practice. Our ways of thinking are heavily 
conditioned by our everyday lives and these intuitive and metaphorical modes of thought can easily 
stand in the way of scientific work, which must proceed against them. In chapter 6, 'Images in/of 
Simulation', we return to this issue, looking at the role of intuitions in scientists' encounters with the 
results of their research. 
At the heart of Bachelard's critique of intuition is the idea of the “epistemological obstacle” and the 
project of what he calls his “psychoanalysis” of the scientific mind. As Mary McAllester Jones has 
pointed out, this is to be interpreted not in a Freudian tradition, but rather in a general sense of 
therapy: “psychoanalysing objective knowledge means ridding it of everything that impedes its 
progress, whether affective interests or everyday, utilitarian knowledge, so restoring it to health”213. 
Because Bachelard has undone the closure of Kantian categories, forms of thought are historical and 
cultural, and can require great effort to be overcome. They must be put into experimental practice 
wherever they risk hardening into obstacles. “It is in the act of cognition that we shall show causes 
of stagnation and even of regression”214. Bachelard is therefore just as opposed to the idea of starting 
with a blank slate as he is to the idea of immutable categories, a problem in both philosophy and 
within science: “the scientist thinks he can start from a mind without structure and without 
knowledge; the philosopher more often posits an established mind, all equipped with categories 
indispensable to the understanding of reality”215. Phenomenotechnique – looking at actual research 
practice – avoids the pitfalls of both, for it posits the conditioning of research as a continual process 
of self-articulated becoming.
Bachelard believes in the disunity of science and refuses to provide a general account of method in 
the Cartesian vein. “[W]e shall ask philosophers to break with the ambition of finding one single, 
fixed point of view for judging the totality of as science as vast and changing as that of physics. We 
shall thus end up characterising the philosophy of the sciences as a philosophical pluralism...”216. 
Bachelard's successors would thus forge their own ways in the study of biology and medicine 
(Canguilhem), mathematics (Cavaillès, Badiou's early work), the social and human sciences 
(Foucault), and a less well fated attempt to do the same for historical materialism (Althusser). In the 
context of attempting to understand contemporary practices of simulation, we can regard this new 
suburb of the “scientific city”217 to be adding to the existing diversity. Scientific concepts can be 
realised in many different ways, and simulation opens up another kind of opportunity for realisation, 
a new kind of phenomenotechnique. 
213 Jones, ‘Introduction’, 3.
214 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 24.
215 Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind, 7–8.
216 Ibid., 10–11.
217 Bachelard, Le Rationalisme Appliqué, 133; Cf Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete, 32.
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  4.5 Reified concepts
There is an important criticism of Bachelard that we must briefly dwell on, for it requires us to 
extend phenomenotechnique somewhat, or at least to situate scientific practice within a broader 
context. Galison criticises Bachelard for dubbing instruments “reified theorems”. For Galison, while 
this appears to hail a philosophy of instrumentation, it risks becoming “a rallying cry against the 
autonomy of instrumentation and for the all pervasiveness of theory”218. Galison is similarly 
unhappy with the anti-empiricism of philosophers like Kuhn and Feyerabend because it works 
through asserting the “theory laden” nature of observation. Although the concept of theory-ladenness 
serves to undermine empiricist notions of pure observations, it also has the effect of overdetermining 
instruments by theory. Galison raises a crucial point, because while the experimental turn required 
the displacing of theory-centric philosophy, older arguments such as Bachelard's were not pitted 
against theory per se, but were opposed to empiricism and positivism, a battle that could be fought to 
a certain extent within the presuppositions of theory-centrism.
The way forward is clearly a middle way, in which Bachelard is brought up to date with these 
currents in thinking about science. The neutrality of facts is to be denied but not because instruments 
are only reified theorems: they are much more besides. Galison points out that not only do we find 
different theoretical schools of thought, we also encounter different kinds of experimentalists, and 
different traditions of instrument makers, in interaction but also with a certain degree of 
independence219. The scientific instrument as reified concept takes on a different tenor when it is 
recognised that not only is it productive of scientific realities when employed within the laboratory, 
it has also been connected with distinct cultures of expertise in which it was originally crafted, 
connected with earlier forms of equipment and moving through various iterations of calibration and 
modification. Dominique Lecourt made a similar point about Bachelard's thought, noting that his 
technical theory of science begs the question of the relationship between science and wider histories 
of industrial production220, a point which is particularly important in the context of today's globally 
distributed and interpenetrating technological systems221. We can certainly accept that Bachelard 
leaves certain questions unanswered, and this gives us scope and indeed good reason to expand his 
theory. But far from refuting phenomenotechnique, this modification to its central pillar serves to 
make it more sophisticated.
Computational physicists have a number of important relationships with other sites of technical 
production with other communities. Some of these are industrial, as in the manufacture of computer 
hardware. In chapter 8 we will encounter new computational devices, such as GPU architectures and 
accelerator chips, which are becoming increasingly important in supercomputer design, but both of 
which have a technical history that owes more to the video games industry than it does to scientific 
218 Galison, Image and Logic, 18.
219 Galison, Image and Logic.
220 Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology, 138–139.
221 Barry, ‘Technological Zones’.
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computing. On the software side of things, a software system like Fluidity draws on programming 
languages developed for general purpose applications development, and uses libraries of functions 
that have been assembled through work in very different fields. The libraries of linear solvers, for 
example, provide an array of instruments for solving matrices on a computer. The fact that the 
matrices dealt with among the Fluidity scientists are generated by fluid dynamics problems gives 
them a particular flavour but many of the techniques that will be deployed from these libraries have 
been developed elsewhere. Their incorporation into a library has enabled them to travel and be co-
opted into a huge range of different software systems. But it is important to note that as much as the 
scientists at AMCG utilise instruments made elsewhere, they also participate in instrument-making, 
adding, for example, new solvers to these libraries where they find them lacking.
It is also important to note that the slogan “reified theorem” would be badly misunderstood if it is 
taken to imply that Bachelard thinks theories exist prior to practical application, and thus serving as 
a source material for the crafting of instruments. On the contrary, theories for Bachelard exist only 
insofar as they are reified, and there is no need to assume that a given experimental system can be 
“translated” into concepts in any straightforward manner. We return to this issue in chapter 7, where 
the question of whether software systems can be described in publications is addressed. The 
experimental system is conceptual to the extent that it drives forward the research practice, insofar as 
it participates in its self-articulated unfolding, and there is no need to assume equivalence to a 
linguistic structure. Rouse sums up this departure from classic approaches to theory as a key aspect 
of the recent turn to practice:
“Scientific theory is better understood in terms of theoretical practices: modelling particular 
situations or domains; articulating, extending, and reconciling those models and their 
constituent concepts and techniques; and connecting theoretical models to experimental 
systems. Such a conception of theorising diverges both from the classical sense of theoria 
and more recent analyses of theories as axiomatic or model-theoretic systems”222.
The concept is not prior (and thus not prior to practice), but exists insofar as it is put into practice, an 
emergence which will inform and deform its structure towards an open future. In this respect, 
Bachelard's thought anticipates practice theory, in its generalised critique of the priority of anything 
(theoretical, methodological or transcendental) deemed to foreclose the field of practice. For 
Bachelard, as for practice theorists, it is practice itself that is the key domain. To the extent that an a 
priori is meaningful, it is immanent to this dynamic multiplicity.
  4.6 Phenomenotechnique in practice
I now take a moment to expand on the concrete lessons of Bachelard's perspective for the 
understanding of the particular kinds of research that are at stake here. I want to show in brief outline 
that it allows us to capture the nuances of the research process. My example is a project modelling 
222 Rouse, ‘Understanding Scientific Practices’, 444.
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tidal barrages in the Severn Estuary. This project involved several scientists at AMCG, but the bulk 
of the work was being done by one PhD student, HU, a mathematician by background. 
Because of the irregular topography of the Severn Estuary, when the tide recedes, what was once a 
single river splits into a number of isolated stretches of water, eventually to be reconnected at the 
next high tide. This is a problem for the current version of Fluidity because it cannot easily deal with 
splitting and joining domains. It is a challenge for most numerical modelling codes, and thus an 
object of study that is methodologically at the forefront of what is currently possible. What HU is 
developing, therefore, is a new method called “wetting and drying”, which will enable the accurate 
simulation of these phenomena. As with all such projects that require developments of novel 
techniques, research is oriented towards the methods as much as towards the applications that they 
facilitate.
In the building of computer simulation, the conceptual development of numerical and computational 
methods is fundamentally tied to their realisation in code, and it is through that realisation that they 
become objects to be worked upon further. It is through being crafted into a computational system of 
exploration and manipulation that things become the kind of things that computational scientists 
study. The scientist does not begin with a pre-formed idea of the final simulation in his head, but 
rather begins with a very rough plan of a trajectory that will successively move the conceptualisation 
of the problem and the development of the simulation through practical steps towards progressive 
realisation. The problem is a problem of method (how to simulate) as much as it is empirical (what 
to simulate). HU does not know at the beginning what the crucial factors will be within the processes 
of wetting and drying. His concept of the problem is general, but becomes more specific as he goes 
through the process of developing the model. Although we can talk about the Severn Estuary in a 
general sense, the specific Severn Estuary as it emerges through phenomenotechnical realisation is 
quite distinct. It is a mathematical system, conceptually uncertain and open, teased out in and 
through a process of investigation.
HU develops the model through a series of stages, testing his new technique for its properties in 
increasingly complex domains. The new software components he developed use a trick to simulate 
wetting and drying which involves maintaining the continuity of the domain despite its empirical 
separations, by allowing an extremely thin film of water to lie over the supposedly “dry” areas 
during low tide. The working hypothesis is that with certain boundary conditions imposed to prevent 
spurious flow across this film, the technique will facilitate the study of the dynamics of the estuary 
without introducing unwanted effects within the simulation results. Not only does HU not yet grasp 
the tidal estuary as a mathematical system, he also does not yet know how his new technique will 
interact with the many other techniques that others have implemented within the model: will it 
disrupt the balance of approximations that is concretised there? Will it bring an unforeseen bug in the 
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code to the fore? Will it prove too sensitive a formulation to provide an apparatus robust enough to 
explore empirical simulations from a great range of initial conditions?
HU starts with an idealised problem, just some fluid in a 2D domain with a sloping floor. By varying 
the water level, he can see how the domain behaves as he writes the new wetting and drying module. 
“At that stage,” he says, 
“you are working with your physical intuition. That is all you have. You don't have the 
ability to validate it against empirical data. You can only compare it against what looks 
right.” (HU)
He is checking visually that the water level gets thin against the surface when the water level drops, 
to try to see if the code he has written is doing what he thinks it is doing. This is a check that his 
code embodies what he thinks it does, and that this has the effect that he expects it to. There is at this 
point no strong assurance of either of these, only an indication that it is time to proceed onwards and 
try some new things.
“Once you have something more or less physical you can validate against empirical 
measurements. But even measurements are not that accurate. The best thing you can have is 
an analytical solution.” (HU)
While this next step can be an attempt to reproduce experimental data from fluid dynamics studies, 
the problem is that experimental set-up is itself inexact and error prone. Furthermore, even if 
laboratory scale experiments are often quite simple, they are still a huge step up in complexity from 
his 2D domain. The next move, therefore, was to use “Thacker's test case”, an idealised problem in 
which the fluid dynamics equations are simplified, and the domain idealised into a very specific 2D 
parabolic frictionless cup. It turns out that if you have a fluid in the cup with its surface raised up in 
another carefully worked out parabolic curve, and then let it flow under the force of gravity, the 
surface height will follow an analytically solvable path. For this highly idealised case, therefore, if 
HU can set it up as a simulation of Thacker's case that relies on his wetting and drying technique, he 
has a set of exact answers against which the effects of his method can be compared. He can then 
vary the resolution of his model to see how the error changes, and meets with success if the error 
will tend towards zero as he runs higher and higher resolution simulations. At this stage, far from 
directly investigating the Severn Estuary, as if it was already given prior to investigation, HU is 
engaged in gradually realising a mathematical system in a computational medium, and the most 
important aspect of this system, in relation to the equipment already existing in Fluidity's toolbox, is 
the effect and behaviour of wetting and drying processes. 
Matching the analytic results of the Thacker case provides a further indication that the method is 
working, and that it will continue to work in more elaborate cases, but this point is a long way from 
making any direct claims. What it does provide is feedback about the properties of the simulation, 
which HU will tweak to see the effect on these results. As the work continues, HU and his 
supervisors begin to understand the interaction of the new computational techniques with the type of 
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mathematical system that he is investigating, in the process of which the very idea of what this 
system is will also be developing. After the analytic solution, he will look to experimental test cases, 
to try to reproduce results in non-idealised domains, with different geometries and different 
properties. 3D domains with irregular topographies are next, and all the way it will be possible to 
tease out of the process more about what the specific effect of wetting and drying will be, alongside 
the growing knowledge of the specific effect of HU's new technique for implementing wetting and 
drying in the computer. The eventual modelling of the Severn Estuary must be understood, therefore, 
in relation to this cumulative trajectory, a trajectory which does not simply build the tools that will 
be needed, but that is formative of the very object being studied. 
We will return to further examples with more detail in the chapters that follow. For now, it is most 
important to note that not only does Bachelard's philosophy encourage us to look at actual scientific 
practice, it also indicates that we should be attentive to the dynamics of research processes, the “real 
time” of practice and its transformative potential. Furthermore, Bachelard points to the differences in 
orientation that can be found in practice, differences that cannot be subsumed under a single account. 
He asks, “[d]o you think that, in all his thoughts, the scientist is a realist? Is he a realist when he 
supposes, is he a realist when he sums up, is he a realist when he schematizes, is he a realist when he 
makes mistakes? Is he necessarily a realist when he affirms?”223 In our case, we can point to the very 
different kinds of orientation found in applications and methods research, as well as the positions 
encountered in the trajectories of modelling, moving from the mathematical conceptualisation of the 
new technique, to its implementation in a computationally discretised version of an idealised domain 
in which mathematics gives a perfect solution, to his modelling of an experimentally artificial 
domain with its empirical idiosyncrasies, to the modelling of semi-analytic solutions, where a 
mathematical function is fitted to empirical data, to the modelling of the Severn estuary itself. 
When HU models the estuary itself he controls a multiplicity of parameters and variables, from the 
resolution of the domain, to the rules about when and how much the resolution of the domain will 
adapt to a new form, to the boundary conditions that control the rising of the tide and the rate of flow 
in different parts of the channel. As his work moves towards the “real world” case, his own 
intervention becomes more pervasive, as the control he needs to apply to a more complex simulation 
grows, even while the progression from the idealisation to experimental artificiality to the 
measurement of an estuary appears at each step to decrease the level of artifice. The effect of 
empirical representation gained in this end case conceals under its surface the entire history of its 
trajectory, carried with it and through which it took shape and turned out the way it did.
  4.7 Phenomenotechnique in context
Phenomenotechnique is a way of thinking about the intrinsic rationality of technical practice. We can 
put this in the context of wider trends in thinking about technology and cognition that became 
223 Bachelard, The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind, 35.
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prominent later in the Twentieth Century. Phenomenotechnique can be set alongside Bernard 
Stiegler's philosophy of technical prostheses and Edwin Hutchin's theory of cognition in the wild, 
both of which situate reason within the world and within our apparatuses of intervention224. These 
kinds of ideas, that “scientific cognition largely relies on non linguistic representations, mental or 
public, such as images, graphs or simulative models”, are now prevalent in many fields225. Reason is 
a question of things as much as, or more than, it is a question of discourse. Nersessian's cognitive 
studies of “model-based reasoning” draw these theories further into articulation with the 
ethnographic tradition in science studies226.
Looking back even further, Bachelard's philosophy follows a general trend of Twentieth Century 
thought in his de-subjectification of Kant's categories. Durkheim argued for the validity of 
sociological arguments (as opposed to psychological explanations) by appealing to the social nature 
of the Kantian categories. While for Bachelard the non-Newtonian developments in science 
precipitated his departure from the immutable transcendental, for Durkheim it was the growing 
evidence from various parts of the world that people from different societies seemed to think through 
different categories. Concepts, he would posit, are not inherent properties of universal subjectivity, 
but are of social origin. “Thinking by concepts”, he wrote, “is not merely seeing reality on its most 
general side, but it is projecting a light upon the sensation which illuminates it, penetrates it and 
transforms it. Conceiving something is both learning its essential elements better and also locating it 
in its place; for each civilization has its organized system of concepts which characterizes it”227. In 
his later work, Edmund Husserl embraced a similar notion of the historical and social embeddedness 
of categories. “Every people, large or small, has its world in which, for that people, everything fits 
well together, whether in mythical-magical or in European-rational terms, and in which everything 
can be explained perfectly. Every people has its “logic” and, accordingly, if this logic is explicated in 
propositions, “its” a priori”228. 
The greatest shift in post-Durkheimian social science has been the integration of this transcendent 
structure with a conception of embodied practice, something pioneered by Durkheim's nephew 
Marcel Mauss, and brought closer to maturity by Bourdieu229. This brings the transcendental back 
“down to earth”, within the structures of practice that govern life, and the generative embodied 
dispositions, “principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can 
be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to 
rules...”230. As Tiles has noted, Bachelard's thought is so difficult to reconcile with analytic 
224 Stiegler, Technics and Time; Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild.
225 Heintz, ‘Why There Should Be a Cognitive Anthropology of Science’, 405; see also Lenoir, ‘Epistemology Historicized’, xvi.
226 Nersessian, ‘How Do Engineering Scientists Think?’.
227 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 435.
228 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, 373.
229 Mauss, ‘Les Techniques Du Corps’; Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice; Cf. Ortner, ‘Theory in Anthropology Since the 
Sixties’.
230 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 72.
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philosophy of science precisely because his emphasis on actual scientific practice is at odds with a 
Fregean rationality always abstracted from any particular implementation in situ231. For Bachelard, 
as for Bourdieu, it is realisation in practice that counts, not whatever structures that can be abstracted 
out from those goings on. Emphasis on fixed structures is displaced in favour of emphasis on the 
sites of their generation and mutation.
As we saw in the previous chapter, much recent social theory has complemented this picture, and 
brought a new dimension to any contemporary appreciation of phenomenotechnique with deeper 
engagements with the role of materiality in practice232. Looking at phenomenotechnique in 
computational science means as much understanding the materiality of systems of investigation as it 
does studying embodiment and the concretisation of concepts. A common core emerges, from which 
the categories are de-subjectivised, de-absolutised, and opened up. Rationalism is no longer about 
the structuration of the subject prior to the approach to the world. It is about the sedimentation of 
intricately textured practical engagements in a world. A science studies that embraces this retains one 
of the most interesting and productive aspects of the critical heritage.
  4.8 Temporality and reason
This last section responds to a final criticism of the Bachelardian position. Bowker and Latour make 
the accusation that Bachelard's philosophy breaks Bloor's symmetry principle, which he laid down as 
a fundamental axiom of the Strong Programme233. This principle states that sociological 
explanations should be of the same kind whether the scientists end up making true or false choices: 
“Having chosen the true option is no less problematic than having chosen the false one”234. Bowker 
and Latour are referring to Bachelard's philosophy of error, of judging the past as error, and this is 
indeed a far remove from the social explanations of how scientists make their choices, that were 
favoured by the Edinburgh School. But Bachelard's philosophy is symmetrical in a more important 
sense, for it regards all present knowledge as the future's error. This is a certain kind of asymmetry 
here, but it is not the kind of asymmetry of which Bloor was critical. Bachelardian asymmetry 
reflects the temporality of practice, for which “truth is nothing other than a historical corrective to a 
persistent error”235. 
While Latour may well disagree with the practice theoretical perspective, and thus reject the 
fundamental role for temporality that it implies, he cannot rightly portray Bachelard's lack of 
symmetry as a symptom of a cheap form of argument that attributes causal power to a decision's 
truth or falsity. Every scientific decision is true in its relation to the past, and false in its relation to 
the future: “we must put scientific culture on the alert so that it is always ready to move, we must 
231 Tiles, Bachelard, 25.
232 Ingold, ‘Bringing Things to Life’; Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 6; Miller, Materiality.
233 Bowker and Latour, ‘A Booming Discipline Short of Discipline’.
234 Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 177.
235 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 172.
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replace closed, static knowledge, with knowledge that is open and dynamic, and dialectise all 
experimental variables. Reason must in short be given reasons for developing”236. This temporality 
is that of the differential articulation of practice and accounts of it, and it always implies that the past 
reflections of such a process be viewed in the present light of error. 
Despite the potential antagonism between practice and semiotic approaches, a potential 
reconciliation is suggested by Stengers, where she integrates the Latourian concept of the “factish” 
with precisely this kind of Bachelardian theme. She writes of moments of transformation in practice, 
of “the moment when a perspective comes into existence in which what is mixed together can be 
separated. A new immaculate state of things separates out from its history, becoming, like any 
factish, capable of explicating the missteps of an outdated past in which it had “not yet” been taken 
into account”237. Latour's rejection of French epistemology, once a considerable barrier to reading 
Bachelard in science studies, can thus be displaced, opening a new door to reflecting on its 
rationalist heritage.
  4.9 Conclusion
Phenomenotechnique provides us with a basis for understanding scientific practice as something 
special, as a deployment of reason in skilled settings, in the articulation of scientific work against its 
own unfolding, its creation of phenomena and setting them into motion. I am interested in the 
integral dynamics of practice, as a real locus of transformation of the conditions of possibility for 
further work. But this dynamic is not something to be measured according to some external metric, 
some scale of advance mapped out through history. It is the temporality of research work itself, 
which can only be understood in terms of its own logics.
It is hard to overemphasise this point. The term “historical epistemology” itself may be misleading, 
for it suggests an external viewpoint on practice, charting larger trends. In contrast, this study charts 
a very small period of time, a period of time containing no huge shifts in the foundation of 
computational science. But the advantage of this quieter field site is that it allows for greater 
attention to the kind of work that will never be subject to grand histories of ideas or of revolutions. 
Reason unfolds, for us as for Bachelard, not in History, as it did for Hegel, but rather in the scientific 
everyday.
236 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 29.
237 Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, 188.
- 91 -
 5 Modelling and Representing
  5.1 Introduction
We now turn to representation. In a sense, this chapter is the hinge between the theoretical and the 
empirical parts of the thesis. It is a theoretical coda flagging up the importance of practice for 
reformulating the concept of representation. But on the other hand, this reformulation turns 
representation into something a lot more everyday, something to be explored empirically, and thus 
we start to explore the phenomenotechnical practice of computational physics as a process of 
modelling, picking up from the example given in the previous chapter, and paving the way for the 
following chapter on images, in which research in the making takes centre-stage.
One of the themes that has come out of my research has been the claim that modelling is creative. 
However, the dominance in Bachelard's thought of the idea of the production of phenomena 
(“phenomenotechnique extends phenomenology”) makes practices of modelling seem too 
conservative to count as properly phenomenotechnical. It is too easy to assume that modelling 
invents nothing new. But I will endeavour to show that practices of modelling are just as productive 
and creative as are particle accelerators. As Petersen put it, “phenomena are “created”, albeit 
digitally, within the simulation laboratory”238. The initial move in showing that modelling is a 
creative practice with its own integral dynamics is to show that it is in not a matter of creating 
singular representations of phenomena of interest. In this sense this chapter is removing a key 
obstacle to our understanding, showing that modelling is dynamic and multiple, that it is creative in 
its own becoming, and must not be hidden behind the singularity of the products that it sometimes 
leaves behind.
Any theory of representation offered here must also reconcile itself with the current of post-positivist 
critiques, which have decisively undermined representationalism, that is, any theory of science in 
which the overall goal and effect of research is conceived in terms of the production of an accurate 
representation of the world. Tarja Knuuttila has expressed this in her call for a “non-
238 Petersen, Simulating Nature, 18.
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representationalist theory of representation”239. She takes issue with views that consider 
representation to be the a priori central feature of science, and to this extent she sides with anti-
representationalist critics, such as Richard Rorty240. For too many philosophers, the idea that science 
represents nature has formed a starting point for inquiry rather than a premise to be critically 
examined. 
The critique of the spectator theory of knowledge has long been a centre-piece of pragmatist 
philosophy (not just Rorty, but Dewey, Peirce, and others too). But over the last three decades it has 
been combined with a general turn towards scientific practice. Ian Hacking, for example, aims in 
Representing and Intervening to shift the terms of the realism debate from positions that largely 
consider realism a matter of the realistic interpretation of statements (particularly where those 
statements concern unobservable entities), towards a more experimental realism based on 
manipulation241. It is important to note that Hacking's argument, like Knuuttila's, does not imply that 
we should abandon representation as a concept. In Pickering's terms the key move is a 
“rebalancing”, in which materiality and practice are allowed their proper space, rather than an 
outright rejection of representation in general242. The point is to de-centre it, to reinsert it within a 
more practical theory based on intervention and manipulation. Representation is not the only thing 
going on in science, nor is it the sole criterion for scientific success. This chapter charts the many 
ways in which representations are deployed, and the many ways they can succeed or fail. 
  5.2 Theories of theory: syntax/semantics
Recent years have seen a huge surge in interest in models and representation. The usual narrative 
relates this trend to a longer-term shift in the philosophy of science from “syntactical” views of 
scientific theory to “semantic” views243. One of the major pioneers of this movement was Patrick 
Suppes, who proposed that there may be advantages to regarding theory in terms of models, rather 
than in terms of statements. This grew into a general movement contesting the “Received View” that 
a scientific theory should be thought of as a linguistic entity244. Since the days of the logical 
positivists, the received view had led many to theorise about scientific theories in terms of the 
logical relationships inside and among these various collections of statements, about their 
consistency, syntax and axioms, and about the reducibility of one or another collection of statements 
to observation statements, or to statements in the language of more “fundamental” science, 
mathematical physics.
239 Knuuttila, ‘Models as Epistemic Artefacts’.
240 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
241 Hacking, Representing and Intervening.
242 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 7.
243 See, for example, Suppes, ‘The Meaning and Uses of Models’; Giere, Explaining Science; van Fraassen, The Scientific Image.
244 Suppe, ‘The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories’.
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By the 1960s, however, a number of problems with this kind of view had accumulated. Quine had 
raised important questions about the distinction within these languages between theoretical and 
observational statements, about translation between theories, and about holism245. Kuhn, on the other 
hand, had further pushed the problem of the relationship between theories by challenging even the 
idea that a science is compatible with past forms from its own history246. In this context, Suppes and 
colleagues made the move from thinking about theories as linguistic entities to thinking about them 
as structures through the framework of mathematical model theory. He thus elided many of the 
problems with the syntactic view. If a scientific theory is considered through model theory as a set 
theoretical structure, many different kinds of formulations would be permitted of the same theory. 
This provides a much more abstract notion of what a scientific theory is, because it can no longer be 
identified with a set of statements found in textbooks or publications. But it presents an exit route 
from the problems that were mounting up through the philosophy of language247.
While the semantic view remained highly abstract and formal248, the general space of contestation of 
the received view led other philosophers to respond by looking instead at the much more concrete 
processes involved in the application of theories. The more abstract the view of theories, the greater 
impetus is generated to question how theories actually get applied to concrete circumstances. The 
most important writer in this trend was Nancy Cartwright, who famously argued that we are 
mistaken to think that scientific theory in itself provides a true description of the world, showing that 
in order for any specific empirical claims to be made it is necessary to go through an intermediary 
process of modelling, and only through such a process could theoretical “laws” be meaningfully 
brought into articulation with the world249. Her work stimulated a great deal of interest in the 
processes of applying theories, as something interesting in itself. Along with others, such as Giere, 
who combined aspects of the semantic view with a more concrete approach to models, Cartwright 
brought processes of modelling to the centre of attention in philosophy of science.
The simulations made at AMCG are constructed using resources from several different bodies of 
theoretical literature (branches of mathematics, computer science, physics, oceanography, geology, 
and others). There is no reason in this context to assume that such different principles can be 
supposed to form parts of a unified whole. Indeed, as we have seen, studies of scientific practice 
often stress the benefits of drawing on disunified theories, triangulating practice with resources from 
very different disciplinary origins250. Furthermore, non-scientific principles drawn from the worlds 
of commercial and open source software development are very important in guiding how the 
simulation gets built. Finally, it is important not to underestimate the role within scientific software 
245 Quine, Word and Object; Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’.
246 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
247 For an overview of the problems introduced into the philosophy of science through the philosophy of language, see Zammito, A 
Nice Derangement of Epistemes.
248 French and Ladyman, ‘Reinflating the Semantic Approach’.
249 Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie.
250 see, for example, Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 183; Galison, Image and Logic, 781.
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development of numerous practical competencies that have been inculcated and transformed over 
many years of such work, and never formalised or written down, but which exert strong guiding 
influence on what gets done and how. So when I claim that we should think about simulations in 
terms of processes of modelling, I am going further than Cartwright. This kind of research can be 
thought of in terms of the application of theories, but it also has significant autonomy from 
theoretical practices251. Phenomenotechnique does not take objects or problematics ready made, but 
transforms them within its own domain, within which theories comprise just one kind of resource for 
modelling among many.
The other major consequence of the semantic turn is that it provoked a heightened interest in 
representation, even with the effect of displacing propositional conceptions of truth. “Unlike 
propositions and sentences, terms such as ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘false’’ did not seem suited to dealing with the 
relationship between models and their target systems. ‘‘Representation’’ seemed to be more 
appropriate—and flexible”252. Representation may appear to raise the question of truth when it is the 
representational role of statements about the world that is at stake. But when we take a broader view, 
and look at idealised models, or at physical models, it becomes very hard to capture what is at work 
within representation with a concept of truth. Many models are effective as models precisely because 
they are in some respects “false”, because they idealise parts of it (frictionless planes and point 
masses in physics, for example) or because they physically embody the target in a manner that 
introduces useful inaccuracies (for example the size of an architect's model of a building allows it to 
be moved, displayed, and easily examined from many angles)253.
The concept of representation appears to provide the flexibility needed to capture what is at stake 
among the diversity of models in science. It also has the advantage of being an ordinary idiom of 
talk about models. Scientists at AMCG will at times talk in terms of representation, but I have never 
heard any of them call their model “true”. Truth is a much more natural idiom for talk of judging 
linguistic claims, and is awkward when brought into the diverse world of models. Shedding the 
connection between truth and representation is probably the most important move in ridding us of 
representationalism.
  5.3 Substantive and deflationary theories of representation
The major dividing line within contemporary theories of representation is between formal and 
practical theories. Formal approaches tend to consider representation to be a two-term relation 
between a source and a target. Suarez identifies two main versions, one which understands this 
relationship as isomorphism, and the other regarding it in terms of similarity254. Roughly speaking, 
Bas van Fraassen is the major representative the isomorphism view in The Scientific Image, a key 
251 Morrison, ‘Models as Autonomous Agents’.
252 Knuuttila, ‘Modelling and Representing’, 262.
253 Knuuttila, ‘Models, Representation, and Mediation’, 1263.
254 Suárez, ‘Scientific Representation’, 95.
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text in the rise of the semantic view, in which he argues for a constructive empiricism255. da Costa 
and French have more recently defended a related view in which representation is to be understood 
as “partial isomorphism”256. The “similarity” conception is best known through Giere's early 
work257, though it must be noted that, partly in response to criticisms from philosophers such as 
Suarez, he has more recently modified his view to make it more in line with the practical enquiry258.
All these formal approaches to representation share a commitment to the idea that representation is a 
certain kind of thing, identifiable according to its essence (e.g. isomorphism, similarity, etc.). In 
contrast, practical theories of representation tend to assert that there is an irreducible contextual 
element necessary for any adequate theory of representation. For those who hold such views, 
representation simply cannot be understood if all we pay attention to is a relationship between a 
source and a target. We must also take into account something else, which may be use, purpose, 
intention, or a more vague conception of the context of representation. In each case, representation 
exists not because of something intrinsic in the relation between a source and a target, but because 
these terms are situated in a circumstance where they are being put to use as a representation 
relation. Depending on which version you adopt, this could be because someone is intending for the 
source to represent the target259, because the source is being used to represent the target, or simply 
because the source conventionally represents the target. Giere proposed a four-term theory of 
representation260, in which alongside source and target both the agent and his/her purposes have a 
role, but what is common to all these perspectives is that they regard representation as at least a 
three term problem. 
At this point I don't want to commit to any particular version of the practical theory of 
representation, but I would note that the force that practical positions have today owes a lot to 
Mauricio Suarez's critique of the major two-term formal theories. Quite aside from his own 
particular take on the form that the practical theory should take, Suarez launched a wide-ranging 
attack on the two major dimensions to formal theories: they tend to be reductive and/or substantive 
in their treatments of representation261. They tend to explain representation by reference to 
something more elementary (reduction) and do so by positing that representation has an essence 
(substance).
Suarez argues that representation is not the kind of thing that has an essence. And it cannot be 
reduced to something more basic (such as, for example, isomorphism). He gives several reasons for 
this. For starters, no reductive theory seems to be able to account for the empirical diversity of things 
that we are going to want to call representations – in our example, even if some key examples of 
255 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image.
256 Da Costa and French, Science and Partial Truth.
257 Giere, Explaining Science.
258 Giere, ‘How Models Are Used to Represent Reality’.
259 Bailer-Jones, ‘When Scientific Models Represent’.
260 Giere, ‘How Models Are Used to Represent Reality’.
261 See for example Suárez, ‘Scientific Representation’.
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representation appear to play on isomorphism in order to do their work, it is difficult to extend this 
across the many other kinds of representation. Furthermore, what Suarez calls the “logical argument” 
notes that three features of the things we call representations (non-reflexivity, non-symmetry, and 
non-transitivity) are usually broken by accounts based on similarity or isomorphism. In other words, 
it would appear to be an incorrect logical consequence of formal theories of representation that 
representations represent themselves (since they would be similar or isomorphic to themselves), that 
the target, if similar or isomorphic to the source, would thus represent the source as much as the 
source represented the target, and that if you have a chain of representations (A represents B which 
represents C), the first and last terms would necessarily represent each other262.
The other arguments Suarez deploys further undermine reduction theories, by showing their 
principle candidates for explaining representation to be non-necessary and non-sufficient, and finally 
pointing out that there is a difficulty from such points of view of dealing with “mis-representation” - 
mistakes in correctly identifying the target from the source. What works in one circumstance as a 
successful representation, may later be reassessed as a mistake. This brings Suarez to assert that it is 
necessary to abandon “the aim of a substantive theory to seek universal necessary and sufficient 
conditions that are met in each and every concrete real instance of scientific representation. 
Representation,” he says, 
“is not the kind of notion that requires, or admits, such conditions. We can at best aim to 
describe its most general features—finding necessary conditions will certainly be good 
enough. Second, it entails seeking no deeper features to representation other than its surface 
features...263”
Suarez does go on to suggest two candidates for these necessary but not sufficient conditions, and 
thus espouses a particular version of a “deflationary” view of representation: “the representational 
force of a source is one such irreducible feature; the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning is 
another”264. Both of these are in his view “general features” characteristic of circumstances where 
representation is found in practice. But I leave them on one side here. Both representational force 
and inferential capacity are tied to a very philosophical preoccupation with making inferences. 
Instead I start from the more sociological tradition of looking at practice as a concrete milieu, and 
look for more practice-based “surface features”.
  5.4 From vicarship to realisation
Suarez gives us a powerful amalgamation of critiques of formal theories of representation, and 
points the way towards a more practical enquiry. But there is a basic problem with his approach. 
Under the surface he relies on an implicit assumption that when we talk about representation we are 
262 Suárez, ‘An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation’, 768.
263 Ibid., 771.
264 Ibid.
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interested in a source distinct from a target. This is the case whether or not we also find a 
fundamental role for the context in the equation.
In the viewpoint that I want to put forward here, representation may involve a source distinct from a 
target, but this distinction is not something to be taken for granted. It exists as a play of ambiguity, a 
play between identity and difference. The separation of source and target is at the far end of a 
spectrum, along which much of what we call representation occurs. This far end, this extremity, has 
as its model a stereotypical type of representation where the two terms are separate. From this 
stereotype, we gain the basic formulation of the problem of representation: that the thing to be 
explained is the bridging of the gap between the two terms. For Rheinberger this situation, called 
“vicarship”, can only be understood as one pole of something broader, “a continuum from vicarship 
to embodiment to realisation”265. We thus gain a much broader perspective on representation, one 
which refuses to take for granted the separation and separability of source and target, and instead 
locates this separability in a broader sphere of possibilities.
In the middle region of the spectrum, source and target are not straightforwardly distinguished. 
Rheinberger illustrates “embodiment” with an example from theatre. In contrast to the sense of 
vicarship in which representation is “representation of”, if “we claim that we have seen the actor 
Bruno Ganz yesterday evening representing Hamlet, we speak of a representation “as””266. Similarly, 
drawing on studies from political and aesthetic theory, Knuuttila makes this discrimination with the 
terms “re-presentation” (what I would call embodiment) and “standing for” (vicarship). Using 
Pitkin's analysis of the etymology and history of the term, Knuuttila notes that re-presentation is 
closer to the original sense of making present, or of “the making present of an abstraction through or 
in an object, as when a virtue seems embodied in the image of a certain face”267. Knuuttila regards 
the vicarship sense of the term to be a modern invention. “Representation as “standing for” is 
typically approached through the metaphors of portrait, map or mirror: what they have in common is 
that they are all renderings of an “original” in a medium different from it”268.
In Rheinberger's view, we can also discern a third sense of representation, further along the 
spectrum. “If... a chemist tells us he or she has produced or represented a particular substance in his 
or her laboratory, the meaning of “representation of” is gone, and instantiation in the sense of the 
production of a particular substance has taken over. In this latter case, we deal with the realisation of 
a thing”269. Embodiment, in Rheinberger's version of things, is intermediate between vicarship and 
realisation. Vicarship is one far end of the spectrum; here source and target are entirely separated, 
while realisation at the other end consists of their complete coincidence, a circumstance of 
indistinguishability. Much of what is of interest in representation, however, happens in between, 
265 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 103.
266 Ibid.
267 Pitkin, quoted in Knuuttila, ‘Models as Epistemic Artefacts’, 21.
268 Ibid., 22.
269 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 103.
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through the intermediate ambiguities of embodiment. The actor both is and is not Hamlet. Hamlet is 
what is realised in the performance, but is also someone else than the actor. Quoting Mitchell's 
Iconology, Rheinberger notes that “[e]very play is governed by this tension, this “paradoxical trick 
of consciousness, an ability to see something as 'there' and 'not there' at the same time””270.
Figure 4: A diagrammatic representation of Rheinberger's spectrum
What figure 4 attempts to put on show is the relatively straightforward situation of vicarship (a 
binary relationship between two distinct entities) and realisation (coincidence of the two terms in the 
same entity), when compared with embodiment, which is ambiguous and hard to represent. 
Embodiment involves the oscillation between coincidence and relationship: the relatedness of terms 
which exist as separate terms through their being equated; the coincidence of differences, of what is 
not the same.
If the vicarship-embodiment-realisation continuum is our necessary but not sufficient feature, a 
theory of representation will have to deal with the full spectrum, and the many ways in which the 
positions on it move and interact. Mary Morgan provides some excellent examples of these issues in 
a text where she argues for a spectrum between traditional material experiments and “non-material” 
experiments such as mathematical models, thought experiments and simulations. Her concerns are 
largely epistemic, about the manner and grounds of inferences. This aspect I will put to one side, and 
concentrate instead on the nature of representational relationships that Morgan describes in the 
course of her argument. In a material experiment, says Morgan, what is produced and manipulated is 
the same thing as what is being studied. In a non-material experiment, it is a mathematical system 
270 Ibid.
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that is manipulated, ontologically a very different thing to whatever empirical system is being 
simulated271. We do not need to subscribe to Morgan's view that simulations should be placed at the 
far end of the vicarship side of the spectrum in order to see that she is dealing with much the same 
issues as Rheinberger. Having set out these contrasting poles, Morgan shows that many types of 
scientific practice fall in between, tapping in to the tension between the extremes.
In her example from studies of bone structure, Morgan shows research proceeding through the 
intermediate zone. In one case, scientists take cow bones and scan them to create a representation on 
a computer. A computer model will then apply a model of physical forces to test the bones' response 
to stress and strain. Although the computational medium can only vicariously represent the physics 
of the bone, to a certain extent the bone structure realised in the bone is transferred to this medium 
through the scanning techniques272. The example resonates with aspects of work in oceanography, 
because while digital processes are very different from the fluid dynamics they represent, the shape 
of the domain for the simulation is often generated from satellite scans of coastlines, or ship-borne 
scans of bathymetry. 
Morgan goes on to demonstrate that these intermediary forms expand further when you consider that 
what is at stake in scientific investigation is often the relationship between individuals and classes. A 
lab mouse, in Morgan's vocabulary, is a “representative of” mice273. It is a mouse. The class as a 
whole exists insofar as it is realised in individuals such as this one, but on the other hand any one 
individual (especially a selectively bred lab mouse) has its own empirical peculiarities and thus can 
only vicariously stand for the species as a whole274. Morgan will then push this further to another 
relationship, in which the mouse is a “representative for” rodents in general, mammals in general, 
vertebrates, and so on. Much medical research is carried out through such relationships, in which it 
is posited that in some significant way mouse physiology stands for human physiology. Common 
aspects of mammal biology are realised in a mouse like this, which may thus be used as a 
representative of a wider class of organisms275.
I don't think it is necessary to adopt Morgan's terminology. Whether something is a “representative 
of” or a “representative for” depends on your view of species and kinds, and this need not be an 
issue here. What is important is that she flags up the fact that many relations of representation cannot 
simply be collapsed into the vicarship pole. On the contrary, they “represent the world via mixed 
modes of representation and representiveness”276. Not only does representational practice occur 
across a spectrum of modes, it also often involves assembling together several different types of 
representation at the same time.
271 Morgan, ‘Experiments Without Material Intervention’, 218–220.
272 Ibid., 221–226.
273 Ibid., 228.
274 For a discussion of the history of norms of representing classes and individuals see Daston and Galison, Objectivity.
275 Callon notes how such intermediate ‘representivity’ can easily become precarious over the course of a project. Callon, ‘Some 
Elements of a Sociology of Translation’, 214–220.
276 Morgan, ‘Experiments Without Material Intervention’, 233.
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Between the extremes of vicarship and realisation is a play of presence and absence. The anti-
positivist tradition of critiquing representation, from Heidegger to Foucault and Rorty, is best 
understood in this context as a critique of pure representation on the far vicarship side of the 
spectrum. But, recalling Nelson Goodman's contributions, “[u]pon closer inspection,” says 
Rheinberger, “any representation “of” turns out to be always already a representation “as”.”277 Any 
representation that seems to be a pure vicarship, turns out to play in a much more complex way on 
its embodiment of the target, and even to some extent on the target's realisation in the source. Pure 
vicarship is rarely, if ever, attained. This side of things is rarely acknowledged by philosophers such 
as Suarez, whose analysis, however much triangulated by pragmatic and contextual concerns, 
however deflationary, nevertheless takes the two terms of the relationship to be relatively 
unproblematic. Things are never this crisp and clear. The source never fully makes way for the 
target. And the target is never completely there either. The heart of representation lies in this 
fundamental ambiguity, which is not an artefact of an insufficient theory of representation, but rather 
a key mechanism in representation itself.
The combination of a pragmatic deflationism with the kind of poststructuralist-influenced material 
semiotics that come through in Rheinberger's acccount provides us with a perspective for which 
representation has no essence, but it does have the necessary condition of being the embodiment of 
ambiguity in the relation between source and target. To embrace this ambiguity is not to defy Suarez 
and propose a new theory of unitary essence. There is no claim that all such play of presence and 
absence amounts to representation. Merely that where there is representation, we are in the space of 
such play. It is necessary but not sufficient, a “general feature” of representation and in this respect a 
rival contender to Suarez's two criteria: a directional relationship (force) and a potential epistemic 
relationship (inference). This play can even be considered anterior to any such criteria, because it is 
the very condition of difference between the source and target, the very condition for the recognition 
of a relationship obtaining at all, on top of which it might then be possible to do as Suarez does and 
identify as its two key properties directionality and inferential capacity.
  5.5 What kind of thing might represent?
A deflationary stance displaces substantive questions. It is not appropriate to ask “what is 
representation?” or “how is representation in general to be explained?”. On face value, therefore, 
deflationism may appear as a form of quietism. But this displacement raises different questions, 
equally “big”. If representation is always irreducibly tied to its specific context, a number of 
“cultural” questions can be raised. 
Representation does not happen in a vacuum, but in specific historical and cultural circumstances. 
Certain sorts of things are candidates for representing more than others, this candidacy being part of 
277 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 104.
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the “social life of things”278. Things become the kind of things that open a play of presence and 
absence in different ways in different contexts. In the Western tradition, photographs are an easily 
recognisable type of thing, the very recognition of which raises immediately the question of the 
target represented in the image. In the words of Roland Barthes, it is “as if the Photograph always 
carries its referent with itself”279. But we can imagine a culture with no similar tradition of planar 
depiction, for which a photograph would not immediately be taken as the kind of thing that would 
represent, as the kind of thing in which is seen something else, some target. Wittgenstein offered 
some thoughts along these lines: 
“we view the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the very object (the man, landscape, and 
so on) represented in it... This need not have been so. We could easily imagine people who 
did not have this attitude to such pictures. Who, for example, would be repelled by 
photographs, because a face without colour, and even perhaps a face reduced in scale, struck 
them as inhuman.”280
These considerations invite a broad historical view of how certain things become candidates for 
representing, analogous with the “positivities” discussed by Hacking, a term he takes from 
Foucault281. Hacking unites his reading of Foucault with the concept of “styles of reasoning”, drawn 
from Crombie282. He points out that philosophical discussions (of translation, conceptual schemes, 
incommensurability, etc.) have tended to regard all statements to be candidates for truth or falsity, 
and proposes instead that these things are much better appreciated from the point of view of a history 
of the styles of reasoning that determine what kind of things are candidates for being true or false, 
and how they might be true or false. Similarly, the historical tradition provides us with a landscape 
of things that in many different ways are the kind of thing that might represent. The kinds of games 
we play in setting up representations are extremely specific. A pencil sharpener may represent a 
football player in an office explanation of the off-side rule. A pillow may become a mountain in a 
child's game. In both cases, there are certain ways to participate in the scenario. Several philosophers 
have made the link between these imaginative games and scientists' work in modelling283. 
In Frigg's terminology, drawn from Walton's pretence theory, there are in each case certain “rules of 
generation”, which “are public and shared by the relevant community”, and which define how things 
can be drawn into games of representation284. He points to the need for philosophers to investigate 
the sets of rules at work in science, stressing disunity, in that “different disciplines have different 
rules, and understanding what these rules are will shed light on how modelling in these disciplines 
278 Appadurai, The Social Life of Things.
279 Quoted in Lynch, ‘Science in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, 214.
280 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 216e.
281 Hacking, ‘Language, Truth and Reason’; Foucault, The Order of Things (Routledge Classics).
282 See also Davidson, ‘Styles of Reasoning, Conceptual History, and the Emergence of Psychiatry’; and Morgan, The World in the 
Model, 13–16 for an application of Crombie’s ideas to economics.
283 See, for example, Toon, ‘The Ontology of Theoretical Modelling’; Frigg, ‘Models and Fiction’.
284 Frigg, ‘Models and Fiction’, 264.
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works”285. Such rules do not exist in any straightforward manner (see chapter 3), but the possibility 
of their objectification points to the key importance of historical sedimentations in practices of 
representing. Over the lifetime of a discipline we would expect such conditions to change, opening 
new spaces for interplay of elements, spaces that in old and new ways “disrupt the immediacy of 
presence of a phenomenon by rendering it as a mark”286, creating new spaces in which representing 
can occur. 
The question of the novelty of computer simulation in science provides a good example. It is 
common for computational scientists to regard simulation as a new and separate endeavour to 
experimentation or theorisation287. But philosophers argue over whether there is any ontological or 
epistemological ground for this claim288. From the point of view of the broad historical terrain in 
which different kinds of things become candidates for representation, the issue becomes clearer. 
Evelyn Fox Keller, for example, points out that when the first computer simulations were being run, 
they were really not much different from mathematical models289. Pioneers of simulation such as 
Stanislaw Ulam and John Von Neumann had previously been doing similar kinds of calculations by 
hand, and the computer provided a way to do the same thing mechanically. The entry of simulation 
into the scientists' repertoire of techniques was smooth. One thing that the growing literature on 
models and modelling has taught us is that models have long been a central part of scientific work. 
Early computer simulations were recognisable without much difficulty as the same kind of thing as 
the numerical systems that scientists were already familiar with. Only minimal effort was required to 
introduce simulation into the scientific repertoire because it was already recognisable.
This does not, however, mean that the debate over the novelty of simulations is resolved. We can still 
suppose that if there is a crucial difference, it is to be understood as something that only emerged 
later. This is Keller's contention, “that what we have now come to see as the epistemological novelty 
of computer simulation in fact emerged only gradually – not as a consequence of the introduction of 
any single technique, but as the cumulative effect of an ever-expanding and conspicuously malleable 
new technology...”290. Having been established within the context of a wide historical precedent of 
modelling in science, simulation's particular constellation of techniques went on to profoundly 
modify the manner in which this kind of representation could represent. Keller argues that 
simulation grew away from mathematical modelling by the mid to late 1950s, when a properly 
experimental dimension emerged as a core part of its practice291. More recently, the kinds of 
simulations typified by artificial life and cellular automata, are in Keller's view, a full departure from 
285 Ibid., 267.
286 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 105.
287 See, for example, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, ‘International Review of Research Using HPC in the 
UK’, 1.
288 The ongoing debate is nicely captured between Frigg and Reiss and Humphreys. Frigg and Reiss, ‘The Philosophy of 
Simulation’; Humphreys, ‘The Philosophical Novelty of Computer Simulation Methods’.
289 Keller, ‘Models, Simulation, and “Computer Experiments”’, 203.
290 Ibid., 201.
291 Ibid., 205.
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precedents. “In contrast to conventional modelling practices, it might be described as modelling 
from above”292. De Landa will concur with the novelty of these approaches, considering them 
instances of a new kind of “synthetic reason”293. In such endeavours practices of modelling do not 
involve any strong explicit determination of what it is that is being represented. This is left largely 
implicit, embodied in the practices themselves. Many of this research concerns the high-order 
behaviour of complex systems, understood in the abstract, and which may turn out to be applicable 
to all manner of different areas of biology, ecology, sociology, economics, etc. 
Now, Keller acknowledges that in this departure, there is no small dose of controversy. It is not clear 
what exactly it is that is being represented in many of these simulations, nor how to validate them. 
The point is that our conventions concerning what kind of thing is recognisable as a representation, 
and how it might represent, are profoundly modified by the historical course of scientific practice. 
“So radical an inversion of conventional understandings of the relation between simulation and 
reality are not yet widespread – either in the physical or the biological sciences (indeed, they have 
yet to make any noticeable impact on the majority of biologists) – but the very fact that they have 
become thinkable, and in certain circles even acceptable, is surely worth noting”294.
  5.6 What makes a good representation?
If the first half of the question is “what kind of thing makes a representation?” the other half of the 
question concerns the virtues that different kinds of representations may possess. Just as we can 
locate scientific practice in a broad landscape of what kinds of things get taken as representations, 
these configurations also set up the conditions under which such representations might be evaluated. 
This is a quasi-moral dimension, epistemic virtues not of character but of the thing295. What makes a 
representation good?
The answer to this question will clearly involve the purpose to which a representation is put, the 
projects in which it is entwined. But this cannot be the full answer. There are many ways for 
representations to be good. It is not simply a question of the evaluation of the virtue of a 
representation on a linear scale from bad to good, but a question of the specific modes in which it 
can be good or bad. Utility is one, and we can list at least three others: faithfulness, materiality and 
relations with other representations.
A useful representation is often a good representation, but it invites the further question of what 
subset of activities the representation might be useful for. Much of the philosophical literature on 
representation is deeply invested in the epistemological utility of different kinds of representation. 
Matthew Parker, for example, considers the utility of simulations in cases where “deductive 
292 Ibid., 209.
293 De Landa, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason; de Landa, ‘Virtual Environments’.
294 Keller, ‘Models, Simulation, and “Computer Experiments”’, 212.
295 What has become known as ‘virtue epistemology’ tends to focus on character, but we could extend this towards a concept of 
virtues of/in practice. Cf. Daston and Galison, Objectivity.
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validation” is impossible. “Where problems are unsolvable, intractable, or just plain hard, we do our 
best, and computer simulations help a great deal”296. The virtue of computer simulations, from this 
epistemic point of view, is tied to the specifics of the problem. In cases where no exact solution is 
available, simulations can provide a good informal approximation. Similarly, the other classic case is 
where experiments are impractical (this was discussed in chapter 2).
We might, however, want to be wary of confining the assessment of utility to the role that a 
representation plays in making arguments. Many, in fact most, of the simulations run at AMCG are 
not used to make arguments, but are provisional simulations run in the course of the development of 
the model. The aim of these may in part be to help ground the epistemic legitimacy of claims 
eventually made based on future iterations of the code, but in large part they are judged good or bad 
according to whether they enable the scientists involved to move on to a further stage of model 
development. They may, for example, be prototypes or proofs of concepts forming the basis for a 
decision about what features of the simulation to try adding next, or they may help ferret out the 
cause of a pernicious bug in the code. They may aid the unfolding of the investigation by operating 
as heuristic tools, cognitive scaffolds for gaining a new perspective on a problem blocking onward 
travel. Conversely, representations' intricacies may enchant and detain attention, constituting a 
blockage to the path of the project297. The exploration of these issues is an important part of chapter 
6.
Representations are often judged according to the perceived faithfulness between source and target. 
A painting may express what the artist feels needs to be expressed there. It may also show a “good 
likeness”. A simulation may provide a good approximation of the relevant equations in physics. No 
doubt it is from these virtues that we gain intuitions of correspondence, isomorphism and similarity, 
intuitions that deeply influence the way that we imagine representation in general. But as Giere will 
point out, it can only be “relevant similarity” that is at stake298. In many cases faithfulness is 
abstracted from any actual isomorphism because the point of the representation is to faithfully 
represent only a specific sub-set of the features of the target. It needs to be false in a number of 
respects if it is to be a good representation in others. If a meteorological simulation to predict the 
weather of next week strove for the greatest faithfulness it would finish its computation many 
months afterwards299! A representation's faithfulness is often to some abstraction of the target, as, for 
example, when the architect's model is faithful to an idea of the form of the building, conventionally 
abstracted from its size, but preserving its proportions. What kinds of accuracies and inaccuracies are 
desirable will depend on the representational tradition and on the particular trajectories of practice 
involved.
296 Parker, ‘Computing the Uncomputable’, 462.
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The materiality of a representation is something often neglected in discussions of modelling, in 
many cases because it is presumed that mathematical and ideal models are immaterial. There has 
been much debate over what role materiality has to play in simulations, because it is easy to regard 
them as abstract when they are compared to physical models300. One of the major points argued in 
chapters 7 and 8 is that computational modelling is just as material as anything else. Knuuttila argues 
that materiality is a key aspect even in the most ideal of cases. “All objects of human culture have 
both ideal (or virtual, if you like) and material dimensions – even totally fictional ones that are 
nevertheless materialized as texts and pictures concerning them”301. She points us towards the 
significance of the material “constraints and affordances”, which affect what potentialities are 
embodied in a particular artefact302. Different kinds of representations can be manipulated in entirely 
different ways, opening up different kinds of possibilities for thought and practice. What and how 
embodiment may play out in a representation will have a lot to do with its materiality, and given that 
there is a great deal of scope for unforeseen epistemic opportunities to emerge during the course of 
the research process, the materials being worked with condition science at a fundamental level.
Other significant material dimensions of the representation are portability and durability. A 
representation may be good because it can be moved into different contexts, a point emphasised by 
Latour when he wrote that “the logistics of immutable mobiles is what we have to admire and study, 
not the seemingly miraculous supplement of force gained by scientists thinking hard in their 
offices”303. The logistics of things depends on which ways they are hard to move, easily moved, 
transitory or durable. Rheinberger echoes this point when he writes that “[i]nscriptions are... not 
mere abstractions. They are durable and mobile purifications, which in turn are able to retroact on 
other graphematic articulations – and, what is most important, not only on those from which they 
have originated”304. It is not hard to imagine that part of the power of written texts derives from their 
easy mobility and their possibilities of being reproduced in many places with relatively little effort.
The medium of simulation has also been afforded new openings by the development of the internet, 
which allows for the efficient transmission of data and code, on a level that dwarfs what is possible 
for most other kinds of scientific apparatus. Whole codes can be transferred across the globe, 
duplicated and shared. On the other hand the medium has its own limitations, confronted on a daily 
basis by scientists who push the limits of what the technology is able to do. Vast data sets, for 
example, may be too big to download in a reasonable timetrame from a supercomputer, and too big 
to store in multiple iterations. As much as computational science involves a free flow of data, it also 
constitutes a vast machine for its disposal and replacement by an endless tide of further 
productions305. One of the greatest dangers for outsiders misunderstanding the nature of 
300 For example Guala, ‘Models, Simulations, and Experiments’; Parker, ‘Does Matter Really Matter?’.
301 Knuuttila, ‘Models, Representation, and Mediation’, 1267.
302 Ibid.
303 Latour, Science in Action, 237.
304 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 106.
305 Edwards, A Vast Machine.
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computational science is to succumb to the postmodern image of computation as free flow and super 
speed306. Once you work at the limits of computation, you are constantly battling with the 
sluggishness of machines, the finite capacity of storage devices, and the limited bandwidth of 
systems of transmission, a messy and tactile world of glitches and capacities. This matters for how 
good computational representations are for working with, for how they get used, how they get made, 
and what happens in research carried out with them.
A final manner in which a representation may vary in its candidacy for being good or bad is in its 
relationship with other representations. In many cases, a representation is good only if it is part of a 
series. Simulations are good when they are part of a system of investigation, a series of simulations 
that builds the validity of the model, and that explore its behaviour under different conditions. On the 
other hand, representations may find other kinds of merit in breaking from a series, representing 
something, for example, in a distinctive and novel way. 
The aim of this discussion has been to show that although a deflationary position may appear not to 
be able to say much about representation, its silence on the universal level does not amount to 
silence on the level of more in-depth engagements. There is a lot to be said about how and why 
particular traditions of representing take the form that they do, how they interact with other ways of 
representing, and how they change over time, as well as their multifaceted manners of being good or 
bad, achieving success or failure, and being deemed worthwhile and worthless. 
These criteria provide us with a provisional set of tools for evaluating the context of representation, 
and the next section aims to put them into practice. To do so, however, it is necessary to move from 
our consideration of representation towards a discussion of processes of modelling. This helps us 
avoid presuming that representations occur singularly and/or successfully, and instead focusses 
attention on the practices in which they appear.
  5.7 Modelling as process
One of the decisive contributions to the philosophy of models has been Margaret Morrison's theory 
of models as “autonomous agents”307. She argues that in many cases models involve extra-
theoretical considerations, that theory often does not provide the means by which to develop an 
appropriate model of a phenomenon, and in many other cases no sufficient theory exists. Models 
inhabit an intermediate space between experiment and theory, a “unique and autonomous position... 
one that is separate from both theory and experiment yet able to intervene in both domains”308. This 
begins to free modelling from presupppositions that it is always only a matter of representing, and is 
analogous with the claim Hacking made of experiments that they “have a life of their own”309. In 
306 See, for example Virilio, The Information Bomb.
307 Morrison, ‘Models as Autonomous Agents’.
308 Ibid., 64.
309 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, xiii.
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both cases, the important thing is to open up an equipmental domain as something with intrinsic 
interest for philosophers, and with its own independent dynamics, rather than regarding experiments 
or models as simply means to theoretical ends. However, while Morrison pushes us in this direction, 
and she has been very influential in encouraging a practice-oriented philosophy that pays attention to 
processes of modelling as interesting in their own right, it is debatable whether she takes us the full 
way. This is Knuuttila's critique. She points to the fact that because Morrison is primarily interested 
in epistemological questions of how we learn or make inferences from models, her analysis returns 
their representational function back to centre stage310.
A theory of modelling must not be subordinated to epistemological concerns about inferences and 
arguments311. It must foreground the temporality of research practice, research as a process312. I 
think Rheinberger puts this well. He says “I am concerned with describing the process of making 
science as a process in which traces are generated, displaced, and superposed... I contend that if the 
perspective of a clear-cut dichotomy between theory and reality, between concept and object, is 
being adopted precociously, this process tends to disappear from sight”313. In other words, rather 
than starting by positing one grand metaphysical relationship between science and the world, we 
examine the multifarious little mundane relationships by which it is made. What we can expect to 
see is an explosion of representation, multiplying its forms, and dispersing it throughout each 
circumstance of research.
Modelling is never started from scratch. It also has no telos. It is, in Pickering's words, “an open-
ended process with no determinate destination”314. A research project draws on many sources. Each 
tool has a precedent, each idea a history. A great deal of baggage comprises the circumstances of 
practice in which research gets carries out. Any simulation, by virtue of being recognisable as a 
simulation, is already strongly pre-conditioned as a clearly recognisable instance of the kind of thing 
that represents. The strength of this conditioning is apparent in the fact that even a simulation that 
has no identifiable target is still regarded as something that represents, albeit with a non-existent or 
indeterminate target.
Many scientists learn to manipulate simulations by playing around with the software. In the annual 
training course for Fluidity, participants run example simulations that have been set up for them by 
the AMCG scientists, and they are then encouraged to make their own modifications to the set-up to 
create something new. These new simulations may well no longer represent anything specific. The 
modification may render them useless for their original purpose. But it is not right to simply say that 
because of this, they are no longer representations. They are representations because part of being a 
simulation is to participate in that play of presence and absence, in which something else is deemed 
310 Knuuttila, ‘Models, Representation, and Mediation’, 1265.
311 Mattingly and Warwick, ‘Projectible Predicates in Analogue and Simulated Systems’ is a good example of the latter.
312 Some philosophers have taken tentative steps in this direction. For example, Lenhard, ‘Computer Simulation’.
313 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 104.
314 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, 19.
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present in the simulation, which, in thus embodying the target, recedes into the background. In these 
training contexts, however, that “something else”, that target, may never be determined. It may be 
left blank. With thousands of options and parameters available, and a limitless number of possible 
simulations to be created, the overwhelming majority have no target easily specified.
Training, it might be thought, is a special case. It is yet another case of that awkward fact that most 
scientists are also by virtue of their institutional affiliation, lecturers and teachers, an aspect of their 
world purified from most philosophical accounts of science. But this is wrong. A good simulation 
involves a good simulationist, a scientist who has learned to work with the equipment, someone who 
can get it working, often in ways that no amount of theoretical knowledge will replace. 
“In most cases you have to adjust a number of parameters and it won't be obvious from the 
theory what they should be. At that point there is a user bias in there. Even if you give two 
different people same experiment, same model, they will get different results. They have 
different ideas about how well the model performs in different ways.” (TX)
For some of these criteria there will be well established conventions about how things should be set 
up. But such conventions only apply to a sub-set of the total set-up and the question will always 
remain whether your simulation is different enough from previous simulations to merit a rethinking 
of convention.
A good example of this is mesh adaptivity. Mesh adaptivity is going to give you a benefit [in 
impact physics] because you need high resolution around the shock wave. This is a wave 
that moves very fast through the material, does work on the target, starts it in motion. It is 
this shock wave that you are interested in and you want to model it accurately. So you set up 
your mesh refinement to give you detail where the shock wave is – but you might also want 
to focus resolution around a particular layer, around a particular boundary in the material – 
so you have that well resolved as well. But when you do this you don't just switch it on; you 
have to give it some logical rules for where it puts resolution and how much resolution it 
puts. One user might want 10 levels of mesh refinement and also a very smooth gradual 
movement from the small to the very large. But another user might come along and say we 
only need 5 and we can do it quite abruptly. You are using the same technology but you are 
using it in slightly different ways. One person might say that you need to model the impactor 
with 40 cells or else you are not really modelling anything, whereas someone else might say 
that in their experience with their model it is only really necessary to use 10 cells.” (TX)
Your study of impact adaptivity in your model may well give you reason to think you need at least 
10 levels of mesh refinement. But perhaps my model is significantly different enough to yours that it 
can achieve the same results with less. Even if both studies use the same modelling framework, their 
different choices in the model set-up may still make space for such particularities. Modelling begins 
always within a nexus of such formal and informal principles: well documented ideas about what is 
appropriate in which cases, as well as undocumented tacit knowledge about how to get the thing up 
and running, doing what you want, in a way that is facilitating the research. In this respect all work 
involves the cultivation of skill in the laboratory, and training is no separate domain. Even in terms 
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of epistemic concerns about the reliability of knowledge gained through a simulation, considering 
that very few critics would ever spare the time to examine the full option-set let alone read the code, 
the participation of individuals regarded as skilled is no small factor in strategies of justification.
The central process in modelling, however, is the cumulative path for their construction that we 
discussed in sections 2.10, 'A multiplicity of simulations' and 4.6, 'Phenomenotechnique in practice'. 
The functionality of the model under development and the practical competencies of the modellers in 
manipulating this model move through a series of positions, modelling very different things, from 
intuitive and analytically tractable idealisations, through different kinds of more complex 
experimental and empirical systems. Considering that these creative processes are nested into wider 
process of development, validation and manipulation that characterise the broader context of the 
modelling framework, there is very little reason to suppose that we would understand modelling by 
looking at it only once it has come to a halt. While individual projects may finish, their existence as 
endeavours of modelling must be understood in terms of their becoming.
Research projects carry with them the whole weight of their past. While the trajectory of 
construction may move from a mathematical model of an analytical solution to a model of a well-
studied experiment, the results of these previous stages become concretised in the apparatus as part 
of a testing system. When a scientist moves on to model something new, it is important to be assured 
that changes made in doing this have not undone earlier successes that built the foundation for the 
project. So as a test incorporated into the automated build and test suite, the earlier result will be run 
every time modifications are made to the code, ensuring that confidence from past success can still 
hold. This is just the tip of the iceberg, because for Fluidity over 14,000 tests are run every day, 
automatically flagging up unforeseen problems. This has been a big focus for the group's 
methodological approach. When a model is under active development, it is never enough to cite 
validations and verifications that have been made in the past, because these have been made with 
respect to a different code. Past verification and validation is accreted in the present system of 
research and is thus carried forwards with current research projects, applied over and over again to 
every new iteration of the code.
All of these dimensions speak of the need to see models in terms of the wider processes of modelling 
of which they are part. There is little sense of speaking of a model in the singular. Modelling 
processes are the practical, phenomenotechnical becoming of research itself.
  5.8 Representation in simulation
Taking representation on Rheinberger's continuum requires viewing it as a play of differences. 
Sometimes these openings are strategic, and other times they are less amenable to manipulation. I 
deal here with two categories. Firstly, there are the conventional ways in which representation 
becomes an issue in modelling. In these cases, the simulation is already posited as a representation, 
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and the question is more how to manage and manipulate what is represented and how. In the next 
section, we will encounter cases where shifts in the wider technical milieux start rendering a thing 
problematic in new ways, something for which representation was not previously an issue, 
unsticking it from the pole of realisation and opening a new field of play which starts becoming an 
issue in research.
Figure 5: Three snapshots of turbulence in a simulation of the lock exchange
The foremost representational opening for a simulation renders the simulation itself a mark of 
something else. What is often neglected is that this relationship goes in at least two directions. 
Firstly, the simulation is a representation of an empirical or ideal system. In the case of the 
simulations of the lock-exchange that we will encounter in chapter 6, and which is shown in figure 5, 
this system is easily identified as an experimental apparatus for studying the mixing of two bodies of 
fluid of different density. On the other hand, however, the simulation is always also a representation 
of the solution to a set of equations. One of the reasons that simulation is such a prevalent technique 
in the study of fluid dynamics is that for the majority of complex fluids problems the Navier-Stokes 
equations are intractable. It can be argued in turn whether these equations themselves represent real 
fluids, ideal fluids, or whether they require modifications even for that315. And as continuum 
equations, they are at odds with theories of molecular mechanics, not to mention quantum 
mechanics, but at AMCG scientists are concerned with macroscopic phenomena, for which the 
Navier-Stokes equations are generally taken as good enough, and their own representational 
duplicity is left unexamined.
In a sense, we can think of the lock-exchange problem as a triangular set of representational 
relationships, in which the problem can be specified as an intractable problem in continuous 
315 Bloor, ‘Sichtbarmachung, Common Sense and Construction in Fluid Mechanics’; Batterman, ‘Idealization and Modeling’.
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mathematics, a tractable approximation in simulation, and an experimental set up. Each represents 
the others in certain respects. The Navier-Stokes equations become an issue when working with a 
model of the lock-exchange. With experimental data standing for the correct solution, the process of 
modelling can tease out details of the internal dynamics of the system on a level impossible 
experimentally. The empirical problem of fluid flow in this experimental set-up can thus also be at 
issue, with both the simulation and the continuous equations serving to represent it. Rather than 
regarding these different configurations as determining different fields of study, it is closer to actual 
scientific practice to regard as fundamental the process of their interplay. “The process of 
modelling,” says Rheinberger, “is one of shuttling back and forth between different spaces of 
representation. Scientific objects come into existence by comparing, displacing, marginalizing, 
hybridizing, and grafting different representations with, from, against, and upon each other”316.
Quite how representational relationships are opened up depends on convention and circumstance. 
One frequently cited adage from continental philosophy is that there is a slippage of signified to 
signifier317. In other words, wherever we try to grasp the target of a representation, the target reveals 
itself as just another mark, standing for and embodying another target, for which we only have 
vicarious contact. In SS's investigations of the lock-exchange, for example, experimental data is used 
to validate the simulation, holding the experiment steady as the target of the simulation, which lets 
us see it in new light. But the project wasn't just about the lock-exchange. It had general applicability 
to oceans problems involving gravity currents, such as the flow of dense saltier water out of the 
Mediterranean basin, through the Straits of Gibraltar, into the Atlantic. The simulation may represent 
the experiment, but the experiment is a representative of a much wider class of fluids problems. 
Recalling the terminology above, the experiment embodies gravity currents in general, because a 
particular gravity current is realised in its set-up. But it also can only vicariously stand for gravity 
currents, because most oceanographic gravity currents exist a far larger scales, and involve much 
more complex topography.
These relationships are entwined in the research. Research proceeds not by isolating one such 
relationship and concentrating on that, but finding ways to play with many such relations' 
combinations. And these relationships are not confined in their effects to one field of practice. They 
may traverse many. Indeed, it may be that the processes of modelling carried out by simulationists 
establish the embodiment of gravity currents in general in the lock exchange experiment to a degree 
that is not possible solely via the practice of the experimentalists.
316 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 108.
317 See, for example, Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter’, 419.
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Figure 6: A visualisation of a time step in a water column collapse 
simulation
These relationships play out not just in private, but across the whole breadth of private and public 
situations in which research is proposed, undertaken and defended. In 2010, at an AMCG 
presentation of current work on the water collapse simulation, another commonly studied 
“experimental scale” problem, a visiting academic queries an anomaly in the amount of mixing 
found at different time intervals when the simulation is compared to the experimental data. “I can see 
you have a good fit,” he said, “but can you explain why you don't manage to pick out this peak in 
mixing that is there in the experimental data at the very first time steps? It seems to be missing in 
your simulation.” This discrepancy was visible in the graph projected at the front of the room. To 
this QY, the doctoral student who was presenting, responded: “Well, we don't know for certain what 
is going on there, but we think that is an effect of the drag caused by removing the barrier.” The 
water collapse starts, in experimental form, with the removal of a barrier that is holding a body of 
water in one corner of a larger container. This barrier is designed such that the effect of its removal 
on the flow is minimal, but that effect can never be zero. If the simulation was really attempting to 
represent the experiment, surely they would have included an extra forcing factor to simulate the 
barrier removal? Confronted with this discrepancy, the relationship slips away. Does the simulation 
really represent this experiment? Simulation and experiment were two terms in one relation, but in 
this new situation they are revealed as two different representations of another, hitherto hidden 
target, an idealised water collapse. Both experiment and simulation embody this idealised system in 
their own distinctive ways, prone to their own characteristic virtues and defects. The idealised 
system exists insofar as it is so realised, and is more fully existent the more vessels are assembled 
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around it. The simulationists, when put under pressure like this, demonstrate that they are not 
slavishly representing an experiment after all, but trying to represent that thing that the experiment 
itself, in its own way, is representing, putting themselves and the experimentalists on level pegging. 
This circumstance forced the unpacking of what is meant by the “water collapse”, a term 
unproblematic in routine discourse. But it is not just a question of the meaning of terms. It is a 
question of what is there in these research practices. 
Similar kinds of issues are raised when handling data from experiments, which for many 
simulationists is the closest thing they ever get to experimental research. “Experiments always have 
a certain error in them,” says HU. “The best thing you can have [for comparing your simulation 
results with] is an analytical solution.” How can experiments have errors in them? They are real, so 
from what can they possibly deviate? This is the same kind of issue that Hacking raised when he 
asserted that “phenomena” are rare in experimental science318. Not everything counts just because it 
is real; what matters is defined by a finely balanced relation to scientific endeavours.
Experiments therefore cannot serve modelling practices as origins, as points of anchorage in the real. 
They are themselves participants in an already complex and dynamic network of relationships, and 
serve as representations engaged in a commerce with those of the simulationists. The experiment as 
experiment embodies something significant, which both is and is not present in it.
While the simulation is already rendered a mark of certain kinds of mathematical, empirical and 
ideal problems, it important to note that it is also an artefact studied in its own right, and this opens 
up further layers of representation. When research is conducted under the orientation that I called a 
“science of method”, particular modelling practices come to embody wider technical dilemmas. 
Fluidity is a fluids model and a finite element model. It involves techniques for parallelisation, mesh 
adaptivity, and other kinds of mathematical systems. In these respects, there are many levels on 
which a simulation can stand as a representative of a variety of wider classes of simulations, on 
which a technique can be representative of other kinds of techniques, and on which a modelling 
framework breaks out of its own specificity and embodies something wider. To swap to 
Rheinberger's terminology once again, these are expansive movements of embodiment, in which 
what is occurring in the research is more than its particularity; something bigger is afoot. 
One recent project revolved around the classic problem of flow past a cylinder. Fluid is forced 
through a channel and as it moves past an object (the cylinder), turbulent effects are observed. Again, 
this is a classic type of experiment that can also be taken to represent wider fluid phenomena, as well 
as an idealised theoretical model. But in this case, another opening was manipulated, as the scientists 
discovered a key dependency between the model set up and the effects observed. Varying the degree 
of resolution around the boundary layer, the layer of fluid at the very edge of the cylinder, is shown 
to produce qualitatively different effects in the turbulent flow (how it oscillates and the stage at 
318 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 227.
- 114 -
- Modelling and Representing -
which it breaks into streams and eddies). The hypothesis that was presented in one public seminar 
was that given the importance of this kind of these kinds of flows in ocean currents, if this 
simulation is representative of other simulations, we might doubt the results of models of ocean flow 
wherever they fail to give a certain degree of resolution around the boundary layer over the 
topography. The questions from the audience revolved around the issue of whether this simulation 
really can be taken as a representation of other kinds of simulation. The issue was not how this 
simulation represents the empirical data against which it had been validated (which came from 
laboratory experiments), but rather whether there were other factors that made this simulation too 
specific to be used as an embodiment of more general quandaries of modelling.
These are all very well established manners of representing that are routinely combined within the 
laboratory. But the next section concerns aspects of the modelling process that end up opening issues 
of representation in unforeseen ways. This is an important point because it captures the sense in 
which representation is constructed, but without necessarily involving any specific intentional 
achievement. We cannot explain how these things come to be an issue by reference to the intentions 
of the scientists; we need to look at the wider milieu of their practice.
  5.9 New kinds of representation
New forms of representation can appear where a previously unproblematic realisation comes 
unstuck, travelling into the territory of embodiment. One notable example is in the relation between 
output data and the code that generated it. For the majority of cases, this is not at issue. The data 
produced by a simulation is simply identified as the causal outcome of running the code, the code 
amounting to a complex arithmetic equation, and the data produced being its answer. The two can be 
identified because the code directly creates its answer. The code is realised in its output. It is the 
same every time, as the logic gates of the processors mechanically crank out the outcome as 
inevitably and precisely as apodictic logic.
For the most part, this circumstance is maintained, and the data as a direct realisation of the program 
forms the unproblematic basis for research. It is at the far end of the spectrum, an extreme at which 
there is no sense of vicarship opening up a play of presence and absence. But certain trends in 
computing have started to break down this relationship, to create a subtle shift in the other direction, 
from which we might doubt it would be possible to return. 
Errors can creep in at all stages of the computational process, from interference among components 
to read/write errors when accessing memory. There are many techniques for identifying and 
minimising errors, and in the vast majority of cases there will be no difference made to any aspects 
of the simulation that are of interest. But as simulations get larger and more complex, running larger 
and larger sets of calculations on larger supercomputers, even the smallest probability of hardware 
error starts to become significant, and at a certain point tiny glitches can be assumed to be the norm. 
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In most cases, they will make no difference, as when a perfect statue is cast from a mould but under 
microscopic examination of the surface tiny bubbles can be seen. However, nonlinear systems can be 
very sensitive to the slightest of perturbations, and such difference may well count for something 
bigger. “Very small differences in the hardware or software design can have large consequences for 
[computing nonlinear] systems. One can think here of the use of different floating point precisions 
(i.e., the number of significant digits used by computer chips) or very small changes in the order of 
arithmetical operations (which would only produce no differences in outcome if the precision were 
infinite)”319.
However minor these concerns, however much they may be countered by techniques to minimise 
their impact, they begin an inexorable displacement of the relationship between code and its output 
data along the spectrum toward the middle zone of embodiment. No longer realising its output in a 
straightforward manner, the code becomes subject to the material complexities of its machinic 
environment. 
Supercomputers are massively parallel, and in the future only going to get more so, and thus we can 
posit that there is a certain class of simulation that will only ever be run in parallel – it would take 
too long for any serial computation. Once you start to scale up parallel operations, the materiality of 
the medium further intervenes in disrupting the relationship between code and data. Digital 
computers store only a finite number of digits for the variables they compute. This means that they 
often round off the calculations they perform. In normal arithmetic, if a computer stores five decimal 
places, the answer to 0.43954 multiplied by 0.68392, which would be 0.300610197, will be stored 
simply as 0.30061. This rounding is a fundamental feature of computational finitude and means that 
the order of operands makes a difference320. (A*B)*C ≠ A*(B*C). This would be all well and good if 
a supercomputer always performs its operations in the same order. If you ran the same code twice 
you would get the same output. However, the physics of the machine matters, and this was 
something WS was keen to point out. Differences in temperature distribution across the array of 
parallel processors can result in slight discrepancies in the order in which the results of sub-
processes are combined. Even without errors, it thus becomes impossible to identify a unique and 
definitive output from a simulation. The relationship between the data generated and the code is 
open for negotiation, and a new space of representation is up for grabs.
Other materialities are also contributing to this trend. Large simulations can easily generate terabytes 
of data, quantities that place enormous stresses on systems for transporting, storing and viewing 
data. For most such simulations, only a minimal subset of the output is written to disk as the 
simulation proceeds, and of this only a fraction is ever downloaded from the supercomputer to the 
desktop workstation, and the manipulation of the data there is subject to further constraints 
according to its hardware and software environment. There are many systems in place to assist these 
319 Petersen, Simulating Nature, 34.
320 See Edwards, A Vast Machine, 175–176.
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processes, often involving writing the code such that it performs a first stage of number crunching as 
it goes, to minimise the data to be stored. For a many of these big simulations, therefore, no single 
“output” ever exists. It is already mediated by all sorts of other interventions.
To be clear, I do not mean to imply that computational science is approaching a crisis. Competence 
in computational science already entails competence in the maintenance and manipulation of many 
relations of realisation, embodiment, and vicarship. It is significant, however, because this is an 
example where technical change has an effect within the distributions of representations. It is still 
very close to realisation. It is still very easy to treat the output as an analytic realisation of what is 
already contained in the code. But once displaced even slightly, it is hard to imagine that this 
relationship can ever fully be put back in its box, now its representational play has begun.
  5.10 Conclusion
Modelling cannot be understood as simply a process of creating a representation of a target. And the 
epistemology of simulation should not be confined to studies of how knowledge is gained from such 
a singular relationship. Representation is best understood in terms of a play of differences, and 
modelling as a multidimensional process that folds such ambiguities together.
Representation has thus taken us deep into the heart of practices of computer modelling, but for the 
next chapters we need to pay closer attention to the materialities and temporalities characteristic of 
this research practice. This chapter has shown the benefits of applying semiotic insights, but within a 
practice theoretical framework. Representation, as I have theorised it here, is no master concept 
through which we are to understand modelling. The concept of practice takes over from 
representation in this regard. Images, texts and software systems are representations but they are, in 
this frame, always more than representations. To grasp modelling as practice we need to see its 
unfolding among these many materials. To this end, we turn next to look at images, and then in the 
following chapters, to look at texts and at software.
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  6.1 Introduction
Over recent decades, the role of images in science, engineering and design has received a lot of 
attention321. Images are among the most visible aspects of scientific material culture, and are widely 
used across many fields of science. In this chapter, images serve as a way in, as a handle on the 
research process by which we might grasp its dynamics and rhythms. They are shown to be key 
handles on this process for the scientists, too, who make and use them. It thus explores how we 
might take images beyond an analysis of representations, and embed them in an account of practice. 
In the course of this chapter we also gain a first insight into a key feature of computational science 
practice, which will be important in the coming chapters: error. In what ways is error manifest? How 
do things go wrong and how do they come to be grasped as such?
The first part of this chapter clears the ground by looking at images as objectifications of research. 
Several of my informants gave scathing criticisms of “pretty pictures” in computational physics, and 
this initial section traces their comments through to the basic tension that we identified in chapter 3 
between the temporality of research in practice and that of accounts or objectifications of it.
The second part traces another path. It instead looks at the role of images within the becoming of 
research. I use them as a methodological handle with which to grasp the dynamics of scientists' 
investigations, the textures of everyday life within the laboratory. This side of images shows that 
they are important not just for depicting things. They are tools which aid the ongoing flow of 
research, tools for the scientist and through which an external observer may get a glimpse of these 
processes. It is a viewpoint from which we can grasp the roles of temporality, of rhythm and habit 
within the evolution of concrete research projects.
321 Lynch and Woolgar, Representation in Scientific Practice; Daston and Galison, Objectivity; Henderson, ‘The Political Career of 
a Prototype’; Pauwels, Visual Cultures of Science.
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  6.2 Trouble with images
Fluid dynamics research produces some wonderful images of swirling vortices, something of which 
many of my informants were openly proud. Occasional emails circulate through the group's 
communication channels calling for the collection of members' latest and best images for use on the 
website or on posters showing off the group's work. Such images abound in the fluid dynamics 
literature, adorning websites and textbooks and play no small role in defining the public perceptions 
of what this field is.
However, trouble arises where images form objectifications of research, and this is a particular 
problem in computational physics because research itself is somewhat hard to see. Its visible outputs 
can easily come to stand for the research itself. The problem is not only that they fail to capture the 
dynamics of research, but that because they are externalisations, material things with their own 
independence, they are hard to control.
“Images lie,” said HU; “it is much better to work with numbers”. KA commented that “there is a 
substantial percentage of scientists, maybe even 10 percent, who will see a pretty picture and just 
want to use it, without even knowing how it is validated. I think that is just disturbing”. More strong 
language from QY: “I think pretty pictures are an utter waste of time”, and QS went as far as to 
claim that “images tell you nothing”. The trouble in all of these cases was that beautiful images are 
compelling for aesthetic reasons, giving the effect of correctness, where caution would be better 
advised. They are a kind of pure rhetoric in visual form, usurping the painstaking systems of 
research with their aesthetic force.
This trope – “representation gone bad” – is hardly something new. It has long been part of our 
Western heritage322. From Plato's expulsion of the artists from the Republic to the history of smashed 
idols, representations embody an entrenched antagonism between the authentic and the derivative.
In charting the recent history of simulation methods across the sciences, Sherry Turkle shows that 
computer-generated images emerged as a key locus for anxieties about the legitimacy of these new 
ways of conducting research323. In the 1980s, when simulations were spreading through many 
scientific fields, Turkle notes that the professors at MIT “feared that even skeptical scientists would 
be vulnerable to the allure of a beautiful picture, that students would be drawn from the grittiness of 
the real to the smoothness of the virtual”324. “Physics faculty” she says, “were concerned that 
students who understood the theoretical difference between representation lost that clarity when 
faced with compelling screen graphics”325. These kinds of issues are still relevant today but for my 
informants, they raise less the question of the merits of simulation in general; raising instead the 
question of the proper role for images in their practice.
322 Latour and Weibel, Iconoclash.
323 Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents, 5, 31, 76–81.
324 Ibid., 5.
325 Ibid., 31.
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Digital images in computational science are created with visualisation software, explorations of the 
vast possibilities for scientists seeing what they have done when making and running simulations. 
The interactivity of these systems for the generation of images is a major element of research 
practice326. But this work, choosing colours, variables to display, contrasts to highlight, viewing 
angles, is just the start. Any thus created image can be manipulated and explored, and while easily 
discarded, it can also be rendered mobile, exported, saved, now embodied in a standard format data-
file. It can travel and multiply, across many screens, projectors and print media. It can facilitate 
decisions elsewhere, catalyse discussions, act as a heuristic, and be embedded in new sites of 
narrative, contrast, and series.
Images are among the many inscriptions that form the material culture in which research is carried 
out. And as material entities, their importance is to be judged
“not by what they depict, but by how they work. Immutable mobiles [a term from Latour] 
fix transient events (make them durable), and in doing so, allow them to be moved in space 
and time (make them available in many places). That is their power.”327
Rheinberger points us towards the many images of the laboratory, how they connect with the many 
other inscriptions (text, data, code) found across its domain, and directs us towards a study of what 
they do rather than what they represent.
Figure 7: Visualisation of data generated by a simulation of the generation of internal waves, 
and their breaking, in stratified flow over a bump
To talk of representation is to talk of a shifting assembly of related traces: “material signs, entities of 
signification”328. The image in figure 7 is one such trace. Recall from chapter 5 the multiplicity of 
relations involved in modelling. Figure 7 represents internal waves in stratified flow and emerges 
from a project investigating the physical processes at work in “real world” sea loch systems. But it 
also represents the data-set that is embodied in its contours and colours (blue standing for fresh 
water, red for salty; yellow and green in-between). Quite aside from any empirical target, the image 
is a way to display this data set, an attempt to render visible what is embodied there. Furthermore, 
any such generated traces are indexical of the software that produced them and the “model” it 
326 Monteiro, ‘Reconfiguring Evidence’.
327 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 106.
328 Ibid., 111; cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology.
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embodies. Not confined to a singular motive of studying a sea loch, the research project is also 
equally concerned with validating the larger software framework, demonstrating that to some degree 
it should be judged capable of simulating turbulence in stratified flows, a key stepping stone towards 
simulating many other fluids phenomena. The code itself is further connected with other bodies of 
software and theory. Rheinberger's approach stresses the dynamics of interaction and substitution 
among a this wide array of relations, and he is therefore “not concerned... with the relation between 
theory and reality, between concept and object as such”, instead he is “concerned with describing the 
process of making science as a process in which traces are generated, displaced, and superposed”329. 
This point of view stands in stark contrast to the general tendency in the philosophy of representation 
to isolate a single relation and ask of it alone what it does and how it does it. 
What we are thus interested in is a wide field of play, of many images, and many other traces, 
connected in many ways and involved in a dynamic process of articulation. We need to appreciate 
images as cognitively significant things. Following Bachelard and Heidegger, we should regard 
cognition as a worldly practice, not as something hidden within the enclosure of a subject: “the 
perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of 
consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, 
the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein”330. Research as practice occurs 
among things. Scientific visual culture is an artefactual stratum that embodies something of the 
cognitive circuits that comprise the scientists' systems of exploration. They are not just technical but 
“mnemotechnical” in the terms of the philosopher Bernard Stiegler, systems of externalised 
memory331. 
Both Rheinberger and Stiegler draw inspiration from the writings of Jacques Derrida, for whom the 
kind of ambivalence expressed by my informants would be a general symptom consequent of all 
processes of working with and through externalisations. This ambivalence he traced to the “very 
condition of systematicity or seriality in general”332. As external artefacts, inscriptions can be 
“generated, displaced and superposed,” material manipulations which facilitate the grasp of their 
complex inter-relatedness, their “systematicity or seriality in general”, and this grasp is possible 
insofar as they are external. But they also harbour a fundamental ambivalence because they thereby 
gain an independence, a potential unruliness, threatening thought. Stiegler thus offers a normative 
stance. Technical systems materialise knowledge and thus render it workable for all sorts of new 
kinds of “distributed cognition”333, but they equally always harbour the potentiality to “short-circuit” 
thought, blocking access to certain parts of the network334.
329 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 105.
330 Heidegger, Being and Time, 89.
331 Stiegler, Technics and Time 2.
332 Derrida, Dissemination, 106.
333 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild.
334 Stiegler, For a New Critique of Political Economy, 35.
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In the opinions of my informants, the image poses an obstacle, a) when it convinces through 
aesthetic compulsion; and b) when it is therefore taken “out of context.” The proper context is one in 
which the intrinsic limitations of the simulation that generated the image are known. The danger of 
the pretty picture is that its self-sufficient existence, its coherence and integrity, come to short-circuit 
the broader field of the research which made it335. What represents, and how it does so, we are told 
by a wave of contemporary philosophers, depends on the context336. But the thing about inscriptions 
is that they can travel. Images travel beyond the site of their generation, and along the way there is 
the possibility of sloughing off accompanying contextual markers, with a variety of legitimacy-
bolstering or undermining effects337. These markers are put down in written form in order that they 
may entwine the travelling image in a mnemotechnical circuit, enveloping it with traces of its origin. 
In publication, it is epistemically virtuous to mark the narrative with caveats, largely consequences 
of the idealisations through which the simulation was made. “Some models,” says KA, “simply can't 
answer the question you want to ask”. But whether or not you can tell if a given model can answer 
your question depends on what has accompanied it on its travels. Obviously given the Sisyphean 
nature of attempting to “give” the whole context (where could you possibly draw the line?), the 
question is one of judging the merits of the fragments that remain.
Science, like many human activities, occurs among technical systems. But any externalisation has its 
independence, what often seems an animistic “life of its own”. It cannot be fully controlled, even by 
those with the strongest claims to authorship. The problem for images, as expressed by my 
informants, is a problem of control which relates to the materiality of the systems they create, 
manipulate, and eventually render partially independent. Images are accompanied by a web of other 
inscriptions that embody the much less tangible relations between the image and its site of 
production. It is the relation between the image and these other inscriptions that constitutes the risk 
of the short-circuit, and the point at which any configuration stands to be judged as good or bad. This 
relation is too often eclipsed in the second-order accounts of social scientists and philosophers by 
another relation, its more assertive neighbour, that between the simulation and the reality it 
simulates, which under the name of validation is the focus for a huge amount of concern and 
philosophical labour. 
There is no reason to expect that this kind of problem will be confined to computational science. 
Anxieties about representation in many different spheres have crystallised around images338. But the 
novelty of computational methods and the disturbance they pose to established forms of science 
raises questions about legitimacy with particular force, and images in this field find themselves the 
outlet for much wider concerns for those whose agency and identity are bound up in these pursuits.
335 Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents, 76–81.
336 Suárez, ‘Scientific Representation’; van Fraassen, Scientific Representation; Giere, Scientific Perspectivism.
337 Lahsen, ‘Seductive Simulations?’.
338 Maurer, ‘Does Money Matter? Abstraction and Substitution in Alternative Financial Forms’.
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The robustness of the travelling image stands in contrast to the fragility of its relations to the traces 
of its context, its ties to its origins in a particular time and place, a particular research project, a 
model with a history and specific limits. Despite all the scientists' best efforts, this contrast cannot be 
overcome. The textual accompaniment is always at risk of being insufficiently explained or just 
written badly or wrongly. “You can't write it all down in your paper,” says GY, “and even if you do, 
you might get it wrong. There are examples where someone has written a paper and has got 
something wrong in their description of what they did, and when you do and look at the original 
source code, they actually did it right”. There is always a risk of being skimmed over, skipped, 
ignored, misinterpreted, mistranslated, lost or forgotten. Or maybe the image is just too compelling. 
In these scientists' complaints, therefore, the key issue is not the image as such. Nor is it the context 
for visual representation. It is the material-cognitive interrelations between visual inscriptions and 
the markers of their context, as these wind their way through the networks of scientific culture. Such 
worries about images are more than a local expression of the troubles with representation. For we 
should not accept the assumption that the natural state of culture is stasis and coherence, but open 
our eyes to human agency among the exigencies of symbolic decomposition339. These scientific 
troubles would then instantiate in a microcosm the feats and frustrations of assembling culture, 
working against the broadest tendencies of things to fall apart.
  6.3 Beyond representation
So, if images are so troublesome why carry on creating them? 
We have seen that as externalisations, as artefacts, images present threats to scientists' control over 
the materials of their work. Pretty pictures direct our attention toward this endemic concern, this 
problematisation of materiality and control that is woven across the laboratory. But if we now turn 
towards research in the making, images take us in another direction, towards the role of these 
objectifications of research within its accomplishment, in which they do not obstruct its flow, but 
rather facilitate it.
In a general seminar-style discussion on the theme of images with about half the group, I displayed a 
brochure for a fluids modelling code, replete with colourful graphics of turbulent mixing, of velocity 
arrows flowing through jet engines, of intricate machinery modelled in detail340. “The trouble with 
this,” said QY, to general assent, “is that it makes it look like the simulation is already finished, 
already complete.” What is erased by these inscriptions is the process, the always incomplete 
becoming of their work. Whatever confidence scientists feel about their work, there is an aspect in 
which this sentiment is deferred towards future validations of the model, future proofs about the 
method, and future studies of the system. Even when inscribed in publication, research is never 
339 Wagner, The Invention of Culture.
340 Major international companies such as Ansys offer similar simulation services to the work done at AMCG, but on a commercial 
scale, and with a visibly greater attention to the efficacy of marketing materials (see for example http://www.ansys.com/).
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wholly present, but is always part of an ongoing becoming. What is not captured in marketing 
images is the fact that, in Rheinberger's Derridean terms a model is “an entity that draws its 
effectiveness from its own absence... [A] model is a model only in the perspective and by virtue of 
an imaginary reality at which it fails to arrive”341. These marketing images are the ones most widely 
disseminated beyond the laboratory but this is an expulsion from which they cannot return. While 
they do represent the simulation and its object, in so doing they eclipse its temporality, its coming 
into being. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the exploratory process in itself, animated by dull feelings, vague 
suspicions, moods and hunches, wrapped in a culture of artefacts and procedures, is destined to be 
erased in the end analysis. No retrospective objectification can do justice to the indeterminacy of its 
genesis. Like the creation of marketing materials, the “write-up” would be a process of erasure as 
much as it is one of inscription. In both cases, the indeterminacy of the exploration is analytically out 
of focus where the “result” of research looms large, for wherever there is a result, there is a tendency 
to see the process of its formation only under the condition of its eventual outcome, to collapse 
indeterminacy into the determination of what will emerge from it342. As Rheinberger puts it:
“An experimental system can readily be compared to a labyrinth, whose walls, in the course 
of being erected, in one and the same movement, blind and guide the experimenter. In the 
step-by-step construction of a labyrinth, the existing walls limit and orient the direction of 
the walls to be added. A labyrinth that deserves the name is not planned and thus cannot be 
conquered by following a plan. It forces us to move around by means and by virtue of 
checking out, of groping, of tâtonnement”343.
There are many images in research that do not retain attention within their own capacities as images, 
in the manner of the pretty pictures deployed for marketing purposes, but rather pull it through them, 
beyond them towards the emerging future of the ongoing project. Here any representational 
capacities are implicit; “the Image” does not appear as a source of problems, because images are 
thoroughly embedded in technical milieux of code, equations, statistics, equipment and procedures, 
drawn together around a temporally unfolding research project, a background from which neither 
images nor any specifically visual dimension are routinely extricated or isolated.
There are very good reasons to be wary about equating visualisation with the production of visual 
sensation, of shapes or colours. Martin Heidegger captures this, though writing of the ears: “Much 
closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and 
never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds”344. What is significant in moments of 
investigation is what is seen in the image, moments in which the image itself disappears, in which 
what is significant is less “what is seen in the image”, than simply “what is seen”, what is 
341 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 110.
342 Cf. Simondon, ‘The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis’; Ingold, ‘Beyond Art and Technology’.
343 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 74.
344 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, 25.
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encountered. Mediation is not the issue and thus not the message. Much closer to the scientist than 
all images is the problem at hand, the simulation, the data, a bug in the code, or its potential solution. 
In the time of their work, present representation is less of an issue than future realisation.
  6.4 Discontinuity and process
Social scientific theory has over recent years become increasingly concerned with process and 
becoming, and in a sense my analysis is indeed intended to take us in this direction. Pickering 
captures this trend in his assertion that “we live in the thick of things, in a symmetric, decentred 
process of the becoming of the human and the non-human”345. But why have we not always seen 
things in this way? Why is dualism so entrenched in Western culture? It would be easy to claim that 
modern scientific viewpoints are responsible, and indeed Pickering will continue: “But this is veiled 
from us by a particular tactic of dualist detachment and domination that is backed up and 
intensified... by science as our certified way of knowing”346. To be clear, however, it is not science 
itself that is responsible, as if scientific research was dualist and detached, but rather a metaphysical 
position that stereotypes science, that requires a “zoomed out” view that brackets off the 
improvisations and processes through which research itself is carried out, for the insight of science 
studies has been that if we look in at the detail of practical research we see that in fact “science is 
itself caught up in the flow of becoming...”347. What is needed is not a rejection of science, but the 
performance of a figure-ground reversal348: “a gestalt switch between the margins and the 
hegemonic centre of gravity would be a way of putting dualist ontology and its associated projects in 
their place”349.
Emphasis on flows and processes is often achieved through the construction of a contrast with a 
world of ontic beings and static structures, for example between on the one hand the inscription of 
the marketing image which presents the model as finalised and on the other hand the research 
process that is always deferred, always reaching out towards an open future. In the context of talking 
about anthropological narrative, but in words that could equally apply to the navigation of research, 
Strathern points to a potential naivety here. The danger is that these flows and processes are 
imagined as smooth, a smoothness which is an artefact of the contrast drawn for rhetorical purposes, 
rather than a feature of the process itself.
“Ideas and arguments are often regarded as “flowing”... The time it might take to travel, as 
the reader moves through the text, gives a kind of experiential unity to the exercise. Yet this 
unity or sense of flow or movement is at the same time made up of jumps over gaps, 
juxtapositions, leaps – unpredictable, irregular. So, continuous as the process of narration 
345 Pickering, ‘New Ontologies’, 8.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
348 Wagner, ‘Figure-Ground Reversal’.
349 Pickering, ‘The Politics of Theory’, 205.
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might seem, the closer we inspect monographs, paragraphs, sentences, the more aware we 
are of internal discontinuities”350. 
Scientists at AMCG inhabit a world of the interplay of the continuous and discontinuous, between 
the continuity of the Navier-Stokes equations for an ideal fluid, and the discontinuity of the 
molecular dynamics that the ideal fluid overwrites for macro-scale phenomena, between these 
continuous equations and the discrete mathematics of the digital computer and between the 
continuities and discontinuities of the numerical approximation and the necessity of modelling 
continuities and discontinuities within the simulated system. Each is implicated in the other. It is 
impossible to idealise continuity as representing some more authentic essence of process. 
Discontinuity is not the antithesis of process, but is endemic within it, folded many times over. 
Thus we might gain first a glimpse of images in the depths of the research process, of their relation 
to a differential of movement, manifest at moments of unpredictable leaps, of irregular jumps, all 
those crucial moments where the ongoing path of investigation is textured by discontinuity, gaps 
where what comes next does not automatically follow, not by prior plan or internal momentum, but 
requires some additional force. Images are fodder for habit and improvisation, the material to be 
grasped in order to push onwards. Somewhat like stepping stones, points of hardness at odds with 
the ongoing movement, without such material artefacts that movement would not be able to push 
onwards towards its future. They are points at which what follows unfolds. As Bourdieu was well 
aware, even when the question of “what comes next” (in a rite, a procedure, an application of 
scientific method) is as rule bound as it can be, the whole success of the enterprise may nevertheless 
rest on a thoroughly tacit sense of timing and of rhythm, a sensitivity to the moment for which rules 
are no substitute351. 
  6.5 Images and intuition
The danger is that images are, to paraphrase Levi-Strauss, so “good to think with” that they are hard 
to think past, and hence Bachelard would claim that scientists must always be wary of them. In his 
view, it is necessary that scientists disrupt their imaginative faculties, that they find ways to kick the 
feet out from under intuitive ways of thinking that have been cultivated across the many arenas of 
daily life. Only then can they break past epistemological obstacles352. Past experience has provided 
us with images through which we make sense of the world, some of which yield false certainties so 
entrenched that only great efforts will see them shifted. Thus Bachelard would assert that “[a] 
science that accepts images is, more than any other, a victim of metaphor”353.
Substance is one of Bachelard's examples. He writes of the way in which images of interiority and 
inwardness exert an influence on how scientific phenomena have been treated. These imaged forms 
350 Strathern, Partial Connections, xxiii.
351 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 7.
352 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 28.
353 Ibid., 47.
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of thought are more than ways of speaking: “there is in fact more here than just description by a 
word: there is explanation by a thought. You think as you see and you think what you see: a speck of 
dust sticks to an electrified surface and therefore electricity is a glue, a very sticky glue”354. Images 
may be useful, but they are also dangerous. They are sources of ambivalence, “pharmacological” in 
Derridean terms355.
The imagination in Bachelard's view wanders among tropes laid down over a lifetime, especially 
during childhood, expressed particularly vividly in poetry and in dreams. These intuitions are in 
constant interaction with new experiences. Patterns in fluid dynamics images such as those in figure 
7 recall the ways in which we dwell among fluids, in which we bathe and consume them, the ways 
we paddle, pour, stir, soak, and splash. Certain kinds of images are favoured, as are certain scales, 
which are conditioned by the kinds of bodies and environments we inhabit. As Myers has shown, far 
from being disembodied, computational science involves a great deal of “body-work”; scientists 
engage with phenomena through a whole range of bodily and gestural entanglements356. So while 
Bachelard sees a pitfall in enlisting intuition into the scientific fold, we need to supplement his 
viewpoint with the other side of the coin, for at times in the development of simulations, there are 
few better resources capable of giving scientists such a handle on their work357.
The course of developing a model proceeds through a time in which it is still uncertain whether a 
simulation is behaving correctly, or what the correct behaviour might be, and, if it does appear to be 
behaving itself, whether it is doing so for all, some, or none, of the right reasons. Prior to the 
emergence of the simulation as it will be spoken about in publication and presentation, is the 
simulation as it is in its process of being made, when existing capabilities of the code are tested for 
their ability to handle the problem in question, when new capabilities are being added in order to 
supplement any deficiencies thus identified, and when the many hundreds of virtual dials and knobs 
within the model set-up and parametrisation are being tweaked and refined. This is a time before the 
simulation is yet ready for the formalised assessments of validation. But at this point many important 
questions will have to be decided, a whole landscape of possibilities to be navigated, for which 
precedents and rules of thumb provide only partial guidance, especially when the project also 
involves adding new functionality into the framework. What kind of basis functions will you use? 
What kind of mesh? At what resolution? Will it be adaptive and if so how? What kind of time 
stepping (implicit, explicit, or somewhere in between?)? What kind of boundary conditions and 
forcing factors? What kind of parametrisations? And do they work in combination for the kinds of 
procedures that will be key to this project?
During this period of model composition, the scientist is constantly modifying the model and 
attempting to understand the results of this modification. Experience here is not an exercise in data-
354 Ibid., 109.
355 Derrida, Dissemination.
356 Myers, ‘Animating Mechanism’.
357 Monteiro, ‘Reconfiguring Evidence’.
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collection, but of reflection, of interacting with one's own effects among what happens. The data-sets 
produced by the majority of simulations run at AMCG are simply too vast to be directly understood. 
Errors in the emerging simulation can appear in three main ways. Some will cause a complete crash 
of the program. Others will produce wildly inaccurate results. And then there are errors of a range of 
subtleties, some of which can only be picked up later on by verification and validation. Errors can 
creep in at all stages, arising from the specific set up of the simulation, from changes made by others 
elsewhere in the code, or from shifts in the wider technical milieu (external libraries, compilers and 
operating systems, for example, being constantly updated and modified).
In these early phases of development, simulations usually evolve through a series of wildly 
inaccurate results, with the scientist trying to understand these, tame them, eliminate any problems. 
While otherwise hard to grasp, error is often starkly obvious when it is manifest in an image, and in 
many moments, even while a large simulation is in the process of being run (which may take a long 
time, even on a supercomputer), it is common practice to download the simulation's data, its work in 
progress, and visualise to “keep an eye on it”, hoping to catch any error as it occurs, if it occurs.
“The point is not to run it for a week and then check at the end of the week and find it was 
wrong after day one, so that is why I keep on checking.” (IW) 
Looking at a visualisation, scientists can often tell that something is going wrong, because problems 
are manifest in the image such that it intuitively “looks wrong”. Indeed it is claimed that non-
scientists would have the same response if erratic behaviour in the model output leads to a 
visualisation that simply doesn't resemble everyday experiences of fluids. 
“If the water moves through the solid object rather than around it, I know there is a problem, 
because that is just not physical.” (AB)
If the image, often in this context a moving image, evokes intuitions of fluids this serves as a rough, 
provisional indication that the project remains on the right lines. This informal kind of check is thus 
ubiquitous in the laboratory routine. QY put it like this: 
“Would you expect that if you bent a piece of wood into a certain position, and then bent it 
further, it snaps? If it keeps bending and bending and didn't snap you would say that is 
unphysical. I guess you could say the same of fluid dynamics. There are just some things 
that the system just isn't supposed to do.” (QY)
On several fronts, fluids exceed codified knowledge of what they do. Turbulence, one of the central 
phenomena of fluid dynamics, implies for modellers that there are dynamics going on at scales 
smaller than those they explicitly model. CQ put it enigmatically: “I think one of the best ways to 
put it is that turbulence is that thing that you can't ever model”. There are always phenomena that 
escape the model, and thus no absolute or “mechanical” means for recognising a fluid to serve as a 
yardstick against the fallibility of intuition. We should therefore be justified in offering a light 
critique of Bachelard's damning view of the role of intuition in science. In some circumstances, it is 
integral to the unfolding of the phenomenotechnical milieu.
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In other cases, however, errors are less apparent. They do not show themselves so easily, and the 
scientist relies on long experience in working with this kind of simulation, experience which 
conditions the space of practice opened by the visualisation. Work with images is often a time for 
inclinations to linger longer on a certain stage of development, to double check some settings, to run 
an extra diagnostic or to look at a different visualisation of the data, movements through the process 
of investigation that open further spaces from which it may become obvious that there is a problem 
lurking somewhere within the system, or which may set up a confidence sufficient to move on 
towards the next steps. But rather than ever actually affirming that the simulation is correct, the best 
these intuitive checks can offer is a provisional double negative: it is “not wrong”. It is not even that 
nothing is wrong, but that nothing appears wrong, in the initial check. “Just [by] opening it up and 
looking at the colours in Paraview, you can't tell it is correct, you can just say if it is wrong” (QS). It 
is not infrequent for something that “looks right” will later on turn out to have subtler problems that 
were just not the kind of thing that would show up in the image.
“Looking at a visualisation, you can eyeball it and see if there is something obviously 
wrong, but if it looks roughly like what you expected then you would do your diagnostics 
and find out exactly how much it looks like what you expected.” (QY)
An image “looking right” provides little ground for any kind of formal epistemic confidence, but it 
does exert an influence on the scientists' course of investigation by indicating that things are stable 
and “not wrong” enough at this point to move on, to take another step, to go and introduce further 
elements of physics, simulate a system of greater complexity, or to attempt to formalise the data 
outputs according to statistical measures, through coding up diagnostics, a mathematical 
transformation of the data-set that often in the end reduces the need or inclination to visualise it at 
all. The image is no substitute for the diagnostic measures that distil the data into numbers that can 
support some kind of positive conclusions, a much more formal grounding of confidence which may 
reveal issues invisible in the image. But these kind of formal measures are not usually available until 
later on in the development process. 
“The initial visualisation will tell you if it is wrong, if the velocity is flying off the sides or 
whatever, but it won't tell you if it is correct. It can never tell you if it is absolutely correct 
and I suspect that is why I plot these graphs now. When I first was developing this 
[simulation] about twenty months ago when I came here I probably did open the file and 
look at it and say “its wrong” or “its right” but it has been looking right for 20 months now, 
but it has actually been wrong. So looking at it wouldn't have told me anything which I 
guess is why I have moved into distilling it down into a graph.” (QS)
  6.6 Navigating error in the lock exchange
Error is encountered in the image but the real importance of visualisation is only apparent when we 
note that this encounter can go much further. It can draw attention beyond the mere fact of error, 
towards its underlying cause and towards the future of its eventual resolution.
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The images in figure 8 show data from a simulation of the lock exchange, a well studied experiment 
where a tank is filled, with the aid of a barrier in the middle, half with hot fluid and half with cold 
fluid. The barrier is removed, and the mixing that occurs is a paradigmatic example of “gravity 
currents”, currents driven by the differing density of the two bodies of water. In this case, something 
has gone wrong.
The simulation that is visualised in figure 8 is a “short test”, a small simulation that is automatically 
run, along with thousands of other tests, by the automated testing server every time anyone changes 
anything within Fluidity's code. The purpose of these tests is to let scientists know when changes 
have affected key results, so that they can be confident that they will be able to reproduce a result 
they got earlier. This system, coupled with the code repository, introduces an element of stasis, of 
reproducibility, into a field defined by perpetual technical evolution. In this case, the example was 
set up with a diagnostic that gives a statistical measure of the amount of mixing between the two 
bodies of water. An alarm was triggered when the test suddenly started exceeding the expected range 
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of values (expected from the experimental and computational precedent), alerting SS, the “owner” of 
the simulation, to the existence of a problem.
Having been thus alerted, SS knew because she designed the test case that the symptom was 
excessive mixing, but with a massively complex code such as Fluidity you are guaranteed no simple 
way to diagnose the cause. SS immediately visualised a cross-section of the simulation, plotting 
temperature. The result is a succession of images that she can click through or play as an animation, 
to see the data at each time step. A selection of these snapshots is displayed in figure 8. All time-
dependent simulations must approximate the continuum of time that underlies the Navier-Stokes 
equations by a series of discrete steps. SS's attention was drawn to peculiar jumps in behaviour 
between consecutive time-steps, such as the sudden spike in mixing visible between 559 and 560 
time units (d and e in the diagram). Individually, both 559 and 560 show intuitively feasible results. 
It is the difference between them that stood out. The abrupt change on the boundary should not 
occur, for there is no process simulated between the time-steps that could explain it.
Figure 9: As in Figure 8, but with mesh overlaid
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Having spotted this, SS went on to visualise the simulation in another way, to create different images 
through which she can hope to push onwards towards a more specific idea of what was going on. 
She chose the same visualisation set-up, but with the addition of an overlay of the mesh, to check 
how it was adapting between these time steps. The mesh is the discretisation of space, which like 
time must be divided into a finite number of discrete units in order for it to be dealt with on a 
computer. In figure 9 you can see the mesh evolving from a regular starting distribution towards a 
distribution that concentrates resolution on the boundary, where the smaller scale dynamics are 
occurring. Looking at figure 9, and seeing that the abrupt change in mixing corresponds to an abrupt 
change in the resolution of the mesh, was a good indication that the problem was something to do 
with the adaptivity algorithms. 
That it is a local problem, affecting only a sub-set of elements (you can clearly see a localised 
section of the boundary markedly relaxing its resolution in figure 9) raised a strong suspicion that the 
problem resides at a deep level: in the parallel processing of the simulation. These finite element 
simulations are designed to run on multiple processors by dividing up the elements within the 
domain (the triangles in the mesh) so that each processor handles a small sub-set. It seemed likely 
therefore that something was causing just one processor to behave strangely. This points SS towards 
further pathways, checking that this was not a hardware malfunction by running a repetition of the 
test, and adding weight to her suspicion by trying it in serial (all on one single processor).
That the investigation heads in this direction takes the issue further from SS's own domain of 
expertise, and having exhausted her own ideas for what would be causing the processor to go astray 
she took the issue to a weekly meeting, which is usually attended by several scientists who are 
specialists in parallel processing. Having the problem externalised in these visualisations had 
facilitated the process of investigation that pointed towards it being a parallel processing issue, and 
then later these images can be brought into the communal forum to catalyse a dialogue with others, 
enabling the SS to marshal assistance to help find a way through the technical system towards the 
source of the problem, a common tactic in a group with a strong communal dynamic. Images tip the 
pathway towards new courses of action, new tests, new forms of scrutiny, new suspicions. But they 
also bring individuals together.
“It is fairly common to go to others to see if they recognise what is going wrong. Not just in 
visualisation, but if the compiler fails and someone comes to me and I recognise the error 
message and know how to fix it... same thing with visualisation. If it goes wrong and the 
velocities are pointing downwards I have seen a similar thing: 'I saw this... I did this... it 
should work'” (QS)
It is not pure goodwill that SS relies on for help. There are bugs in all complex software, some of 
which can be very difficult to analyse and fix. It is in everyone's best interests to fix bugs when they 
appear. The bug's manifestation in a failed test such as this could provide a sufficient handle with 
which to grab the opportunity to iron out a problem. If ignored it would just lie dormant within the 
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code only to cause problems in the future. It is not just a single scientists' problem, but a problem for 
everyone who is invested in this modelling framework.
“All the libraries that we depend on, so PETSc and VTK for example, they all have bugs. 
We can't fix them either except when we hit one and we fix it and report it back. Compilers 
have bugs, operating systems have bugs. There is no way we can get rid of them all. We 
often hit compiler bugs. It is just part of computer modelling as a whole. You are going to 
have bugs and you are going to hit them. You just have to make sure that there aren't enough 
bugs that it derails everything, which is why we have test suites. Most research centres by 
the way do not have test suites.” (QS)
In many cases, an automatic alert like this will lead to the problem being traced to the most recent 
change to the code, the change that triggered this particular round of testing. This can then be 
searched for errors and fixed or just “rolled back” and removed. But this case was slightly more 
unusual, and the change in question was not itself the source of the problem. This change had 
modified the operation of the code in a subtle way that had allowed a deeper more insidious bug to 
manifest itself. Some bugs, of course, are simple: a bracket too few or too many in a newly added 
file, or a problem with how the model has been configured. But others can be pernicious. 
“Sometimes when I see certain problems that I have never seen before someone will say 
'That seems like this is going wrong' then I will have a look and find out. 'Oh yes that's what 
is going on'. If someone is really stumped on a problem they will ask and hopefully someone 
will have seen something like that before. But occasionally you get a problem which no-one 
has seen before, so you just have to battle through it.” (IM)
  6.7 Becoming a scientist
The research process does many things. It produces knowledge and generates complex software 
systems. Yet further to the production of knowledge and equipment, the repetition of seeing and 
working upon problems, bugs, causes and solutions also forms a basis of scientific habituation, a 
milieu of sensitivities across the community. When we look at the meandering course of 
investigation, it is impossible to separate the becoming of the process of research from the process of 
becoming a scientist. Recalling Ingold's critique of skill transmission discussed in chapter 3, the 
skills of scientific practice are not transmitted through the communication of codes of conducts. 
There is an art to science that requires habituation. “Since an art cannot be precisely defined,” says 
Polanyi, “it can be transmitted only by examples of the practice which embodies it”358. To go further, 
we should extend this point, and say it is not even a question of examples. It is a question of 
becoming a co-participant in a field of practice, a co-constituent, to give oneself over to its contours. 
Over countless iterations of problems and solutions that have characterised his or her work, what the 
scientist sees (in the image) is subtly and strongly conditioned. 
358 Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, 15.
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Don Ihde talks about what he calls the “multistability” of images, the plurality of what can be seen in 
an image, and he uses the famous image of the “duck-rabbit” to make this point359.
The duck and the rabbit are both possibilities here, but with respect to scientific visualisation, it 
would help to extend this image, and to imagine one where the duck is more stable than the rabbit, 
one where only certain people would, through long years of encounters, be habitually inclined to see 
the rabbit, and one where the rabbit even at its clearest to even the most rabbit-inclined observer is 
still a slightly tenuous and vague suggestion, a fleeting suggestion like a shape recognised in a 
passing cloud. Alac and Hutchins explore this habituation through a distinction between seeing and 
looking, writing of a “trajectory that took the novice from looking at the image to seeing the 
structures in it ”360. But the precariousness of recognition, its instability, is equally important361. 
Training does not just provide new kinds of clarity, but opens new windows for new kinds of 
ambiguity to be brought to bear.
Where habit is at stake, it is apt to think back to the quote of Rheinberger given above, where he 
notes that the walls of the labyrinth “blind and guide” the experimenter. The blindness is the lack of 
clear foresight of what is to come, the basis of the improvised decision, following a vague suspicion. 
But the same thing that blinds also guides, regulates and determines. This interplay between the 
regularity and difference, between the rule and the act, is commented on by both Bourdieu and 
Deleuze, who must be recognised, for all their differences, as two of the most influential 
commentators on habit. It is in precisely this vein that Bourdieu characterises the habitus as the 
“durably installed principle of regulated improvisations”362. Improvisation is regulated according to 
principles “which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product 
of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at 
ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor”363.
359 Rosenberger, ‘Quick-Freezing Philosophy’, 68; Ihde, Expanding Hermeneutics; cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
204.
360 Alac and Hutchins, ‘I See What You Are Saying’, 659.
361 Kruger, ‘Visualizing Uncertainty’.
362 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 78.
363 Ibid., 72.
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Deleuze points to the novelty that emerges from and resides within the repetition of the same. “Habit 
draws something new from repetition – namely, difference... In essence, habit is contraction. 
Language testifies to this in allowing us to speak of “contracting” a habit, and in allowing the verb 
“to contract” only in conjunction with a complement capable of constituting a habitude”364. Over 
many instances of generating, navigating and working with and through a great many different 
images, working through them in the same manner and mode, according to the same kinds of code, 
the same kinds of physics, and the same kinds of problems, sensitivities are established. Through 
these, research is regular, yet this regularity is what opens up the space for irregularity, for 
improvisation, following barely grounded suspicions to investigate further, suspicions which may 
well later confirm themselves, a confirmation that only emerges through having already had to act, to 
follow a suspicion when it was no more than a vague feeling. Those that come to nothing constitute 
departure points for further exploration while those that are confirmed shed their vagueness, and 
establish a retroactive teleology that collapses the discontinuity of the decision into the unity of the 
continuing process. The form of the scientific everyday is not stamped upon it by some a priori 
definition of the correct scientific method, but grows instead out of the difference and repetition of 
research practice.
  6.8 The fate of the image
In the above the problem (the error) is seen through the image. The image is not the problem. It is 
not that the image does not represent, but the question of their representation risks establishing a 
discord between the questions of the analyst and those of the subject. Images of the lock exchange 
may well pose questions of representation when at a later point the research is written up for 
publication. There, the multiplicity of their targets will be unpicked. Do they represent the data? If 
so, how well? Or are they instead to be representing the simulation? Or the target of the simulation? 
Or the simulation's representation of the target? Which image will be chosen out of the countless 
possibilities that can be generated from the same data-set? 
But the images exhibited above in figures 8 and 9 will never make it this far. They will never be 
subject to such questions and will never find their way into publication. They are generated from a 
simulation which has gone awry. They are part of the greater stock of scientific visual culture, all but 
the tip of the iceberg, never disseminated, never anchoring truth claims: disposable images created in 
the between times, finding their place in the midst of the repetitions of daily life, never in the final 
analysis, where they are written out of wider concerns with eventual results. At such points within 
the becoming of research, even the most deceptive image would be valuable if it helps SS find her 
orientation, for at issue is what will bring the process forward, and establish for it a future. Confident 
or tentative, research takes its steps forwards according to such materials, catalysts for its 
progression. 
364 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 94.
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In the end, the image can never be left alone. It gets accompanied by other kinds of narrative and 
inscription. While SS works to keep her simulations functional, combating problems such as the one 
described above, she writes her research up into publications, and here visualisations take a back 
seat. Here the big question is the representative capacity of the simulation, not of its images, and it 
will be measured by diagnostic variables, statistical measures of its fit with experimental results, 
with other scientists' simulations, and with different set-ups of this simulation modelling a range of 
analytic and empirical targets. Much more than visualisations, these diagnostics play the central role 
in the strategies through which claims about the lock exchange and about simulating both might be 
justified. For this reason, the image draws the eye back into the incomplete process of research, 
rather than anchoring it to its results, its eventual outcome, which is characterised by an general 
desire for mathematisation.
“You want hard numbers... Turbulence is a good one because it will produce some very 
pretty animations of flows oscillating and you have the wave region behind something and it 
is all circulating and it looks amazing, but it only means something if you start analysing it 
statistically, finding out what it does on average and finding out what the scales of motion 
are there...”(QY)
  6.9 Conclusion
Winsberg notes that simulation does not fit squarely within the concerns of traditional philosophy of 
science365. He attributes this in part to the fact that simulation is usually based on theory that is 
already known, so it would be easy to assume it would not pose any problems outside those that are 
already tackled in the philosophy of scientific theory. In other words, if a simulation is built out of 
theoretical knowledge, it can only discover what is already there. Theoretical systems, such as the 
theory of fluid dynamics embodied in the Navier-Stokes equations, are in many cases analytically 
intractable, so that many of their results are inaccessible to direct solution. Simulation would 
therefore be a means at getting at these results by means of clever approximations and computational 
power. Winsberg sets out to debunk this myth by showing the extra-theoretical and inter-theoretical 
resources that simulation-building requires366. While simulation does explore theoretical systems, it 
also steps outside their scope, by drawing on computational methods and syntheses of conceptually 
incompatible theories in order to achieve its results. This is an extremely pertinent critique, opening 
the question of simulation to new kinds of questions. But as I have argued here, we can effect a 
further displacement, in which the frame is shifted from the simulation to practices of simulating, 
regimes of activity in which such artefacts are realised. Such regimes take wandering paths forged 
within concrete cultures assembled around them, generating, working through and discarding 
artefacts such as images as they go.
365 Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, 3.
366 Ibid., 26, 73.
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Artefacts such as software, simulation data, and images of such data, have been wholly constructed 
by humans and would thus be entirely within the realm of culture, radically distinct from the natural 
realm where the unknown, mysterious and contingent reside367. But as I have argued, things are not 
so simple. Software may have been written by human hand, but this does not imply that it is 
graspable in any straightforward manner, especially not when it is of a high level of complexity. 
Large software systems exhibit an unruliness that commentators on software engineering long 
emphasised, and with which programmers have struggled since the first operating systems368. 
Scientific software is an intricate labyrinth, one whose construction and navigation are accomplished 
by one and the same movement369. Working upon it in everyday research practice is a matter of 
enlisting techniques such as visualisation through which scientists try to understand what it is that 
they have done when they make a simulation. Research is not simply turned outwards towards the 
domain of nature, but holds itself in the picture too, in a process of phenomenotechnical self-
articulation that follows clear paths as well as negotiating through abrupt discontinuities, where 
uncertainty is rife and vague suspicions the only guide. Through the image scientists encounter the 
effects they have brought about, reflect on them, act upon them, an inherent reflexivity in which this 
kind of research finds its footing. In the space of decision toward the onward path of investigation, 
what is encountered (in the image) also exerts its own kinds of influences on how and what may be 
realised in that immanent future, while traversing a field of practice itself defined by a stratigraphy 
of such tracings, its cultivation the intrinsic historicity of research sites. In Kathleen Stewart's words, 
a study of these phenomena requires new kinds of scholarly attention:
“An attention to the matterings, the complex emergent worlds, happening in everyday life. 
The rhythms of living that are addictive or shifting. The kinds of agency that might or might 
not add up to something with some kind of intensity or duration. The enigmas and oblique 
events and background noises that might be barely sensed and yet are compelling”370.
The image, I said, is among these rhythms a point at which what follows unfolds, emerging out of a 
reflexive entanglement of the process upon itself, a knot sufficient to grasp the future so to bring it 
about, and to realise the project of which it was born.
367 Cf. Strathern, ‘Artefacts of History’.
368 Brooks, Jr., ‘No Silver Bullet’.
369 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 74.
370 Stewart, ‘Atmospheric Attunements’, 445.
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  7.1 Introduction
We now turn from images to code, to analyse this characteristic element of computational science 
practice. Computational science has much in common with other kinds of research, but by focussing 
on code we can embark on a journey towards its heart. The way in is through writing.
In my account of modelling, the site of scientific practice can be described as a material and bodily 
multiplicity. Investigation works upon and with these materials. Such an account is intuitively suited 
to systems of experiment, where a plethora of equipment and techniques are very visible, on the lab 
bench, as it were. The challenge is to show that such an account is equally at home with 
computational science, in which much of the key equipment is “virtual”, and in which many of the 
practices are undertaken from the visibly quiet position of sitting at a computer. This chapter aims to 
tackle the issue head-on by inquiring into the nature of software.
How are we to understand software? What kind of theoretical, philosophical or social scientific 
approach would be appropriate to its particular mode of existence? These questions are at the 
forefront of the “software studies” movement, which seeks to establish an interdisciplinary 
framework through which software can be made a central object of cultural critique371. So far, 
however, software studies has tended to foreground art and media372, and the particular question of 
scientific software remains to be raised. We can expect that an encounter with the philosophy and 
sociology of science would be a productive one for this young interdisciplinary field. This chapter 
concentrates on the diversity of texts in the laboratory. The chapter following this, 'Workability and 
Habitability', is its companion piece, and builds upon the foundation established here, to turn to look 
at the materiality of software environments.
After outlining the diversity of texts of the laboratory in section 7.3, and the performative effects of 
writing in section 7.4, I argue that software in contemporary computational science is of a size and 
complexity that it cannot be accounted for in the paper medium, that it becomes practically 
371 See, for example, Manovich, The Language of New Media; Fuller, Software Studies.
372 Berry, The Philosophy of Software.
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irreducible to the public texts of its conventional objectification. I read the move towards open 
source in scientific software as a move beyond paper, towards a new medium for scientific 
dissemination, one which profoundly transforms knowledge towards a more practice-centric 
conception, transmitting not discourse about practice, but the software itself, the material substrate 
for this kind of research. First, though, we return to a theme from early chapters, to a new 
rationalism in which inscriptions are thought in terms of an a priori brought down to earth.
  7.2 Concepts and inscriptions
The great advantage of the term “inscriptions” popularised by science studies has been its levelling 
power. If we talk about inscriptions, we are not approaching a domain already organised into what is 
pre-judged to be important and what is not. It is also a useful concept because it defies the intuitive 
separation between the ideal and the material, to help find the rational in the practical and the 
material in the intellectual.
“This mysterious thinking process that seemed to float like an inaccessible ghost over social 
studies of science at last has flesh and bones and can be thoroughly examined. The mistake 
before was to oppose heavy matter (or 'large-scale' infrastructures like in the first 'materialist' 
studies of science) to spiritual, cognitive or thinking processes instead of focussing on the 
most ubiquitous and lightest of all materials: the written one”373. 
In this vein, Rheinberger has recently proposed that we open up our understanding of writing beyond 
the formal and “begin to observe and investigate in its epistemic positivity the “economy of the 
scribble” in the lab”374. He is interested in the use of temporary and informal writing surfaces for 
taking notes, jotting down ideas, doodling and sketching, within the practices of research. To a 
certain extent these forms of writing can reconcile the finalised and formalised publications that 
eventually become the officially sanctioned medium for telling the story of research, with the 
material systems through which that research was accomplished. “They lie between the materialities 
of experimental systems and the conceptual constructs that leave the immediate laboratory context 
behind in the guise of sanctioned research reports”375.
Software would sit alongside these scribbles as forms of writing crucial to laboratory practice. Both 
have been sidelined by an overt emphasis on the public discourse of science. Like scribbles, software 
can be brought into the open by the levelling effect of a generalised analysis of inscriptions.
The concept of inscriptions, however, carries a risk of which we must be wary, a risk of rendering 
everything banal, of flattening everything into a flat economy of traces, which can be described but 
which struggles to support any wider argument or explanation, the danger that science studies 
collapses into a naïve semiotic empiricism. This was what Collins and Yearley famously dubbed 
373 Latour, ‘Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World’, 162.
374 Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete, 244.
375 Ibid., 245.
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“epistemological chicken”. They claimed that “[i]t is no good just talking about inscriptions and 
immutable mobiles; I won't learn from a No Smoking sign why some people obey it while many 
others ignore it”376. In my analysis, inscriptions are not free roaming materials, but rather situated 
within the material and bodily multiplicities that make up fields of practice. By placing them in 
practice, we are able to associate them with the Bachelardian displacement we encountered in 
chapter 4, 'Reason in Practice' from fixed transcendental a prioris to the dynamic a priority of 
technical systems. It is this displacement that helps us grasp inscriptions in their relation to practice.
Ethnographic science studies achieved its greatest results by treating scientific concepts not as ideal 
entities but as material things, as real inscriptions involved in systems of circulation through the 
laboratory and beyond. This involved a refusal of the a priori nature of analytic epistemology. While 
epistemologists speak of the conditions for knowledge, before and above the actual work of science, 
science studies scholars prefer to “follow” the entities that come to be called “facts” and 
“knowledge” during their actual processes of production and dissemination377. However, this 
distinction between a priori philosophy and a posteriori science studies fails to capture the full 
importance of material systems of scientific investigation. Rather than abandoning the a priori 
entirely, we can instead locate it within the technical cultures of research. The a priori becomes 
something else, something existing in the historical unfolding of practice. Science involves the 
worldly re-production of the conditions of its possibility, in its work with and upon the apparatuses 
of its practice. Software becomes a key part of these apparatuses, a system of technical objects, 
which in Rheinberger's words are “the frozen product of former epistemic activity, or historical 
aprioris, to use the language of Edmund Husserl”378.
Bernard Stiegler expresses this transformation when he points to the disturbance of Kantian created 
by our recognition of the a priority immanent to technical externalisations, these fundamental 
techno-historical conditions of fields of practice.
“A priori synthetic judgement would be supported by an 'a priori' prosthetic synthesis -- an 
'a priori' which nevertheless has to remain in inverted commas because, upon closer 
inspection, the a priori of synthetic judgement of consciousness takes place after the event 
[après-coup], after a prosthetic synthesis, and thus a posteriori (empirically, it pre-cedes this 
consciousness in time as the possibility of its already-there). But at the same time it also 
partakes in the a priori of the synthesis of judgement that it only makes possible -- in a 
somewhat mythical, performative and foundational après-coup -- and which, in being a 
precondition for any possible experience based on recognition, is 'transcendental', even 
though it only exists under the a posteriori conditions imposed by the history of technical 
inventions.”379
376 Collins and Yearley, ‘Epistemological Chicken’, 318.
377 Pickering, ‘From Science as Knowledge to Science as Practice’, 2.
378 Rheinberger, ‘Reply to Bloor’, 409; cf. Thrift, Non-Representational Theory, 10.
379 Stiegler, ‘Our Ailing Educational Institutions’, np; see also MacKenzie, Mechanizing Proof, 334 for a discussion of the 
relevance of the concept of prosthetics for talking about computers in science.
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Bachelard's philosophy provides a good ally, not just because he too wished to bring a priori 
categories “down to earth”, but because he asserted that scientific concepts never simply exist in 
abstraction from experimental practice. They must always be put to work. “A concept becomes 
scientific in so far as it becomes a technique, in so far as it is accompanied by a technique that 
realises”380. In studying software within scientific research we are studying concepts that are put into 
practice: concepts realised in code. We are not passively following a web of inscriptions, as it 
mutates and evolves. We are studying forms of writing and practices of writing as aspects of 
technical systems that set up and set forth a world in which scientific work gets done, and in which 
the very question of what it means to accomplish actions as a practising scientist is given its primary 
reality. In other words, while a theory of inscriptions is a key ally, there is no reason to suppose that 
we need be drawn into a banal empiricism. We can have a strong theory of technical-practical 
systems as the very site of reason, one significant substrate of which is made up of the interleaving 
of many kinds of texts.
  7.3 The many texts of the laboratory
Before zooming in on the question of software in particular, I want to situate it within the sheer 
diversity of texts that circulate within the research group. We will discover that software is 
intimately linked to many of these. It is already anticipated throughout the technical culture. Any 
appreciation of software must begin from these arrays of texts, because it is only among these that 
the question of precisely what is to count as software, and as relevant to its operationalisation in 
practice, can be asked.
We can start with scientific publications. Those produced by the group as well as those produced 
elsewhere circulate around the research group, on paper or in electronic formats. There are research 
papers in journals, PhD theses, and textbooks for reference. Many potential publications created in 
the group spend considerable time in draft form. All have multiple authors and are discussed and 
commented upon individually and in groups. Other texts also abound, such as conference papers, 
and texts for lectures. After having been displayed at conferences, posters showing the results of 
particular research projects are often put up on the walls of the corridors and of the lecture and 
seminar rooms throughout the college.
The comments we find on the texts of draft papers are most often made digitally, but sometimes 
simply scrawled in the margins of a print-out. Similarly, many scientists take notes on publications 
that they read, on loose paper, on computer, or on post-it notes peppering the scientific textbooks that 
are found throughout the offices. Most scientists would take notes in meetings on pads of A4 paper, 
which most often turn out to be mixtures of “to do” lists and sketchy graphs, pictures and formulae. 
These are “messy” pads, and it was rare to find anyone keeping a coherent “journal” of research. 
When explaining things to each other, they often used the whiteboards which are ubiquitous 
380 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, 70.
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throughout the offices. Explanations in these informal settings usually rely on the use of such 
externalisations because it is helpful, even when talking about the most well known mathematical 
formulae, to be able to point at particular terms within the expression, and to draw graphs to 
illustrate the point. The A4 pads of paper that are carried around to meetings are commonly swapped 
around at such moments and whoever is attempting to explain the concept will draw the illustration 
on the other person's pad, or else pieces of paper are torn off and exchanged.
Figure 11: Typical scribbles, sketched in order to facilitate explanation of the  
problem of the "supermesh" (top) and of discontinuous elements (bottom)
Drawings and writings such as those in figure 11 emerge alongside laboratory talk, and I don't find it 
helpful to isolate this kind of discourse from the gestures that accompany it. The chatter of the 
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laboratory is never purified in the way that publications are, through their rigid conventions of 
composition and format. While it is easy to point out that marks such as these have a durability that 
is lacking in the case of speech, these scribbles would rarely last more than a day or so. Those 
written on paper are discarded at a similar rate to that at which new ones are generated, while those 
on the whiteboard get confused, mixed in with other sketches and writings, and eventually erased 
whenever someone desires a clean slate with which to explain something new.
Members of AMCG email each other privately where it concerns private meetings and documents, 
but most digital communication happens in the more public media of email lists and the group's chat 
channel. Email lists are used to inform everyone of upcoming events and of technical changes (e.g. 
server downtime, upgrades to operating systems and so on), to ask for help, as well as to respond to 
questions. They are also used to distribute details of changes to source code and comments produced 
by the review board system. General technical support is also provided on this channel, especially 
for outside users who have downloaded the group's open source systems. It is common to see queries 
that were originally sent to a single individual being bounced into the list, either because responses 
will be quicker when the question is received by the whole community, or because many of these 
queries and their answers are potentially interesting for the wider readership. 
The group runs a chat channel that most scientists log onto in the background throughout their day. 
This medium is used more informally than email, for co-ordinating lunches and coffee breaks as 
much as for meetings, as well as for locating members of staff (“Is X person in the office yet? Can I 
come and see you about Y issue some time this afternoon?”). But they are also used if a scientist 
wants to get a quick response to a plea for help on a technical question. As opposed to the email list 
support, this kind of support is generally between group members. Chat has the advantage of 
providing quick responses, although sometimes the format makes the issue or solution hard to follow 
(sometimes several conversations are on the go at once). The automated testing system is directly 
hooked in to the chat, so conversations are occasionally interrupted by a message about a failed test, 
which sometimes provokes comment.
The following is a discussion in the chat of a problem in a small section of Python code:
CE 11:01 
how do I fix this: 
x(:,1) = x0 + dt*(/0.,sin(x0(2)) /) + sqrt(2*k)*dW(:,1) 11:01 
1 11:01 
Error: Element in REAL(4) array constructor at (1) is REAL(8) 11:01 
all my variables are declared real*8 11:01 
 
WS 11:02 
A. don't use real*8, it's nonstandard  
CE 11:02 
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what should I use instead? 
(this is in some Fortran compiled with f2py) 11:02 
 
WS 11:03 
The cleanest way to do this is to declare a parameter, say D for double or P for precision 
you then define the parameter either directly to 4 or 8 relying on the convention that kind 
types are the byte count 11:03 
or you use the selected_real_kind intrinsic to do it the official way 11:03 
then you can declare your variables real(P) 11:04 
 
CE 11:04 
you mean  
WS 11:04 
and in those cases where precision really counts, such as in array constructors, you can 
append _D to the literal  
 
CE 11:04 
integer, parameter :: P = selected_real_kind 
? 11:04 
 
WS 11:05 
eg 0._D 
for a double precision 0. 11:05 
 
CE 11:05 
oh, it's the 0. that's the problem is it>  
WS 11:05 
almost. selected_real_kind is a funciton  
CE 11:05 
?  
AX has disconnected (Remote host closed the connection) 11:05  
WS 11:05 
the direct problem you're having is that that's a single precision 0. 
since it comes first in the array constructor, that sets the kind of the array 11:06 
 
CE 11:06 
I see  
WS 11:06 
then you put sin(x0(2)) in and that's a real(8) 
- 144 -
- Code and Writing -
which it doesn't like 11:06 
 
CE 11:06 
how come we don't have to do all this stuff in Fluidity?  
WS 11:06 
because fluidity cheats 
fluidity does everything in default precision and relies on compiler extensions to change the 
default 11:06 
there are a few places in fluidity where this matters. Generally because of interfaces to 
external libraries. 11:07 
 
CE 11:07 
ok 
so, I'm probably declaring P in the wrong place 11:07 
I have a file containing subroutines which gets compiled by f2py 11:08 
and I did 11:08 
subroutine shearflow(x,x0,dW,dt,k,n) integer, parameter :: P = selected_real_kind() real(P), 
intent(out), dimension(2,n) :: x 11:08 
... 11:08 
and got: 11:08 
real(P), intent(in), dimension(2,n) :: dW 11:08 
1 11:08 
Error: Parameter 'p' at (1) has not been declared or is a variable, which does not reduce to 
a constant expression 11:08 
AX has joined the room 11:08  
WS 11:08 
actually, you almost certainly have an error above that  
CE 11:08 
does P need to be declared outside of the subroutine declaration? 
oh, you are right 11:09 
 
WS 11:09 
didn't your mother tell you to always fix the first error first 
? 11:09 
You can see here how quick a response it is possible to get. Provided willing respondents are logged 
in to the channel, help is forthcoming in real time. As opposed to email lists, the chat has a “live” 
feel, the interactivity of the medium helping WS and CE work through their mutual 
misunderstandings, towards some kind of resolution. Fragments of code here find themselves 
transferred into new electronic formats, generating a consequent cascade of other kinds of text.
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Another example of more informal comments, interspersed with a failing test, from slightly later on 
the same day:
CE 12:21 
lunchtime?  
YN 12:23 
aye  
amcg-data 12:23 
running failed [82 seconds],: ; No blamelist; http://buildbot-
ocean.ese.ic.ac.uk:8080/builders/test-sphere-3D-drag-Re1-cx1/builds/651  
WS 12:23 
Right-ho. Anything is better than reading the random grammar of this MSci lit review  
CE 12:24 
a lit review on random grammar would be interesting 
I'll see you outside the SCR imminently 12:24 
QH has joined the room 12:24  
QH 12:25 
hello all from my shiny new laptop!  
 
amcg-data 12:25 
Hello, QH!  
CE 12:25 
yay!  
SS 12:25 
GY: could you put the output from lock_exchange_3d_parallel on Buildbot on /scratch for me to 
look at please?  
CE trundles down to SCR 12:26  
TT 12:27 
does anyone know of a way to get the college email archiving system to play nice with 
anything other than outlook?  
QH keeps forgetting that the mouse is attached to the other laptop 12:29  
HP 12:30 
did QN not mantis an issue at some point where the intel build would crash in the mainfl_fc() 
call? 
oh no, that was gfortran 12:31 
QH laments the loss of her apple key and tries to get used to ctrl-alt instead 12:33  
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KU has joined the room 12:35  
KU 12:35 
have people gone for lunch?  
KU is at an openmp training course in aero 12:35  
HU 12:35 
WS has gone, I think 5mins ago?  
KU 12:36 
ok 
thanks 12:36 
KD has joined the room 12:49  
amcg-data 12:55 
running failed [62 seconds],: ; No blamelist; http://buildbot-
ocean.ese.ic.ac.uk:8080/builders/test-circular-duct-from-rest-cx1/builds/1057  
amcg-data 13:05 
running failed [362 seconds],: ; Blamelist: KD; http://buildbot-
ocean.ese.ic.ac.uk:8080/builders/test-water-collapse-2d-valgrind-cx1/builds/1316  
KU has disconnected (Quit: leaving) 13:22
The majority of AMCG members work in the same buildings, but there are several floors, offices 
and sections. Some are based in different buildings on the same site, while others are based in 
different cities. The chat gives a constant sense of bustle, a connection to the being-together of the 
community, which could easily be downplayed if the relative quiet of the working environment was 
the only thing ethnographically observed.
In addition to the automatically generated notices of failed tests are the manually submitted, 
monitored and assigned bug reports, which describe problems with a view to keeping track of their 
various manifestations and their seriousness in order to help the appropriate person find a way to sort 
them out.
Meshes of 2D topology in 3D space are not correctly partitioned by fldecomp.
    Fluidity Bugs
    Bug #929690
Reported by AB on 2012-02-09
Bug Description
When supplying topologically 2D meshes on a geoid, to be extruded in the vertical direction 
within Fluidity, the following error-message appears:
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 *** FLUIDITY ERROR ***
Source location: (Quadrature.F90, 282)
Error message: make_quadrature: 3 is an unsupported vertex count.
The fldecomp help suggests using the '-s' option, to indicate that the input mesh is a 
spherical shell mesh. However it does not fix the problem. To date, the problem is 
circumvented by using a mesh in the triangle format and that use an awk script to edit the 
.node file:
sed '1s/\<3\>/2/' < mesh.node > modified_mesh.node
mv modified_mesh.node mesh.node
Thus when using meshes on a sphere, one can only use triangle-format meshes, along with the 
fix above. Binary Gmsh meshes cannot be used.
Related branches
lp:~fluidity-core/fluidity/gmsh-on-sphere
Ready for review for merging into lp:fluidity
QS: Pending requested 2012-03-26 
Diff: 2132 lines (+909/-758) 17 files modified 
AB on 2012-02-09
Changed in fluidity:
assignee: nobody → AB
QS wrote on 2012-02-23: #1
AB: can you upload an example FLML, mesh file and makefile (or script) that shows this, 
please? I can then mark it as confirmed.
Changed in fluidity:
importance: Undecided → Low
QS wrote on 2012-02-23: #2
Discussion in the dev meeting was to try flredecomp instead of fldecomp. Awaiting results of 
this test.
QS on 2012-02-28
Changed in fluidity:
status: New → Confirmed
importance: Low → Medium
HU wrote on 2012-02-28: #3
Related to this: I found the gmsh reader does not handle the spherical+extrusion case 
correctly even in serial. So this might not (only) be a fldecomp issue. To reproduce, see the 
new sample_netcdf_test/ on the lp:~fluidity-core/fluidity/fluidity-initialisation-from_netcdf 
branch and switch the input to gmsh.
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AB wrote on 2012-02-29: #4
    sps_6G4.1_local_bin_gmsh.tar (100.0 KiB, application/x-tar)
I attach a test case, the mesh is a rectangular area on a sphere, extruded in the vertical 
direction within fluidity. The makefiles in the top-most directory and the mesh directory 
will generate the mesh, decompose it and run fluidity. The third line of the Makefile in the 
top most directory must be changed, and the 4th line in mesh/Makefile will have to be changed 
if one needs to use the makefile in the mesh directory separately (make input in the top-most 
directory should use the makefile in mesh/, with all the right variables). Then 'make 
NPROCS=x' should run the case. There is also a run_gdb target, so 'make run_gdb NPROCS=x' 
will run fluidity in parallel under gdb on x processors.
My apologies for the svn files (including hidden svn files)
AB wrote on 2012-02-29: #5
Following discussion in the last dev meeting flredecomp has been tried as well, but it fails 
with a zoltan error, I will be posting a separate bug report with more details and a test 
case.
HU wrote on 2012-03-21: #6
The issue is not so much with fldecomp, which seems to be doing the right thing with -s 
option, but with the gmsh reader in general. This also doesn't work in serial, i.e. the gmsh 
reader used by fluidity doesn't handle a 2d spherical input mesh (mesh%dim=2 but 3 coordinate 
dimensions).
This is fixed in the gmsh-on-sphere branch. All it needs is a test which I'm working on. 
(currently there are no short tests on the sphere at all!)
Changed in fluidity:
assignee: AB → HU 
The discussions of bugs that we find alongside bug reports are generally more formal than those on 
the chat channel. There is a sense of creating an archive, of actions, questions and ideas, brought 
together using this software system (the group used to use “Mantis”, but transferred to Launchpad's 
integrated bug reporting system in 2011). Given that many bugs will not be solved immediately, bug 
reporting creates a database of known issues, to which new information can be added, priorities set 
and responsibilities assigned.
The software itself is accompanied with several layers of text. New commits are always commented 
on, something quite strongly policed381. It is considered very bad manners to make a change to the 
code without a note saying what the change is and why it has been done. These are distributed to the 
lists with appropriate metadata automatically attached (e.g. version number, time and date, file 
name). The review board system that was set up in early 2011 also enabled comments to be made by 
other users. When a commit was made, it was queued up for an appropriate reviewer to check the 
quality of the code, and many of the comments made at this point refer to the style of the software 
writing (e.g.  naming practices for variables) as well as for more substantive issues such as the 
management of memory.
A typical example of comments on a commit:
Author: QS
Date: Mon Nov 29 10:19:51 2010
381 A “commit” is a change made to the code base.
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New Revision: 15049
URL: http://amcg.ese.ic.ac.uk/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi?view=rev&root=fluidity&revision=15049
Log:
Adding new option to adaptivity to limit node change, rather than just maximum increase as 
with the existing options. No tests as yet. Doesn't make the slightest difference to the 
spikiness during adapts in my tests, but hey, someone might find it useful. Also adding a 
limit_metric call for the vertical adaptivity. The limit applies to each vertical column. 
Current limits only applied to the surface mesh
Modified:
   trunk/assemble/Adapt_State.F90
   trunk/error_measures/Assemble_metric.F90
   trunk/error_measures/Limit_metric.F90
   trunk/schemas/adaptivity_options.rnc
   trunk/schemas/adaptivity_options.rng
Another typical example, using the comments on commits as a point of reference for general coding 
standards:
Author: XC
Date: Fri Dec  3 13:06:04 2010
New Revision: 15099
URL: http://amcg.ese.ic.ac.uk/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi?view=rev&root=fluidity&revision=15099
Log:
A little tidying up of Momentum_CG.F90 as some coding sins were being committed making it 
extremely hard to add new functionality.
Some basic coding standards for the future (these apply beyond Momentum_CG):
 - Arguments to subroutines should not be declared as optional if all instances of calls to 
that subroutine have that argument.  In the case of Momentum_CG there were several 
subroutines that are only called from one place in the entirity of fluidity and yet they had 
optional arguments declared for no reason.  This meant that adding new arguments to the 
subroutine was difficult and I think possibly led to people adding extra superfluous optional 
arguments, which leads to the next point...
 - If optional arguments exist in a subroutine call and a new required argument has to be 
added, it should be added before the optional arguments as a required argument.  It should 
not be added at the end of the argument list and declared as optional (as it is required).
 - If an optional argument is really required (i.e. there is more than one call to that 
subroutine, one with the argument, one without) then a check should be made that it is 
present before using it.
 - New arguments to subroutines should be declared at the start of the subroutine - not 
interspersed amongst the local variable declarations.  Furthermore they should be added in 
the same order they appear in the subroutine call.
 - Within the assembly routines a convention has arisen that logicals and parameters turning 
on and off options within the assembly loops can be declared as private module variables, 
which can be accessed from any subroutine within the module.  This reduces the problem of 
having to pass every parameter through every subroutine in the element loops.  However it 
should only be done for logicals and parameters that do not change during assembly.  
Furthermore they should not generally be made public.
I'm anticipating that intel debugging on cx1 might have a problem with this commit.  I will 
keep an eye on the relevent test cases and update as necessary.
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Modified:
   trunk/assemble/Momentum_CG.F90
In addition to the comments attached to the commit and to the review, the code itself is full of 
comments which describe what the code is doing (or supposed to be doing) at any one time. When 
part of the software is in the process of being written, and is not yet ready, these comments often 
include many “notes to self” to help the programmer keep track of what he or she is thinking while 
writing. When the code is working properly, and ready for general use, comments are edited so they 
address a general reader, rather than being specific to their own particular thought processes.
Comments within the code are marked as such at the start of the line (in the case of Fortran, by two 
exclamation marks). This instructs the compiler to ignore that line. It is intended solely for the reader 
of the code. For example:
      subroutine construct_advection_diffusion_dg(big_m, rhs, field_name,&
       & state, mass, diffusion_m, diffusion_rhs, semidiscrete, velocity_name) 
    !!< Construct the advection_diffusion equation for discontinuous elements in
    !!< acceleration form.
    !!< 
    !!< If mass is provided then the mass matrix is not added into big_m or
    !!< rhs. It is instead returned as mass. This may be useful for testing
    !!< or for solving equations otherwise than in acceleration form.
    !!<
    !!< If diffusion_m and diffusion_rhs are provided then the diffustion
    !!< terms are placed here instead of in big_m and rhs
    !!<
    !!< If semidiscrete is present and true then the semidiscrete matrices
    !!< are formed. This is accomplished by locally setting theta to 1.0
    !!< and only inserting boundary conditions in the right hand side.
    !!< Setting semidiscrete to 1 probably only makes sense if a separate
    !!< mass matrix is also provided.
    !! Main advection_diffusion matrix.    
    type(csr_matrix), intent(inout) :: big_m
    !! Right hand side vector.
    type(scalar_field), intent(inout) :: rhs
    
    !! Name of the field to be advected.
    character(len=*), intent(in) :: field_name
    !! Collection of fields defining system state.
    type(state_type), intent(inout) :: state
    !! Optional separate mass matrix.
    type(csr_matrix), intent(inout), optional :: mass
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    !! Optional separate diffusion matrix
    type(csr_matrix), intent(inout), optional :: diffusion_m
    !! Corresponding right hand side vector
    type(scalar_field), intent(inout), optional :: diffusion_rhs
    !! Optional velocity name
    character(len = *), intent(in), optional :: velocity_name
At the top of this excerpt, you can see a general explanation of how the code works, and below it is a 
line-by-line labelling providing more fine-grained description. While it would be possible, in theory, 
for new developers to work all this out by reading the code, without reading any comments, these 
reading processes are greatly accelerated by the additional layers of text. The need for new 
developers to start work quickly, for scientists with little coding experience to learn to program, and 
for the code to be constantly modified while being kept consistent, has thus resulted in the profusion 
of commentary throughout its structure.
A final layer of text that surrounds the code is the documentation. In a sense, all the comments are 
documentation, but the central point of reference is the user guide, which is kept up to date alongside 
the software itself. The rule of thumb is that if anyone changes the code, they must ensure that the 
relevant changes are made to the user's guide. Actually, this is often let slip, and the annual or 
biannual official releases of the code are times for a comprehensive policing of any parts of the 
user's guide that might not be up to date. 
The code itself is far from being a homogeneous text. The majority is currently written in Fortran 90, 
a language commonly used by mathematicians and engineers. It is organised into a structure of 
documents and folders. However, many of the functions that it uses are found in external libraries, 
libraries for parallelisation or for solvers, for example. Some of these are written by members of 
AMCG but many are written by outsiders with nothing to do with the group. This interfacing or 
overlapping of software systems with each other is ubiquitous. If a new solver method is needed for 
a particular kind of oceans problem, for example, there is no point in writing this method into the 
Fluidity structure. Instead, you write this method into the general library of solvers and have Fluidity 
use it through its interface with the library. This keeps things organised but also enables other 
programmers to use that method in other software projects.
Fluidity is modular, written according to the principles of object-oriented programming. It is also 
modular at a higher level, with its components designed to be as general purpose as possible. When 
writing a new input system for specifying options and parameters, the AMCG scientists decided not 
to make a system specifically for Fluidity, but rather to make a completely separate programme, that 
can itself be configured to manage any input set whatsoever. The idea is that it can be used by other 
scientific models too, something that will have the advantage of widening the community of users 
who have an investment in keeping it maintained and up to date. This system, called Diamond, 
therefore has its own documentation, its own source code, its own comments. It also requires further 
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texts, because it requires a “schema” to tell it what the model is that it is to be used for, and what 
parameters and options that model has. Diamond has a front end, called “Spud”, which displays all 
these options in a visually intuitive interface, with a tree structure. The schema specifies 
dependencies so that Spud can indicate if an option is not set which should be set, and has a 
comprehensive system of commenting so that every parameter is displayed with a short section of 
text explaining what that parameter is needed for and any extra information that would be needed by 
a user. For a user who is not involved in writing new functionality, Spud will provide the main 
interface for working with Fluidity, accompanied by the command line for executing the code, and 
visualisation and graph-generating suites for interpreting the output data files.
One of the most significant differences is between “compiled” code and “interpreted” code. The bulk 
of Fluidity source code is compiled code, and is therefore compiled into an executable binary file 
before being run. In contrast, interpreted code is effectively compiled at run-time. Some parts of 
Fluidity are interpreted, and are written in the Python language, a general purpose programming 
language used in many different fields of software development. The majority of Fluidity is 
compiled in order to achieve maximum efficiency. It also works well for the normal user work flow. 
When a binary is obtained, it can be used to generate many simulations with different initial 
conditions. It is compiled, so the core functionality cannot be changed without recompiling, but all 
the options can still be modified through Spud/Diamond. If, on the other hand, the project involves 
making changes to a more fundamental feature of how Fluidity works, it would be necessary to 
regularly re-compile a new binary in order to see the results. Exactly what kind of software is dealt 
with on a daily basis, and how it is encountered, will thus depend on the kind of research that is 
being done, and on what stage the project is currently at. QH commented in an interview that: 
“at the moment, most of my time is taken up with running simulations. A year ago, though, it 
was very different. Then I was developing the software to create these simulations.”
Different kinds of code are nested together. Fluidity runs sections of Python within it. Python is most 
commonly used within the options system to set a parameter or boundary condition as a 
mathematical function rather than as a constant. If, for example, you want a flow through a channel 
to vary in its velocity according to some quadratic oscillation, you can write that function in Python, 
and feed it (through Spud/Diamond) into Fluidity, which will calculate its value for each time step. 
Interpreted codes are generally called “high level”, as opposed to “low level” compiled codes like 
Fortran. In choosing between the two for a given aspect of a model, the trade-off is between the 
speed of programming and the speed of the program. When I queried this balance at a training event, 
WS explained that where it is a critical part of the simulation, Fortran is used, but where it is a non-
critical part, and where it would be handy to be able to quickly and effectively read and modify the 
script on a regular basis, Python becomes the obvious choice. Further language diversity will be 
discussed towards the end of the next chapter, which outlines a current project to add another high 
level language for the formulation of the basic equations.
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It should be quite clear, therefore, that 'Fluidity' cannot be treated as a single text. It is many, some of 
which are written in different languages, and some of which are to a certain extent separate programs 
or libraries written and maintained by different communities. Software systems are more like 
networks with mobile boundaries rather than bounded Cartesian objects. Their identity is topological 
and dynamic rather than geometric. 
The next section will investigate the practical dimension of code, to ask whether, among texts, code 
is something special. The clearest manner in which code might be special is the sense in which we 
speak of it “running”.
  7.4 Putting text to work
One of the major theoretical shifts in Twentieth Century philosophy of language saw the 
displacement of the assumption that the important thing about speech or text is that it says 
something, to allow space for thinking about the many aspects in which speech or text does 
something. From Austin's How To Do Things With Words, to Foucault and Butler's theoretical texts, 
performativity became a hot topic382. Whether you are interested in the discursive creation of 
subjectivities or in declarations and naming practices, it is no longer possible to take for granted that 
language is simply about communicating meanings. Speaking, writing, or manipulating texts in other 
ways, are all real actions that change the circumstance in which they are performed. This paradigm 
would seem to be strongly embodied in software, which is surely the epitome of text for which its 
ability to do things, to be transformed into real processes of computation, is never hidden behind its 
semantics, behind what the meaning of what it says383.
I want to argue, however, that this very division, between saying and doing, is not very helpful in 
understanding what happens when software is put to work. I will argue that it is impossible to regard 
code only in terms of the physical processes of computation, but that to thus displace its inherent 
operationality is not to revert back to a passive theory of language. The best way to capture the 
nature of code is to regard both its operationality and its interpretability as different ways in which it 
is approached and handled in practice384. As an object, code is reducible to neither aspect, but 
features in practice in both ways, depending on the circumstance.
Code “does things”, but only insofar as it is embedded in a concrete field of practice, insofar as it is 
already enfolded in other goings on, in projects and endeavours that have many non-digital aspects 
to them as well. The “doing” in question in the performativity of code cannot therefore be simply 
that of the brute reality of it computation, but must extend to the human aspects of its being part of 
situations of research. To claim this is not to claim that it is “socially constructed”, but rather to point 
382 Austin, How to Do Things with Words; Butler, Excitable Speech.
383 Cf. MacKenzie, Cutting Code, 90.
384 Ibid., 5 makes a similar point.
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to the fact that its real effects as part of a computational system exist as part of concrete human 
activities.
Computational scientists at AMCG confront the twin possibilities for approaching their code on a 
daily basis, in the need to balance formal and empirical measures of their simulations. We 
encountered this in section 2.12. Mathematical results about discretisations and methods treat the 
code as a text, as a text in formal language which can be interpreted, analysed, and subjected to 
mathematical techniques of proof. On the other hand are the empirical investigations of the 
simulations they produce, their behaviour under different initial conditions, and the relationship of 
sets of output data with validation data. These investigations are grounded in the software's actual 
running. They treat it as a real electronic process which can be subjected to empirical techniques of 
manipulation and measurement. There is no shared ultimate ground upon which formal and 
empirical treatments get combined, no essence to code that unites them. To see their commonality 
we have to look outwards towards the research practice in which they are found, and this takes us 
into a sphere of multiple techniques, materials, bodies, competencies and actions.
This duality of approaches to code in practice is reflected in long traditions of computational science 
that flag up either side as the “real” essence of software. I would prefer to shift emphasis and take 
these disagreements as a sign of the real elusiveness of any such essence. Tony Hoare, for example, 
claimed that “[c]omputer programming is an exact science, in that all the properties of a program 
and all the consequences of executing it can, in principle, be found out from the text of the program 
itself by means of purely deductive reasoning”385. If this were the case, then it would be possible to 
initiate a pure study of software which would discover what it does from what it means, from the 
text alone. It wouldn't really be necessary to run the software; the whole context of practice could be 
disregarded. But no matter how many formal proofs are deployed in the verification of software, and 
no matter how influential they are, they cannot erase the possibility of pointing out that the computer 
itself is an empirical entity subject to all the limitations and exigencies that characterise our dealings 
with other such things. Its electronic occurrences may be amenable to formalisation, but such 
formalisation requires a mathematical treatment that is itself an empirical practice, and does not 
apodictically follow from these events. James Fetzer states the converse point of view: 
“These limitations arise from the character of computers as complex causal systems whose 
behaviour, in principle, can only be known with the uncertainty that attends empirical 
knowledge as opposed to the certainty that attends specific kinds of mathematical 
demonstrations. For when the domain of entities that is thereby described consists of purely 
abstract entities, conclusive absolute verifications are possible; but when the domains of 
entities that is thereby described consists of non-abstract physical entities... only 
inconclusive relative verifications are possible.”386
385 Quoted in Franklin, ‘The Formal Sciences Discover the Philosophers’ Stone’, 527.
386 Quoted in ibid. NB: The verification Fetzer mentions is the computer scientists’ sense. See section 2.12.
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While it is easy to treat computation as logically determinate, this determinacy is the property of an 
abstract representation (a very effective one) of the computation, and can never be applied to the 
actual computation without empirical caveats. 
There is another issue that further entangles the two treatments of software. When software is run on 
a computer, electronic events ensue, and produce output data as a result. This relationship can easily 
appear to be a one-way determination. The software determines the computation. The software, and 
formal treatments of it, would be prior to the empirical occurrence and the traces it leaves on disk. 
But in practice, even after the running of the programme, the software continues to play an 
ineliminable role by conditioning the interpretation of that data. It is only by bringing that software 
into articulation with its computational output that the latter can become meaningful for research.
There is a forward-backward asymmetry that requires the text and the process to be combined at 
every point. Whether you are given a computational process, its data output, or even a ready-
compiled, ready to run binary file, none of these things can be understood in their formal structure 
without access to the source code that generated them. This is the only human readable text 
involved, and it is only in its association with these materials that it confers intelligibility upon them. 
As opposed to the interactive software of desktop interfaces, in which meaning is created “on the 
fly”, within the running of programs, computational science requires interpretation of computational 
processes in terms of the mathematics embodied in their actual running. For this it is always 
necessary to already know what code has been used. Reverse engineering the binary file by looking 
at the computational process can produce a massive number of different possible binaries, each of 
which in theory would generate that computation. Reverse engineering the source code by looking at 
the binary would similarly yield a huge number of possible texts, the vast majority of which will be 
completely unintelligible. This property is relied on by commercial software vendors to discourage 
customers or competitors from reverse-engineering their products. Finally, most simulations do not 
write to disk anything like enough data to reconstruct the computational process that created it. For 
each step to be recorded it would be necessary to make modifications to the source code and set-up, 
and this then raises the question of whether it would still be the same computation. Just as the code 
cannot be fully understood without being run, the running of the code cannot be meaningful without 
a relation being maintained to the texts of its origin.
We thus can understand computer modelling in terms of a two-fold structure. The code can be run, 
but once it is run, the transformation undergone in its execution gives the computation itself an 
independence from its origin. It is severed from its origin. There is no straightforward way of 
identifying a computation such as a simulation with the source code. We thus find two very different 
sets of practices at work together: empirical treatments in which the simulation is treated like an 
experimenter's apparatus, and formal treatments in which the code is analysed as a text. To 
understand this twofold it is necessary to refuse the temptation to look for the essence of 
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computational science in code or in computation. We can only grasp their relation if we concentrate 
on another frame: that of research practice itself. From this point of view, we grasp formal and 
empirical treatments as activities, and we also start to see the composite whole, including bodies and 
materials, things which usually seem very foreign to software. It is this broader frame that gives us 
some grasp of the significance of software in practice.
  7.5 Software in practice
Once we start to look at the systems of investigation through which scientists work on and with 
software, we start to see that there is more to code than its empirical execution. Dexter et al., for 
example, point to the need to understand the ways in which processes of working with software draw 
on the most complex imaginative, embodied and metaphorical resources.
“Code may appear to some to be among the most 'linguaform and propositional' modes of 
contemporary human expression and, thus, completely unsuitable for attaching completely 
different forms of meaning. But... the development of modern programming depends 
absolutely on a complex scaffolding of metaphor and non-propositional meaning drawn 
from the roots of embodied human experience.”387
Software is a question of practice more than it is a question of language. The most important thing is 
not what software “does”, because in approaching the issue in that way we make an untenable 
isolation between the computation and the environment in which it is put to work. The most 
important thing is what the practice of working with software “does”. We have seen, in previous 
chapters, how scientific objects emerge in this sphere, in the iterative processes of writing and 
revising software, in exploring its consequences, testing it and opening it out to new possibilities.
We are talking about texts as real things, immersed in systems of practice. What is important is not 
what is “said” about a physical system by representing it in a simulation. What is important is the 
effect of folding it into a practice of computer modelling, aligning it within the activities of building 
and manipulating that are developed within this frame, as possibilities of exploration. We are 
interested in manipulation, not denotation. As Rheinberger puts it:
“The whole thrust of my argument lies in the assumption that the primary way of symbol-
making in the realm of scientific activity is itself a material process and not linguistic, that 
the epistemic semiosis is one of traces that we relate to invisible entities, and not between 
names and things. Handling a virus as a gene, that is, on the model of a gene, can take for 
instance the experimental form of trying to mutate the building blocks of its nucleic acids... 
Handling the virus as a chemical molecule may take the form of trying to crystallize it. All 
these investments in turn, and as a rule, may lead to changes in what a virus is understood to 
be. The concept is nested into the exploration of the epistemic thing.”388
KU expressed a similar sentiment common among the scientists at AMCG when he commented that:
387 Dexter et al., ‘On the Embodied Aesthetics of Code’, 16.
388 Rheinberger, ‘Reply to Bloor’, 408.
- 157 -
- Code and Writing -
“you think you know something when you learn it. And then when you go to teach it you 
find out you didn't really understand it. But then when you go to code it, that's when you 
really realise that you didn't understand it. When you can code it up and it works that is 
when you really know what you are doing.” 
The practice of writing software is not a matter of putting down in a new language a set of concepts 
already known in another language. It is a materially and bodily mediated process which creates new 
understandings. This was the core principle of phenomenotechnique, that concepts in science do not 
properly exist outside of their putting into practice. This field of practice is a space for creative and 
transformative processes. In chapter 8 we will look at the work involved in creating and maintaining 
an environment for computational science which provides a crucial quotient of freedom, which we 
can think of as a space for playing around, challenging preconceptions, and creating new things. At 
this point, it is sufficient only to note that there is nothing straightforward about working with 
software. It is unruly and bug-prone. Its freedom is that of skilled craft, not of an idealised space of 
pure thought. Scientific ideas, insofar as they are put into software practices, require practical 
competencies as much as does any other laboratory practice.
“In order to program, you have to understand something so well that you can explain it to 
something as stonily stupid as a computer. While there is some painful truth in this, 
programming is also the result of a live process of engagement between thinking with and 
working on materials and the problem space that emerges. Intelligence arises out of 
interaction and the interaction of computational and networked digital media with other 
forms of life conjugate new forms of intelligence and new requirements for intelligence to 
unfold.”389
To appreciate this “live process of engagement”, we have to regard software not just as the thing 
being made, but as also forming the environment in which the practice takes place. Work with 
software is work on an edifice, a generative structure embodying, in KU's words, “terabytes of 
implicit knowledge”. Fluidity is the concretisation of countless past projects, investigations and 
explorations undertaken by members of the group. It is the material embodiment of their research. In 
this sense it is their research, as much as it stands for their research. As such it inspires strong 
feelings of duty, care, and respect, towards both the group and the code, which underlie the concept 
of “best practice”. Whatever the content of these stipulations of best practice, they gain their force 
and efficacy from embodied attachments to software as the site in which research gets done, 
structures of care, built through the past and formative of whatever successes are to emerge in the 
future.
We can therefore appreciate that scientific software is always more than simply operationalised 
theoretical concepts, mathematical theory turned into a new productive machine. It is more than a 
“reified theory” (see chapter 4), or it is a reified theory that teaches us that we never engaged 
properly with theory until putting it into practice, and that once it is there it can never be extracted 
389 Fuller, ‘The Stuff of Software’, 10.
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and purified from this material backdrop, this irreducible scaffold of computational science research. 
As Winsberg puts it, “these models are best viewed not as mere solutions to theoretical equations; 
they are rich, physical constructs that mediate between our theories and the world”390. 
I have argued that there is no sense in regarding software simply as a system of language, that it 
must be seen in the terms of the systems of practice in which it is embedded. In the next, final 
section, I want to take this further, and explore the potential of software to displace natural language 
and “public sphere” discourse from our conception of scientific research. My thesis is that if we 
understand the relationship of software to language within the context of its use in research, we will 
no longer be able to unthinkingly give epistemic priority to the kind of propositional knowledge that 
has dominated our understanding of epistemology for several centuries.
  7.6 Epistemology beyond the paper medium
One of the highest stakes of science studies is the displacement of the kind of propositional 
knowledge that is embodied in official paper publications, in favour of a more diverse account of 
science, in which tacit knowledge, materiality and practice play leading roles391. In a sense, this is a 
displacement of the concept of knowledge itself, but it can also be thought in terms of an extension 
of the concept of knowledge beyond what can be discursively formulated, the idea, as Polanyi said, 
that “we can know more than we can tell”392.
Philosophy of science and epistemology have traditionally been dominated by views of science in 
which what counts are theories, bodies of explicit propositions, which are backed up by evidence 
and argument, and which in some sense represent the world. An appreciation of the role of software 
in computational science can help break down this image of science in favour of a much more 
pluralistic one, because on a number of fronts it becomes impossible to reduce software to ordinary 
discourse. Software itself is the output of research. It is not just a means to an end of creating 
statements about the world. Research is directly creating things, what Daston and Galison theorised 
as a recent trend in science from representation towards an “engineering-style presentational 
approach to the real”393. It is about creating stuff, about creating productive research systems as 
much as it is ever about representing the world in discourse.
Writing code is not a matter of conceptualising a process in natural language and then translating it 
into software. To the extent that there is a language of thought, for scientists who write software 
every day, this language is the programming language they habitually use, as much as it is the 
natural language (English) with which they explain their science. Many of my interviewees reported 
that they routinely “think in code” and that after their daily routine it is not uncommon to dream in 
390 Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, 28.
391 See, for example Pickering, ‘From Science as Knowledge to Science as Practice’.
392 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 4.
393 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 395.
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code. Scott Rosenberg entitled his study of a Silicon Valley software project “Dreaming in Code”, 
drawing on a quote from the well-known programmer Jaron Lanier:
“To be effective at any large software project, you have to become so committed to it. You 
have to incorporate so much of it into your brain. I used to dream in code at night when I 
was in the middle of some big project”394.
Natural language is not an underlying medium for science, but a source of awkwardness and trouble. 
Real difficulties are encountered when trying to describe research in natural language and in reading 
others' descriptions of software. QS recalled the trouble he had when implementing another 
scientist's parameterisation method: 
“The paper I based most of the turbulence parameterisation on has several major errors in 
the formulas. They have written out the maths and it is incorrect. It has to be incorrect. But 
the model results were correct. They gave the right answers. This is an easy mistake to make 
but it means that when you are reading papers and trying to reimplement the methods that 
they describe, the first thing you have to do is to check for errors.” (QS)
The transition between the software and the kind of propositional description found in journals is a 
difficult one. The peer reviewing process does not reliably identify these problems, which emerge 
during the reincorporation of these ideas into modelling frameworks. Moving from working in code 
to working in mathematical or natural language descriptions, and vice versa, is difficult. “The 
problem is that the more detail you go into, the more chance of error between what you have written 
down and what you actually ran” (QS). 
Over the years, as Fluidity gained multiple new methods, functions and capabilities, it was 
accompanied by a growing trove of publications reporting their successes and exploring their 
potentials for further expansion. The challenge has always been for this piecemeal assemblage of 
descriptions to comprehensively relate to the software system. “In a publication,” says TX, “you 
would not describe your whole code, but would only describe the new part of it. You might, I 
suppose, reiterate the most important bits, but never the whole thing.” You can, of course, refer back 
to past publications, but for TX “there will be bits of the changes to the code that never resulted in a 
publication, either because they are too minor to be interesting, or because they are part of someone's 
PhD. Even if you go back to all the papers, and the manuals, there will be lots of gaps.” What thus 
applies to the software applies also to the model set-up, because Fluidity has a huge set of options. “I 
don't have all the details written down. They are all there in my Diamond file,” says QS. “If I wrote 
down all the parameters that are in my Diamond file that would be several tens of sheets of A4.”
As a project grows, the gaps between it and the discourse about it proliferate. This creates a problem 
of “witnessing”, of access and openness395. As the inadequacy of the written archive is progressively 
exposed, the software itself starts to function as a primary repository for the science itself. It is better 
394 Lanier, quoted in Rosenberg, Dreaming in Code, 310.
395 Kelty, ‘Free Science’, 427.
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to go straight to the source code than to look at descriptions of it. But as we have seen, this move is 
more than moving from one body of text to another. It takes us from a body of text to a field of 
practice.
Because the software pushes the limits of what is possible to say in publications, all you can do, says 
QS, is “to give supplemental information saying “all my input files are here”, “the model is here”... 
If they really wanted to, a reviewer could go and run it for themselves.” This is one of the principle 
reasons that Fluidity was made open source in 2010, something that required extensive negotiations 
with the university, which had to give up its intellectual property rights in the system in the process. 
In an influential piece in Nature Climate Change, Kurt Kleiner notes that for climate science it is 
becoming essential to move beyond the past paradigm of releasing results, end products of analysis 
and visualisation, to a new level of openness in which the raw data itself is made available396. This 
sentiment was echoed at AMCG. “I don't think you can ever perform good science in a closed source 
environment simply because you need to show how you got the results. You can't write it all down in 
your paper and even if you do, you might get it wrong,” says GY. Rather than rely on the traditional 
discourse of the public sphere, scientists have been opening up new channels, ones that are less 
limited by size constraints and by problems of translation, new media channels for the direct 
dissemination of code. As the apparatus for the research becomes less and less amenable to 
description in natural language, there is a growing demand to distribute it directly. From having been 
an empirical supplement to the knowledge disseminated in publication, the terms change places and 
publications become the textual supplement to the research primarily embodied in apparatuses and 
the systems of practice they inhabit.
With new channels for distribution, open source code and data, we are not just looking at a globally 
connected science397. We may have to reorganise the basic lenses through which we approach 
science. What would be an epistemology without paper? In other words, what is a digital 
epistemology? As well as transforming our appreciation of science into the vast scales and high 
speeds of computer processes, this also opens up a redeeming possibility for how we understand all 
science, pre- and post-computational science. Undermining the dominance of data-theory, we move 
to a focus on practice, on modelling, on phenomenotechnique. This kind of science, while globally 
distributed and highly technically mediated, nevertheless draws attention back to the concrete 
practices of its production, because it defies convertibility into textual description.
  7.7 Conclusion
Code cannot be assimilated into discourse. It does not embody knowledge in the sense of containing 
it, ready to spit it out again, were it to be needed. They are not mutually convertible. It embodies 
396 Kleiner, ‘Data on Demand’.
397 Tiles, ‘Technology and the Possibility of Global Environmental Science’; Edwards, A Vast Machine; Schroeder, ‘e-Sciences as 
Research Technologies’.
- 161 -
- Code and Writing -
knowledge in the sense that it participates in the kind of play of presence and absence addressed in 
chapter 5. In a representative play, it is and it stands for the practical nexus of research itself. 
With computational science we encounter an intriguing possibility for the kind of practice theoretical 
rationalism endorsed here: the possibility that practice itself comes increasingly to the surface 
because the textual outputs, the publications disseminated after research has been done, are less and 
less effective as objectifications of the research process. The eye is drawn to those processes 
themselves. Software systems are continually shifting scaffolds for practice, and require users and 
developers to directly engage with their materialities. In their continual transformation and 
momentum the movement of research is grasped directly rather than indirectly through 
methodological write-ups. The software as a text does not describe what happened; it is what 
happened. It is happening and mutating all the time. It is possible, for this reason, that simulation 
science is the best possible ally for the kind of theory that science studies scholars and others 
interested in practice have been espousing for many years now.
The next chapter picks up on the threads of this one, and explores software as a material for research. 
We put the question of publication and knowledge on one side, and look at materials of practice, 
worlds of software with different tone and texture, facilitating different kinds of interaction, and 
different kinds of research in their domain.
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  8.1 Introduction
“Without materiality mediation is empty”398.
In this chapter we take a further step into the world of scientific software development, and look at 
the materiality of research systems. What kind of world is this? What is software like as a material 
for doing science? What does it mean to be already thrown, already entangled, in a world of 
software?
I am interested in the skilled work within highly developed socio-technical systems that comprises 
the daily investigative work of scientists. Different kinds of media and material provide different 
possibilities for manipulation, for creativity and for recombination. Experimental work, in this sense, 
provided the classic example of “hands-on” research, the practical reasoning of thinking through 
doing. But work with software is equally “hands-on”. It too builds skills, requires competencies, 
practical thinking, the kind of practical reason instantiated in working things out by playing around 
with them. For scientists whose everyday existence is one of working with software, it has a number 
of very tangible properties that emerge in the practices of its use which warrant the term 
“materiality”.
While this practical element is often forgotten in studies of simulation, which often naïvely regard it 
as a domain of free invention399, it has been highlighted in recent philosophy of modelling. 
“Manipulability” and “workability” have been flagged up as important features in how models fulfil 
an epistemic role400. Knuuttila has pushed this point by emphasising that materiality is important for 
even the most “ideal” kinds of modelling. Citing Klein's work on “paper tools”401, she stresses that 
“even in the case of symbols and diagrams, the fact that they are materially embodied as written 
signs on a paper accounts partly for their manipulability”402. This precedent opens a still largely 
unexplored field with respect to understanding digital materialities, whose many dimensions remain 
398 Knuuttila, ‘Models, Representation, and Mediation’, 1267.
399 For example, Heymann, ‘Modeling Reality’.
400 Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators; Knuuttila, ‘Models as Epistemic Artefacts’.
401 Klein, Experiments, Models, Paper Tools.
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to be charted. How does software become efficacious as a medium for thought and action? How, 
conversely, does it threaten research by becoming unwieldy?
This chapter aims to answer these questions by telling the story of the growth of Fluidity, and 
drawing out “material” dimensions threatening workability: brittleness, bureaucratic sluggishness, 
portability and durability. Finally, I go on to draw these pressures together into the general question 
of “habitability” outlined by Richard Gabriel, which will bring us towards the final chapter, in 
raising the question of the stability and openness of efficacious environments for action.
  8.2 The environment for doing computational science
The material culture of computational science is distinctive for its sparse aesthetic. The laboratory 
can hardly even be perceived as a rich material culture without a great effort of estrangement. So 
ubiquitous is the office environment, with its uniform colours, its swivel chairs, filing cabinets, 
monitors, keyboards, mice, it is hard to see it at all. Like the settings of so much modern work, 
AMCG is based in a connected set of open plan offices, with low dividers to break the gaze of seated 
occupants, while allowing the airy feel of mutual surveillance to dominate at higher eye-levels. The 
majority of scientists work in these divisions, peppered with post-it notes, stationary and personal 
paraphernalia. Those more senior have shared or individual offices. The open workspace blends into 
the kitchen area. Private meeting rooms sit off to one side. Carpet tiles, ceiling tiles. The gentle hum 
of whispered conversation and computer fans. Bookshelves store reference material and provide a 
platform for in-trays and printers. Whiteboards adorn the walls, on which sit ever-changing tangles 
of scribbled functions, graphs and diagrams.
It is sometimes hard to remember that these physical environments are as deeply affecting as any 
other. This is a symptom of their ubiquity and of their association with the bureaucracy that traverses 
contemporary culture, routine so routine that it is not really seen. David Graeber and Annelise Riles 
have begun the ambitious project of turning over the stones of this largely implicit ground for 
contemporary Western existence. Graeber points out the “interpretive depth” of the kinds of rituals 
that anthropologists have historically studied most, a depth that is distinctly lacking in Western 
bureaucratic procedures, which seem to gain their efficacy precisely from cutting exegesis short403. 
Riles' studies of paperwork and documents also follow this thread, and are informative for 
understanding any culture, like that of computational science, that has such a strong anti-interpretive 
effect that its spaces of work appear paradoxically to contain no culture whatsoever404.
These features of computational science point to its contemporaneity, a truly Twenty-First Century 
science. It is an office job. This goes some way to explaining the bemusement of some of my 
402 Knuuttila, ‘Modelling and Representing’, 269; see also Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organisation of Society; Netz, The 
Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics.
403 Graeber, ‘Beyond Power/Knowledge’.
404 Riles, Documents.
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informants when I explained I wanted to do an ethnography of their group: “What are you going to 
see? We just sit here tapping on keyboards!” (QY)
So despite this resistance, how can we start to appreciate the nature of this work, of this “tapping on 
keyboards”? How do we start to appreciate the subtle nuances that show themselves throughout the 
day, the hopes and frustrations, the resistances and accommodations, under the surface of all this 
routine, that is research with software, research working upon software. Pointing to the sterile 
appearance of the environment tells us why it is that software as a material is easily ignored, but we 
need to go much further if we are to transform this ignorance to a new kind of engagement.
  8.3 Software as a material
Most scientific software consists of environments or libraries for research. Fluidity is more like a 
flexible toolkit than a singular device. This is why I have called it a “modelling framework” rather 
than simply a “model”. It can generate innumerable simulations of many different kinds. No 
simulation will use all the tools in the toolbox, nor will different simulations use them in the same 
way. Different kinds of simulations will make use of different functions within Fluidity's libraries. 
Fluidity also draws on many external libraries for its solver routines, its parallelisation and its 
adjointing capabilities. It is integrated with several other software systems which provide its 
compilation, its set-up, its mesh-generation, and its post-processing. Fluidity is not one object that 
can be taken out of storage, placed on a work bench, and probed and prodded. It is the major element 
of the research systems for studying fluids at AMCG. It provides a concrete setting for this research.
Philosophical debates over simulation have long stressed questions of materiality, but remain caught 
in a singular problematic, one for which the issue is the nature of the inferences made by scientists 
who are working with different kinds of model or experiment. And the materiality in question is 
almost always the materiality of the actual electronic processes occurring in the computer hardware. 
With experiments, says Guala, scientists play upon the argument that the laboratory set-up is made 
of the “same stuff” as a broader set of physical, chemical or biological systems, and thus inferences 
can be extended outwards405. The “same material causes” are at work in one instance as in 
another406. In contrast, for idealised models, and for computational models, only a “formal” 
correspondence can be posited. Various exchanges played out between the alternative positions on 
this question. For Wendy Parker, for example, simulations must be thought of as material processes, 
and are thus not to be treated by analogy with abstract mathematical models407. Mary Morgan 
extended the debate, by bringing in hybrid cases involving experimental and simulation elements, 
and proposed a typology of intermediates408.
405 Guala, ‘Models, Simulations, and Experiments’.
406 See also Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, 55–56.
407 Parker, ‘Does Matter Really Matter?’.
408 Morgan, ‘Experiments Without Material Intervention’.
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But these questions follow a very particular line of enquiry. They are about the role of materiality in 
reasoning about experiments and simulations. To the extent that I am interested in reasoning, it is not 
this post-hoc reasoning that justifies what statements can be made about simulations. It is the 
practical reasoning that occurs in the very writing of scientific software, in work with this medium. 
This requires us to look beyond the materiality of hardware, beyond the kinds of inferences that may 
or may not be made based on empirical occurrences in a computer. What we need to do instead is to 
try to find ways to talk about the materiality of software, about the ways in which software systems 
are for the scientist like clay for a potter, a medium which needs to be experienced, to be learned 
from, to be played around with, and practical competencies developed as more elaborate or elegant 
forms get produced.
Both Tarja Knuuttila and Mary Morgan have started thinking along these lines in recent years. For 
Knuuttila, it is important that we don't get sidetracked by the representational relationship between 
the simulation and whatever it might or might not represent. Such concerns are certainly legitimate 
but they have historically overwhelmed equally interesting features of models and simulations, their 
role as what Knuuttila calls “epistemic artefacts”, as things that are, to paraphrase Levi-Strauss, 
“good to think with”. Knuuttila encourages us to explore models' “constraints and affordances”, 
what they provide to the user by way of possibilities of manipulation409.
The term “constraint” has been the subject of some dispute, largely revolving over the question of 
whether it implies an external, pre-existing property impinging on scientific practice, or whether 
conversely it should imply a resistance immanent to practice410. For present purposes, it is 
somewhere in between. The materiality of software systems involves properties of those systems that 
are not necessarily bound to any specific practical situation. But at the same time, as will become 
clear, these materialities are only fully graspable when seen unfolding in practice.
The term “affordance” was coined by James Gibson to talk about the possibilities offered by the 
immediate environment relative to an embodied being411. It is not just that the environment allows 
certain actions for me (such as sitting, climbing, hiding, etc.). These actions are also perceptible 
possibilities for me412. Where models are concrete, for example in the case of plastic models of 
molecules used in chemistry classrooms, the affordances are what suggest possibilities for 
manipulation413. If the plastic balls are too small or too big, they are less easily manipulable, too 
fiddly or cumbersome. But if they are of a medium size, in relation to the hands and body, the user 
who is playing around with them can easily see and feel new ways of connecting things, new 
isomers, for example. This brings in another key dimension, which must not be forgotten. The 
embodied being is not preformed in its capacities, but has continuously evolving dispositions. 
409 Knuuttila, ‘Models as Epistemic Artefacts’; Knuuttila, ‘Modelling and Representing’.
410 Galison, ‘Context and Constraints’; Pickering, ‘Beyond Constraint’.
411 Gibson, The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception, 127–143.
412 Ibid., 128.
413 Justi and Gilbert, ‘Models and Modelling in Chemical Education’.
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Manipulability is relative not just to the body, but to the whole field of practice, of bodily cultivation. 
Where models are realised in software, this “playing around” becomes more abstract, in the sense 
that it is about the manipulation of digital entities and processes rather than of physical objects. But 
the software system nevertheless offers certain affordances for its manipulation or modification. If 
we follow Giere in his use of “distributed cognition”, even the most abstract models become tied to 
possibilities of working with things414. 
Mary Morgan uses the term “workability” to stress the importance of the manipulability of models to 
their role in the accomplishment of scientific research415. To be effective, they must be workable, 
relative to available potentialities for grasping them. With this in view, we start to understand 
something of the variation native to software development, something of its idiosyncrasies, of its 
resistances and openings, in and through which scientific work is more or less productive. There are 
different kinds of software systems, and software systems which change in kind, and in each case, 
something can be said about what they offer to the user as a perceptible potential for doing good 
research.
This work with software is a practical engagement that we can call, with Bachelard, the “objective 
meditation” of research practice, the thought inherent in working in a laboratory as opposed to the 
“subjective meditation” of pure or purified thought416. “Objective meditation” is 
phenomenotechnique, reason in practice. With Morgan and Knuuttila we can stress the relativity to 
bodies that such practical deployment implies. Some ways of putting concepts into practice, whether 
in experiment or modelling, will be extremely efficacious. Others will be unproductive because they 
are unmanageable, not so easily handled.
Software systems come in many shapes and sizes, but anyone who has been involved in software 
development will be able to empathise with the general problems of workability that it poses. It is 
possible to create highly complex systems with software, but these can easily cease to be workable. 
Things can “get out of hand”. Workability is always relative to the kind of work being carried out. 
What concerns me here is not primarily the “black box” use of software interfaces, that we find 
explored in human-computer interaction studies, but the actual intervention in their source code, 
writing and modifying code, finding your way among complex systems of writing, tracing their 
logics and relating what is expressed there to the output, the computations that system can be made 
to generate.
In the world of software development, bugs are a fact of life. Frustrations are a fact of life. Software 
can easily become unwieldy. It is worth beginning with the simple observation that the failure rate 
for large software projects is extremely high. Humphrey cites figures to the tune of an 85% failure 
414 Giere, Scientific Perspectivism, 96–116.
415 Morgan, ‘Models as Working Objects in Science’.
416 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 171.
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rate for projects between 3 and 6 million dollars, and over 90% for those over 6 million, where a 
failed project either goes significantly over budget or is abandoned with no deliverables delivered417. 
In the following sections I consider three major axes of workability: brittle/robust software, the tar 
pit, and hardware portability. Each of these has a major effect on the ways in which software can be 
put to work in science, and strongly conditions how that research proceeds.
  8.4 The troubles with growing software
Where it is under active development, scientific software grows in a piecemeal fashion, a 
consequence of the dominant funding model. It is very rare to get funding to build a large software 
system from scratch. What is feasible is usually to build a small software system, within the terms of 
individually funded research projects, a system tailored to the specific goals of that project. Once 
built, however, this can serve as a proof of concept for further projects, which extend the software in 
new directions, adding new functionalities, exploring new possibilities. Success in producing results 
thus tends to “grow” software within scientific contexts418. This has been the experience of the 
scientists who built Fluidity.
Fluidity began its life in the late 1980s as part of a PhD project looking at small scale fluid 
phenomena for industrial applications. The original author of Fluidity, CK, brought his code to 
Imperial College a few years later when he joined the Applied Modelling group, which at that time 
was primarily concerned with studying radiation transport problems for nuclear safety engineering. 
It soon became apparent that Fluidity would be usefully integrated into the tool kit of the group, 
because this opened the door to studying nuclear applications involving fluids, such as those found 
in “fissile solution” reactors. With the assistance of a new coupling code, “FETCH”, Fluidity was 
coupled to “EVENT”, at that time the main AMCG nuclear modelling code.
This emerging interest in fluids within AMCG sparked much further development of Fluidity and in 
the late 1990s new staff were brought on board to extend the code to new applications such as 
multiphase flow (where fluids move between liquid and gas phases) and to render it capable of 
running efficiently on highly parallel supercomputer architectures. At this point, AMCG was 
composed of 15 scientists, and was roughly evenly divided in its work between radiation problems 
and fluids problems. In the early 2000s, however, a major new funding initiative began which 
doubled the size of the group within four years, and rapidly accelerated the pace of development on 
the code. The main part of this project was a major extension of Fluidity from its previous 
incarnation as principally an engineering code, to a huge new realm of geophysical applications, 
from oceans, to coasts, rivers, atmospheres and mantle dynamics.
417 Humphrey, ‘Why Big Software Projects Fail’.
418 Basili et al., ‘Understanding the HPC Community’, 29.
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This time of great expansion reveals a lot about what software is like as a material, and about the 
ways in which workability can become threatened. As the group expanded, the fluids side of things 
became by far the largest area of study within AMCG, and by 2010, there were around 30 scientists 
actively developing Fluidity. The code became a different kind of material for science, subject to 
different kinds of pressures. The engineering and small-scale computational fluid dynamics research 
continued, while geophysical applications accounted for more than half of what this much bigger 
development team were studying. The beginnings of this expansion in 2001-2003 saw the 
commencement of many new geophysical research projects but it also saw a major shift in the way 
that the science was done.
The expansion of the group was an expansion in the number of people involved, but this implied an 
expansion in the number of different agendas to which Fluidity was being put. The group 
experienced new demands for collaboration and communication. At the same time, the increase in 
scale resulted in an increased rate of change for the Fluidity code base. The software was being 
changed often, by many people working on many different projects. These stresses placed a burden 
on the team that was exacerbated by the fact that much of the code had never originally been written 
with an expectation of future massive expansion. The priority during the early life of Fluidity had 
always been to deliver the short-term aims of specific research projects, and there had been little 
time or money available to make the system maximally extendible. Furthermore, as is the case for 
many computational science teams, the majority of scientists working on Fluidity had not come from 
a computer science background419. They were predominantly mathematicians, engineers or physical 
scientists. Even now, most new PhD students coming to AMCG have never written any software 
before they arrived. They learn on the job and as KU pointed out, this has good and bad effects: 
“when you have a team of good programmers around you you learn by osmosis. But when you have 
a team of bad programmers around you you learn by osmosis as well!” (KU). While Fluidity was a 
small or medium sized enterprise, there was a degree of tolerance for idiosyncratic working 
practices, but as it grew, this tolerance shrank.
“As a mathematician I was never interested in coding practices. It didn't bother me. As long 
as my code ran fast and did what it was supposed to do I was happy. So my codes were often 
a tremendous mess. Someone like WS would have been none too happy seeing that. But 
then that is no problem when you are on your own: no-one else has to look at it.” (IM)
“Over the years Fluidity had been adapted... bit by bit for different applications. We ended 
up with quite an unmanageable mess, what coders call “the code becomes brittle”. There 
were so many hidden assumptions in the code that as soon as you change one detail the 
whole thing breaks down” (HP)
The trouble with the code in the early days of the 2000s expansion was expressed in very tangible 
terms. The code had become “brittle”. This term is a commonplace within software cultures. Brittle 
code is the opposite of robust code. Brittle code breaks more often than robust code. But the 
419 Ibid.
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fundamental problem with brittle code is not so much that it breaks more often – all code can be 
expected to break when you are developing it – it is that when it does break it is hard to figure out 
exactly why. Then, when you have figured out why it broke, it is hard to fix it. And when you do 
implement the fix, there is a high probability of that causing further problems. “Brittleness” is a 
somewhat loose term that captures the experience of coders struggling with working in what has 
become a very difficult and frustrating medium.
“Have you seen the old code? It was written without any levels of abstraction whatsoever. 
That makes the code very difficult to understand because what you see is a whole load of 
very low level mathematical operations and then you have to work out for yourself what the 
big picture is and what all the bits are doing. And that is hard to see. It was missing an awful 
lot of modern software engineering, which is about making code that is either error free by 
design or at least easy to define what the errors are. So there were undiagnosed errors that 
had been in there for years because you can't find them. (WS) 
Brittleness seriously compromises workability. Working with and upon a brittle Fluidity rendered 
research difficult and time consuming. If lots of time is spent fixing bugs and tracing the logic of 
convoluted sections of source code, there is very little sense of the code as a flexible medium. It is 
not conducive to just “trying things out” in the set-up of a simulation, following a whim, an informal 
inclination. Not only do these processes take much longer, it is harder for new collaborators to be 
brought on board. One complaint with the old Fluidity was that it was hard for new PhD students to 
properly become experts in the code in the 3 year span of their doctorate.
“The interface originally was very cumbersome. Only two or three people in the group were 
able to use it. It was a big text file with lots of random names. They all had to be six letters 
so it used all sorts of crazy acronyms. It was very hard to modify the option system but they 
were constantly adding new functionality so basically the numbers became encoded in more 
and more complicated ways. For example, if you put a minus sign in the time step that might 
mean something special. Or you put in a very large number with different meanings for the 
different digits. The option system basically dated back to the days of punch cards and it was 
very complicated to set up meshes. Nobody really knew why it broke when you changed 
something. It was a big project to step by step change things to see where it broke and figure 
out why” (HP)
  8.5 The scale of software
What makes a software system brittle? Fluidity became brittle as it became big and as the group 
developing it became larger, so brittleness is often relative to scale. It is, however, difficult to talk 
rigorously about the size of software. There is no perfect measure. The most common measure is that 
of the number of lines of code in the source code repository. This is the software written by humans, 
before it is compiled into binary code that can be executed on hardware. But counting lines of source 
code is somewhat arbitrary: different software languages use different rules of formatting that take 
up different amounts of space. This is compounded by the fact that Fluidity involves different 
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languages working together. According to some relatively standard calculations, however, Fluidity 
gets currently estimated at over a million lines of code. At the point of the rewrite it already 
comprised more than a quarter of a million.
But the size of the source code is not a good measure for the complexity of the code420. This can be 
split into two issues: the complexity of the software architecture and the complexity of the processes 
to be computed. The complexity of the software architecture had become a problem for the Fluidity 
developers. Because the code had grown in piecemeal fashion there was very little large-scale 
planning at the start, and many additions were tacked on in inconsistent ways. A code that is very 
large in terms of lines of code need not be complex for a human reader to find their way around. It 
may be very intuitively organised. Conversely, even a relatively small code may have a torturous 
organisation with many headaches in store for a navigator.
The old Fluidity was big but the real difficulty came from its organisation. It is impossible to expect 
the developers of a young software project to anticipate its future directions in such a way that they 
can pre-emptively provide a structure into which each new piece of functionality can fit. This being 
said, the old Fluidity implemented very few design principles that are pretty much standard practice 
in software development outside of science.
There was also no concept of orthogonality in the code: one of the design principles you 
want when you design code is that things that are conceptually unrelated are also unrelated 
in the code, so that you can play around with the code in this area without having to worry 
about the other areas. But if the code is all mixed up that doesn't work. They are all on top of 
each other.” (WS)
Another property that captures an element of the scale of software is the complexity of the processes 
that it computes. Some software performs tasks that require a lot of space to be encoded, but which 
are relatively conceptually simple, whereas something like Fluidity is computing a lot of very 
complex mathematics, and this exerts a large influence on how manageable its source code is.
The fourth aspect of software size and complexity is its rate of change. If the code is being updated 
on a daily basis and brand new parts added in regularly, any problems dealing with size and 
complexity become much more serious. It is one thing to know your way around a complex code 
well enough that it is “workable” for a research agenda. It is another thing to maintain this level of 
engagement while that code is constantly changing. Such is the rate of change for a project like 
Fluidity, it is necessary to think of Fluidity itself not as a code that is sometimes updated, but rather 
as something perpetually changing.
420 Booch, ‘Measuring Architectural Complexity’.
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  8.6 Making Fluidity robust
As the group's expansion got under way it became clear that the code would only become more 
brittle as more scientists carried on adding new functionality. Some scientists were already refusing 
to work with the latest version of the code because they were sick of results that they had got one 
week no longer being reproducible a week later. The response was two-fold. Firstly there would be a 
complete rewrite of the code, completely reorganising its architecture and the style of programming 
in which it had been written. Secondly, a number of supplementary practices and technologies would 
be adopted to help co-ordinate the work and to change the working style of the group.
“When the grant to develop the ICOM [Imperial College Ocean Model] model arrived, all of 
a sudden a lot of people were working on the development side. Code organisation and 
management became critical. We hired people who had good ideas about testing, code 
structures, modularisation” (HP)
The complete rewrite of Fluidity took a small team about a year. While there was no funding 
earmarked specifically for this task, a number of new projects were just getting off the ground and 
this work could be built into their early phases. The rewrite required a huge amount of work, but its 
pay-off was to be a newly efficacious, much more workable code. It is an extreme measure to rewrite 
a code from scratch, but the new code reimplemented the same core algorithms that had been 
developed over the previous 15 years of Fluidity's lifetime. While the work of expressing these 
algorithms in software had to be redone, all the work that it took to devise them in the first place did 
not need to be repeated.
The “new Fluidity” did what the old Fluidity did, but it expressed it in a more reader-friendly and 
manipulator-friendly way, organising the core algorithms so it was much easier to find your way 
around the source code. The new code used a newer version of Fortran and employed many new 
stylistic techniques, even down to implementing new rules for naming variables in a consistent 
manner. The modularity of the new code allowed new functionalities to be added easily and for them 
to interface with existing modules in a standardised manner. A new options system with a clean and 
clear graphical user interface complemented this process, speeding up the process of running new 
simulations and tweaking them in the course of their investigation.
Things have moved on dramatically in the last few years.... People came in too who knew 
more about software development and modern programming. Slowly what happened was 
that good practice and rewriting the code in modern Fortran happened. The code we have 
now has effectively zero lines in common with the code that I started on. The algorithms are 
the same – these are the important part, the hard part. The early stages of working on these 
codes are getting the algorithms. But then get an algorithm and there are hundreds of ways 
that you can code that, lots of choices of how you implement it: different languages, 
different structures, different orders of things that you do things in. One of the big things that 
happens now in dev. [developers'] meetings are debates over this kind of thing because there 
are lots of ways of doing something: What is the best way to do it? And people have strong 
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feelings about this, making sure that things are useful for other people and future-proof. In 
the old days you were only worried about getting something working. From 2005 onwards 
there was lots more emphasis on producing a product that now we have released [as open 
source software] (NK)
The modularity of the new version of Fluidity was taken as far as possible. WS advocated this tactic 
in a presentation to representatives from the Natural Environment Research Council. Modularity in 
its extreme means that parts of Fluidity could in theory be transplanted into very different modelling 
frameworks without having to be retooled for the new job. For example, in the main body of the 
code, 
“we don't code anything about the discretisation, so we can let things change without having 
to recode. The code doesn't even know it is a fluids model. It just knows it is solving PDEs 
[Partial Differential Equations].” (WS)
It is interesting to note that while a complete rewrite of a software system is a radical tactic, in 
principle it doesn't have any bearing on the epistemic legitimacy of the research that had been done 
with the old version of the code. Exactly the same simulation, the same computational process, may 
be executed by a brittle code as by a robust code. Or if these processes differ, they may differ in no 
significant manner. Just because a code is robust does not mean that the simulation it produces will 
give a more legitimate answer to a given question. This issue is one of validation and verification, 
which pertain to a finished simulation and thus bear little on the actual process of writing and 
manipulating software.
In practice, however, the robustness of software does matter. It matters because a robust code 
facilitates a greater degree of manipulation, and therefore offers a lot more potentiality to surprise 
the scientists, to lead him or her down an unexpected path of exploration, towards innovative 
research. It also matters because the justification of results is accomplished by a drawing together of 
a patchwork of arguments. Verification and validation are very important elements here, and 
probably the major components of this patchwork. But they are never conclusive. A code that is 
known to be robust and well-written is likely to include fewer bugs, so less likely to involve bugs 
affecting the solution that have eluded detection by verification and validation.
These considerations point to the real difference between the “artefactual” approach to modelling 
(espoused by Knuuttila) and more mainstream epistemology of simulation. The latter has largely 
focussed on validation and verification as strategies for justifying propositions about a final 
simulation421, while the former draws our attention to the research process before the final simulation 
has been arrived at. It is here that we can talk of scientific practice as skilled activity within a 
material environment, which provides specific ways of working and certain very tangible constraints 
and affordances on the cognitive processes of making and manipulating.
421 For example, Bailer-Jones, ‘When Scientific Models Represent’.
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  8.7 Programming systems products
Fluidity was made robust, or at least significantly more robust, by the full re-write. But it would be a 
mistake to think about this kind of manipulability solely as a property of the software itself. 
Everything depends on what you are going to use the code for, and how you are going to work with 
it. There is no straightforward way to isolate the technology from the techniques through which 
brought into use. The overcoming of the brittleness of Fluidity was also the overcoming of the 
frustrations that arose from working in a larger group. During the same period in which the code was 
rewritten a number of what we could call “social technologies” were implemented within the group. 
Its rewriting was also a reconfiguring of the working procedures of the researchers who used it.
“Part of our quality control process for the code is all this testing and that is both in order to 
make sure that new features that people develop don't cause problems but also to make sure 
that people haven't sort of messed it all up or literally made a spelling mistake or get a 
wrong syntax” (QH)
A full version control system tracked every change made to the source code, an automated testing 
suite checked every new version of the code for errors. More recently, the group pushed these trends 
forwards with a code review system, so that every new section of software is reviewed by another 
developer to try to pick up errors or just problems of style. A manual and user guide, and set of 
example simulations, is kept up to date so that new users can get to grips with the code quickly and 
easily. 
“Some reviews are extensive... [The time commitment] can be expensive but probably not as 
expensive as a bug getting in. We have a couple of pernicious bugs in the code at the 
moment; we are trying to ferret them out” (HU)
Since November 2010, Fluidity has been open source, so new users from around the world can 
download the software and they inevitably need to be provided with support. By expanding the user-
base, being open source also has the advantage of enhancing the probability that bugs will be 
discovered.
There are major advantages [to open source] in the sense that hopefully we will have people 
across the world using our code. And they will find bugs, guaranteed. They will report those 
bugs and we can fix them and that is all going to improve the validity of the code (IW)
Going public with the code is a bold strategy, because it exposes the innermost workings of your 
research practice to scrutiny.
The fact that people can see your code means that you will be more careful with it. It ensures 
that your code is good. It is also like the [Microsoft] Windows release cycle. They release 
SP1 [Service Pack 1], SP2, SP3 in response to error reports people have sent in. The public 
do the error testing... (GN)
These technologies help keep Fluidity reliable and stable for its users. The code is changing all the 
time, but if you got a certain result last week, even if it doesn't work this week you know exactly the 
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version of the code in which it did work and you know who is responsible for the change, and the 
automated testing system probably already alerted you to the problem as soon as it happened, rather 
than having to find out further down the line.
On the other hand, the introduction of all these systems has had a huge impact on working practices. 
While they make the code more easily manipulable, they also make a huge number of new demands 
on scientists' working lives. For every new piece of code, a test must be written, the manual must be 
updated, and a review must take place. Requests for help on the email lists and chat channel must be 
responded to. Because the style and structure of the code must be kept consistent, the group started 
having weekly developers' meetings in order that everyone can be kept up to date with all the other 
research projects that are currently going on and so that proposed changes and additions can be 
discussed before they are implemented. These meetings must be attended. Work with the old Fluidity 
could be quite individualistic, with a great freedom to work how the scientists liked, in control of 
their own time. But the social environment of the new Fluidity is more akin to a bureaucratic 
organisation, with constant meetings and communications. A more workable code seemed to bring 
with it constraints on work and time that left little remainder for the kind of playing around that the 
new code facilitated.
These pressures are not new, and they are not confined to scientific contexts. They were the subject 
of a classic essay in software engineering called “The Tar Pit”, by Frederick Brooks Jr.422. He wanted 
to understand the complaints of software developers who were working in big bureaucratic 
organisations, of the sort that developed big projects like operating systems. He wanted to 
understand their frustrations with all the management, all the meetings, all the regulations that were 
imposed on them. The feeling was that if only they could be left alone, if only they could just be free 
of all this bureaucracy, this feeling of wading through a tar pit of daily routine, then they could be so 
much more productive. The fresh air of freedom and they could write many more lines of code; they 
could create something amazing. If brittleness is one dimension of the materiality of software, the tar 
pit is another, the feeling of density and sluggishness imposed by the bureaucratic structures that 
grow up around the central task of writing big software.
 “One occasionally reads newspaper accounts of how two programmers in a remodelled garage have 
built an important program that surpasses that best efforts of large teams. And every programmer is 
prepared to believe such tales, for he knows that he could build any program much faster than the 
1000 statements/year reported for industrial teams”423. So, Brooks asks, “[w]hy then have not all 
industrial programming teams been replaced by dedicated garage duos?”424 This myth, of the couple 
of guys (and in the myth they are of course male) sitting in their garage, writing something of great 
422 Brooks, Jr., ‘The Tar Pit’.
423 Ibid., 4.
424 Ibid.
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genius, is still prevalent today, not least through the figure of the Google founders, who wrote 
something amazing and ended up taking over the world.
The problem, says Brooks, is that this way of thinking is mistaken about what it is that is actually 
being created in the different contexts. What gets written in the garage is a program. A program “is 
complete in itself, ready to be run by the author on the system on which it was developed”425. It does 
the core task, and may do it exceptionally well. But it works for that person, on that computer. What 
the big organisations are after is something quite different: a “programming systems product”. This 
“can be run, tested, extended or repaired by anybody... usable in many operating environments, for 
many sets of data... written in a generalisable fashion... [with] thorough documentation”426. It also 
must conform with standard interface design, with control on memory usage, tested in all 
permutations with multiple other systems with which it is going to need to be able to coexist and 
interact427. Brooks' estimate is that to create a programming systems product requires nine times as 
much work as a program, and it is this amplification of effort that gives the tangible feeling of 
wading through a tar pit when working on big software compared with working on an individual pet 
project.
In other words, the transition to big software brought with it a number of changes to the technologies 
used to do research at AMCG, and while these technologies made the software workable in new 
ways, they also imposed new kinds of burdens. While it is possible to make every effort to smooth 
out working processes, big software does simply require a lot of additional effort in order to keep it 
manipulable. While the software may be easier to play around with in the research situation, less 
time is available for that play because of the extra demands of the bureaucratic machinery.
For these reasons, there remains a subdued but still perceptible tension within the group between the 
pioneers of the bureaucratic transformation of the group, and those who would like to work in a 
more individualistic manner. For them, it seems, the efficacy of their practice is compromised by an 
exaggerated emphasis on bureaucracy, which is constantly distracting attention from the core task of 
research.
“There are also people... I call them “the code police”... These are people that really 
understand the code to a level that others don't. Any changes that aren't suitable they will say 
“look, that is useless,” often with my changes, and say “do it this way, do it that way”.” (IW)
“There are some people here who are very interested in how the code is written so they like 
to have all these meetings and discuss things all the time and update people. I understand 
you need various things in place. But from a personal perspective I just want to do science.” 
(IM)
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid., 5–6.
427 Ibid., 6.
- 176 -
- Workability and Habitability -
CA tries to balance these feelings. “Sometimes there is a feeling of being too software engineering 
focussed but in the long run you need to do that, otherwise you will end up with codes that are 
impossible to run” (CA). 
Reflecting upon the broader significance of these ideas, it is interesting to posit a fundamental 
division in computational science between that which gets done with programs, and what, on the 
other hand, only gets done with programming systems products. A lot of computational science is 
done in small groups, with relatively short-term goals for the software, and a more flexible attitude 
to its longevity and portability. This software is written in the scientific equivalent of a garage 
(probably the office of a principle investigator with a couple of his or her PhD students tacked on, 
maybe a couple of postdocs). In most of these cases there is no need to create a programming 
systems product. You don't need to worry about new people being able to get on board quickly 
because the whole team was on board from the start. You don't need to worry about other groups 
using the software because they could just write a similar application for themselves from scratch. 
You don't need the software to run on any computer but the facility that you have access to for that 
project, and for which you have been writing from the start.
But for some significant subset of problems, the kinds of systems that are to be the focus of research 
are so complex that a large software framework is required. Some geophysical problems involve 
multiple interacting processes, operating on many scales. Software above a certain size has to be a 
programming systems product approach if it is to stay workable, to remain material for productive 
research. A big team needs to be co-ordinated around it. The project will take long enough that some 
of the founders will leave and new people will have to come on board part way through. The time it 
takes to build in all the necessary functionality and to validate all the parts of the model is so great, 
that the software itself needs future-proofing. It is not just the money; careers are being invested. The 
legacy needs to be more than the paper output of publications. It extends to the software itself, the 
provision of a platform for further studies into the future. In these cases, and climate science is 
probably the best example, software is an output of scientific activity in its own right, and for that to 
be the case, the software and the frameworks that surround it take a different form to small-scale 
endeavours. It must be legible, extendible, and widely-compatible, a programming systems product. 
Problems of brittleness must be overcome, and ways must be found to live with consequent 
processes of bureaucratisation.
  8.8 Portability and code generation
One of the most important properties of a programming systems product is its portability. It is 
designed to work on a range of different computers. But portability is a relative concept. Most 
portabilities relate to operation on different operating systems, with different compilers, computers 
with different numbers of processors, and so on. A great deal of work is invested in keeping software 
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functional when travelling across these kinds of gaps, taming these differences. But there is always 
the possibility of new gaps emerging in the landscape of evolving technologies that require radically 
different approaches, that make previous portability seem comparatively minor, as if for all the effort 
it entailed it never left the comfort of home at all. One such abyss is on the horizon of computational 
science. It is caused by a seismic shift in fundamental technologies that threatens the integrity of 
research practice. This challenge is provoking serious methodological reflection on the part of 
AMCG in order to prepare the group for a future with very different kinds of supercomputers. 
Making Fluidity a programming systems product was one thing; keeping it one in the face of wider 
shifts in the technical environment is another. Workability can only be provisionally assured, and 
requires continual vigilant maintenance work.
A handful of members of AMCG are currently working in tandem with a team from the computer 
science department. They are investigating automated code generation, trying to rethink the way that 
computer simulations are written. The core work involves adapting the existing language Unified 
Form Language (UFL) developed by the FEniCs project, developing its libraries such that finite-
element simulations can be written at a new higher level of abstraction, using a new language to 
specify the equations to be solved and the methods to be used to solve them. The point is to provide 
new flexibility at the level of coding, so that Fluidity can be adapted with minimal effort to run on 
new kinds of supercomputer architectures.
The automated code generation project will ultimately produce a new system of code, a new rewrite, 
scheduled to be integrated into Fluidity from 2014. But this very practical output is also 
accompanied by a profusion of theoretical computational science papers, as in the course of the 
project the team studies the fundamentals of computational science software, its challenges and 
practice, contributing to the science of method, what could be called the “theory of doing 
computational science”.
The UFL project responds to challenges to workability, but in this case these challenges are not yet 
faced by computational scientists. The new supercomputer architectures are yet to make it into the 
mainstream. But they are in the pipeline, and hence, the consequent response from the software side 
of things is also in development. Faced with this future threat to workability, the UFL project is an 
exercise in pre-emption. As an expert in high-performance computing and one of the original 
developers who parallelised Fluidity during the late 1990s, TT explains the situation: “There are 
paradigm shifts in the technology... Supercomputers are going to become much much more 
complicated beasts to program” (TT). 
The hardware of supercomputers changes all the time as better components are produced, but some 
shifts count as what TT calls “paradigm shifts”. They change the nature of the machine such that it 
will require different kinds of software to be produced. Currently, Fluidity's software embodies a 
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whole set of implicit assumptions about what kind of machine will run it, rendering it poorly 
transferable to novel kinds of architecture. 
“It is always one thing to get things to run on this specific architecture, and a second thing to 
really run them efficiently. This [writing for novel architectures] is a bit different from what 
programming CPU [Central Processing Units – the standard architecture] has become... 
CPUs offer a very high level of comfort because they take care of a lot of things internally 
which you as a programmer don't really need to think about. But you have limited 
opportunity to influence things like caching and instruction-level parallelism that GPUs 
[Graphics Processing Units] offer today. Programming a CPU today is much closer to the 
hardware and that is also the problem and why we want to introduce these abstractions 
because it is hard to efficiently program for GPUs.” (UI)
GPUs are one of the elements of these anticipated future exotic architectures. As the name suggests, 
they are designed to handle graphics computations, which can be rendered massively parallel by 
dividing the computer screen into pixels, or regions of pixels. While desktop CPUs today tend to 
have two or four, or perhaps eight processors, GPUs have evolved to have thousands of relatively 
slow processors, with a shared memory cache. Soon after their appearance in the marketplace, 
however, GPUs were put to other uses than for graphics. They became, in the words of UI, “the poor 
man's supercomputer”, used by computational scientists as a cheap way to run massively parallel 
programs. GPUs are expected to provide some of the key technology for novel supercomputer 
architectures, and have thus taken on even greater importance, as placeholders for an uncertain 
future, testing grounds for new techniques.
Part of the problem lies in the fact that it is hard to program for parallel processing. It is difficult to 
think in parallel. Fluidity, like the vast majority of software, is written in a serial fashion, but in such 
a way as to render its operations decomposable during the compilation process, to be distributed 
across many processors. Because writing this software in such a way that it can easily be made 
parallel requires making assumptions about what the target architecture is like, WS will refer to it as 
“hand coding parallel”.
“Hand coding parallel involves making decisions that are heavily driven by the sort of 
machine that it is going to run on. So the code you write is not parallel for different sorts of 
parallel machines. [In the future] the architecture frameworks will change radically and 
individual machines will have different sorts of parallelism. At the moment you have 
paradigms of shared memory machines or a distributed memory machine. But the future 
paradigm is that there will be a distributed layer and each of those nodes is itself quite big 
and within that node there might be one or more layers of shared memory parallelism. And 
there might also be something distributed there.” (WS)
“One of the things that is happening is that with these graphics cards... if you have multiple 
graphics cards on one node, they can't really talk to each other, so they talk to each other 
indirectly via the node – so that's two layers of distribution – then each graphics card is itself 
a distributed machine which works on a sort of shared memory model, but it is a shared 
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memory model that itself has two or three layers of memory. So we can easily get up to five 
different layers of parallelism in one code. It is already hard to program for that and the next 
machine that comes along will have a different five layers of parallelism” (WS)
Dealing with all these hardware architectures is the major problem that the automated code 
generation project is supposed to address. It is not just that the new supercomputers are complicated. 
The threat to workability comes from their variety, and there is little chance that this variability will 
settle down to a singular new conventional architecture to replace the CPUs that have dominated the 
whole history of digital computing thus far. TT continues:
“You have all these innovative technologies such as hardware accelerators, graphics cards, 
and there are multiple different competing technologies. The one thing that they all have in 
common is that they are all vastly more complicated to program... Automatic code 
generation for these target platforms is going to become more and more important. WS is 
collaborating with KP over in computer science on this and they will talk about “software 
technologies” rather than software.” (TT)
“[We would be] developing these algorithms rather than hand coding them ourselves to our 
target machine, where we are very almost actually touching the silicon: that's how close we 
are, the level of detail which you have to program. [In the future] the direction would shift 
entirely and you would start writing your algorithms in a much higher level language, and a 
whole new layer of technology would place itself between you and the silicon, so you are 
dealing with a much higher level language and you are mapping that to much more 
complicated computing devices.” (TT)
The question is not one of dealing with the divide between ordinary computers and supercomputers, 
which has largely been a question of scalability, of scaling software to run on increasing numbers of 
processors. It is a question of exotic architectures, which makes the previous paradigm, present day 
PCs and supercomputers alike, look monolithic.
“HECToR [the UK national supercomputing resource] is made up of components like CPUs 
that are no different from your laptop and the piece of code that we would write would be no 
different from the one that we would run with the same compiler on your laptop. There is no 
major shift there – and that is common with almost all supercomputers – but there are trends 
coming along where the whole beast that you are running on is shifting fundamentally. This 
is a big shift in terms of everything we have seen for the last, say, thirty years in terms of 
computing and a feature of that is that the computers are going to become much more 
complicated in terms of the kind of code you are going to have to write for that.” (TT) 
“It is no longer business as usual from a programmer's perspective, for all us writers of 
software... On a GPU our software is just not going to work. It has to be rewritten entirely, 
so this puts up a massive technical barrier and most likely what is going to happen is that 
there is just going to be a paradigm shift that will shift the way that we develop models so 
that we shift to having domain specific languages and you would write your algorithms for 
these domain specific languages. At the moment we write code and the same compiler that is 
used for developing software like your word processor is the same type of compiler that we 
use for our climate models. It generates assembly code that is going to run on your silicon. 
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In the future when everything is much more complicated you simply don't have the 
workforce to implement everything for all these different types of machines. You are going 
to end up with a new level of complexity... We are going to start writing in a language that is 
specific to climate modelling or to other applications in our field. And then you have a new 
layer of technology that is going to get that and convert it into a much more complicated 
source code. And then a compiler would get that and convert it to your architecture. So a 
whole new field of people is institutionally going to get inserted in the middle.” (TT)
While the automated code generation project produces discursive outputs and software outputs, one 
of its most significant practical effects is to be social. Writing software encodes specialised 
understandings, and the interrelations of systems of software involves the interrelatedness of 
communities of specialists. In the new world of UFL, WS envisages a new relationship between 
computer science and computational science. In the current arrangement, computational scientists 
produce code, which they then compile and run on hardware. Computer scientists complement this 
work by developing the systems that manage the hardware and developing compilers and assemblers 
that will transform the code into effective binaries. But there is a limit to how much a computer 
scientist can manipulate the code because of the large amount of implicit mathematics of the 
approximations used to simulate the physics of the continuum. The aim is to change the way that 
computational scientists develop their models, so that their relationship to computer scientists can be 
changed, in such a way as to enable computer scientists “not to have to know” about the 
mathematics of the simulation in order to be able to work on the problem of how to run its software 
on computer hardware. The research project has thus opened up the institutional question of whether 
or not it is a problem that there is limited communicability between computer science and 
computational science disciplines, and whether a technical “paradigm shift” might prepare the 
ground for a new, much closer, relationship.
“The mathematical skills that go into [computer science] are what I would describe as being 
“discrete”: set theory, counting, combinatorics, graph theory... Whereas scientific computing 
[i.e. computational science] is very much about differential equations. That is the starting 
point. You have to discretise [the equations] to put it on a computer because there is no 
continuum on a computer chip. In a maths department they teach both types of mathematics 
but in a computer science department they would only teach the discrete side of things 
because that is the foundation of it.” (CE)
The possibilities for utilising the latest optimisation tricks are therefore limited because many of the 
techniques of the computer scientist would risk “breaking the abstractions” within the code. This 
barrier between computer science and computational science is just one instance of a practical 
limitation on individual expertise. Very few scientists are able to straddle the two disciplines. It is 
therefore important to see the technologies developed as part of the automated code generation 
project as social technologies as much as they are calculating machines. They facilitate new kinds of 
collaboration between different kinds of scientists, new ways to integrate different kinds of work.
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“The amount of stuff that a PhD student needs to have in their head to do this stuff is getting 
unmanageable. And not just the PhD student. People who work in these fields need more 
information than they can reasonably expect to have mastery of. So part of this [project] is 
carving up the fields so that people who are experts in something can bring their expertise to 
the problem.” (WS)
The automated code generation project is aiming to introduce a higher level of programming 
language (UFL), in which the computational scientist would write the core mathematics of their 
numerical methods. This discretisation scheme would then be parsed by a system that would analyse 
its structure such that it can be optimised for the specific kind of hardware that it will run on, 
automatically generating code that is amenable to all the latest techniques. When the hardware 
changes, this intermediary system can be changed accordingly, without requiring a rewrite of the top 
level mathematics. “I see this as an opportunity to specialise, not a dumbing down. It is an 
opportunity to get computer scientists involved, especially compiler experts” (WS). The field could 
become even more interdisciplinary, enabling compiler experts to participate, producing simulations 
at the very cutting edge of advances in computer science.
Figure 12: Changes in disciplinary interface anticipated by the code generation project
In this case, the project emerges from the urgency of radical technical change. Several years ago, 
processors stopped getting faster, due largely to thermodynamic constraints, so the computer 
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hardware industry started to turn to increasingly parallel architectures428. This preserved Moore's 
Law, but it creates a headache for programmers. Rather than having a machine that gets faster at 
doing a calculation as new hardware is developed, we have machines that can do more and more 
concurrent calculations at the same speed. Contemporary supercomputers comprise thousands of 
such “cores”. This is one of the biggest current headaches for large scale simulation, because running 
a simulation on eight cores as opposed to one will not give an 8-fold increase in speed if at any point 
within the calculation one processor has to wait for another to be finished with its calculation before 
it can proceed. This has been a huge problem, for example, for the UK Met Office GCM (General 
Circulation Model), and will only get worse as new architectures exploit possibilities for 
parallelization on a much larger scale. But these problems are nothing compared with what looks 
likely with the next generation of architectures, a change in technical condition, which may force 
fundamental changes in how computational scientists write and work with their codes. Looking 
towards this uncertain future, the Met Office is one of the organisations funding the AMCG 
automated code generation project, with a view to exploring possibilities for its next but one 
dynamic core rewrite.
“The design brief is “must run on whatever [hardware] the Met Office is running on in 
2019,” about which we and they have no clue. Well, we have very rough ideas about the 
general direction and one of the issues is that by 2019 the Met Office might not even get to 
procure the machine [currently they have their own 'in house' supercomputer used for both 
their weather and climate simulations]. There might be some big machine which is either a 
European weather resource of some description or it might be a UK national resource of 
some description. The Met Office is part of the Ministry of Defence... it is possible that they 
might have to share with other bits of defence. And in either case they might not get to 
design it. The performance portability thing we are trying to make work here is something 
that is going to become very important for them.” (WS)
“Portability” is one of the key concepts explored through this research. Investigation begins from the 
fact that exactly how software systems can best be rendered portable, and thus durable in the face of 
hardware variability, is not something that is well known. This research is intervening in the very 
heart of the accomplishment of computational science, studying the systems used, and their potential 
reorganisation in order to bring new technologies and new disciplinary specialisms into the fold. It is 
fundamental “science of method” research.
Computational science exists within a shifting landscape of technologies. Workability is not 
something that can be established and assured for the future. It must be continually maintained in a 
dynamic milieu, and as we have seen with these radical upheavals, past and future, in the nature of 
research itself, this whole field of practice is as dynamic as are its conditions. It is also not only a 
case of shifts elsewhere causing consequent shifts in research practice, but pre-emptive 
transformations based on early tremors and warning signs. Research responds not only to the open 
428 Sutter, ‘The Free Lunch Is Over’.
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future of its accomplishments, but also to the open future of the wider frame in which are seen feint 
glimmers of transformed conditions of its possibility.
  8.9 Habitability
We can grasp these various dimensions of workability with the concept of “habitability” proposed by 
Richard P. Gabriel. Habitability captures something of the overall effect of contrary pressures, and 
the negotiations through which workability is maintained. 
Gabriel's concept emerges from a critique of what he saw as an unquestioned and deeply problematic 
assumption, shared by many programmers, about what it is that software developers are doing. Most, 
he says, have a “monumental” model. The software is going to be a perfect and magnificent final 
product, and all the work that goes into it is oriented towards creating this product. But, he says, this 
isn't really representative. Very little software is ever finished and left alone. Most software is 
continually modified429. This change of emphasis flags up the importance of software as an 
environment for the developer's work, something that is often hidden behind concerns about the 
experience of the end user. “Habitability makes a place liveable, like home. And this is what we want 
in software – that developers feel at home, can place their hands on any item without having to think 
deeply about where it is”430.
 “Programs live and grow,” he says, and instead of being all about a monumental final product, “their 
inhabitants – the programmers – need to work with that program the way the farmer works with the 
homestead”431. A house is built, and then maybe a storage shed. Later, a barn is built, and then 
maybe an extension for grandma. The whole lot needs to remain coherent, but it also needs to remain 
open for further changes. You may, in the end, get a less effective configuration of buildings than if 
you had started with foreknowledge of all the requirements that would stack up over time. You may 
end up having to pull the barn down and rebuild it elsewhere because it no longer makes sense. But 
the point is that you cannot know beforehand how things will grow, and the important thing is not so 
much the efficiency of any “final” state of affairs (after all, at what point would we decide we have 
reached such a state?); it is that at each point along the way, as the structures lived and grew, the 
environment was effectively good to live in.
What Gabriel points out about software in general is even more true of scientific software. As 
Rheinberger has pointed out, change is an essential feature of productive research. 
“Unprecedented events are about things and concatenations not sought for. They come as a 
surprise but nevertheless do not just happen. They are made to happen through the inner 
429 Matsumoto, ‘Treating Code as an Essay’, 478.
430 Gabriel, Patterns of Software, 11.
431 Ibid., 12.
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workings of the experimental machinery for making the future. And yet they may commit 
experimenters to completely changing the direction of their research activities”432. 
Gabriel echoes this sentiment, but for pragmatic rather than epistemic reasons. “Software needs to be 
habitable because it always has to change. Software is subject to unpredictable events: Requirements 
change because the marketplace changes, competitors change, parts of the design are shown to be 
wrong by experience, people learn to use the software in ways not anticipated”433. All the 
materialities discussed in this chapter speak to the habitability of the social and technical fields in 
which scientific research is done.
Scientific software is very rarely developed to any kind of specification434. Indeed, where 
specifications dominate software cultures, it is hard to see the creative side of development 
practice435. In opening up this inherent indeterminacy and openness, scientific software lets us see 
creativity in greater clarity. It serves as a very good example of the kind of thing Gabriel is interested 
in, the kind of code that is never finished, nor is it crafted all along by a pre-set idea of its 
destination. Easterbrook and Johns' study of the development practices around the UK Met Office 
Unified Model concluded that this work bore closest resemblance to elements of Open Source 
development and the Agile school of thought436. Agile methodologies are constructed around the 
premises set out in the influential “Agile Manifesto”, which is based on a rejection of predetermining 
projects with a prior specification, suggesting instead that it is better to keep things open, following 
an iterative cycle as the customer and developers revise their expectations in the course of things. 
Far from predetermining the product at the start of the development process, the manifesto's 
signatories declare that they “[w]elcome changing requirements, even late in development. Agile 
processes harness change for the customer's competitive advantage”437. 
While it is not usually developed with any idea of competitive advantage in mind, scientific software 
is necessarily agile, because it is funded by lots of small projects that contribute iteratively to the 
building of the larger whole. It is agile because it is rare to set out completely clear goals for a 
project at the start. It is very interesting that one of the original authors of the manifesto, Brian 
Marick, recently claimed that “the Agile style of work is readily and satisfyingly described by the 
terminology of Andrew Pickering's The Mangle of Practice”438. It is revealing that an account of 
scientific practice, in which software did not play a major role, should resonate so with this 
movement, which was itself born from the acknowledgement of the idiosyncrasies of actual software 
practice, compared with the rigidities of the plans and goals managers attempt to formulate around it.
432 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 134.
433 Gabriel, Patterns of Software, 13.
434 Segal and Morris, ‘Developing Scientific Software’, 18.
435 Evens, ‘Object-Oriented Ontology’.
436 Easterbrook and Johns, ‘Engineering the Software for Understanding Climate Change’.
437 Beck et al., ‘Manifesto for Agile Software Development’.
438 Marick, ‘A Manglish Way of Working’, 185.
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An agile approach is one that embraces change, and that embraces uncertainty, as parts of what 
makes the process of creating software interesting and productive. In contrast, for traditional, non-
agile approaches, change and uncertainty are seen as threats to success. This fits beautifully with the 
aspects of scientific practice that I develop in the next chapter, which looks at the key role of 
openness to surprise in research. The malleability projects, allowing goals to be redrawn according 
to what emerges in phenomenotechnical practice, the “objective meditation” of work in the 
laboratory.
“Habitability” captures that side of workability that renders big software systems efficacious. It is 
when software development becomes an un-inhabitable environment that its efficacy as a material to 
think with is compromised. And these threats come from all sides. “Software is hard”439. Threats 
come from the success-driven expansion of software rendering it brittle. But they also come from the 
reaction to this, from the wholesale bureaucratisation of research practice. They come from the 
growth of the research group and its response to its changing formation. But they also come from 
outside, from technical conditions originating elsewhere in industry, in the wider world to which 
scientific practice is intimately connected. The experience of scientists at AMCG seems to me to be 
one of treading fine lines, working to preserve that space in-between, a balance in which good 
creative research can continue to be done on a daily basis.
  8.10 Conclusion
The sense of “materiality” here has been necessarily vague, spanning concepts such as 
“workability”, “habitability” and “brittleness”. Each of these plays on intuitive metaphors, 
attempting to grasp something of the tangible reality of doing scientific research. The materiality in 
question is something akin to that described by Rheinberger, when he states that “[m]y emphasis is 
on the materialities of research... I would like to convey a sense of what it means for the participants 
in the endeavour to be engaged in epistemic practices, that is, in irrevocably experimental 
situations”440. It is this sense that I have been attempting to convey in this chapter, but to build on 
Rheinberger's approach, because it is the distinctive materialities of different fields of research that 
we can capture by complementing the existing studies of laboratory practices with new studies of 
what it is like to do science with software.
Habitability extends the concept of workability and of Knuuttila's conception of models as epistemic 
artefacts. It draws these concepts closer to a framework of practice because it moves us away from 
looking at a model as a singular thing, with its own properties, and towards a broader environment in 
which research takes place. This environment brings together technologies, artefacts, concerns, and 
embodied orientations into the comprehensive field of practice that is constitutive for the unfolding 
of research in real time that we may call its practical reason.
439 Donald Knuth, quoted in Rosenberg, Dreaming in Code, iii.
440 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 26.
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 9 Stability and Surprise
  9.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters have taken a tour around the various materials (visual, textual, 
computational) that furnish the computational science laboratory with the means to work and to get a 
grip on itself. In this final chapter we return to some key theoretical questions: What is the 
relationship between the stability of the systems of research that get assembled around scientific 
projects and on the other hand the power of that research to destabilise, to produce surprising 
results? In grasping surprise, novelty, and the lacks and absences through which new and surprising 
events emerge, we reach to the heart of the temporality of scientific practice, and start to find 
tentative grounds that set science apart from other activities.
The first three sections look at how stability is produced in the laboratory setting, starting with an 
analysis of two images of technology theorised by Gilbert Simondon. I use these images to 
conceptualise the technical dimension of science in terms of the regularities of practice. I then will 
relate this discussion to one of the central aspects of scientific work, the production of stability by 
the careful measuring and balancing of the unknown. The unknown threatens stability by introducing 
a precariousness to research, but through incorporating these instabilities into its fold, capitalising on 
their potentialities as generators of surprises, modelling becomes efficacious as a research practice. It 
becomes hopeful and exciting, a generator of innovations.
The remaining sections attempt to draw out the ways in which surprise irrupts against this 
background, firstly in terms of the epistemic thing. This concept of Rheinberger's is the very material 
embodiment of the productive unknown in research, the thing that gathers attention around it, the 
motivating locus of promise for the future of research. While approximations serve as a mundane 
unknown used to construct systems of investigation, the epistemic thing is far from mundane, a very 
different sort of unknown, an inspiring and inviting unknown. With this concept, we grasp research's 
primary orientation, towards an open future of unanticipated events. The following sections analyse 
how such events can be identified, and trace their philosophical significance, leading towards the 
conclusion of the thesis as a whole, in which we take stock of the widest conceptual implications of 
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the argument. The final consideration that brings us towards these grander conclusions is whether a 
concept of novelty in the present opens the door to a new concept of the scientific real, a capacity to 
be other immanent to things, displacing ideas of a hidden domain of nature to which we have only 
partial access.
  9.2 Regularity and technology
“Research produces futures,” says Rheinberger, “and it rests on differences of outcome. In contrast, 
technical construction aims at assuring presence, and it rests on identity of performance”441. 
Rheinberger will thus criticise ideas of technoscience for “the tendency to lump together what should 
be understood in interaction”442. He points to the intuitive difference: technical activities produce 
reliable pre-determined outcomes, whereas research opens a space in which what happens is in some 
fundamental respect unanticipated. This interplay of repetition and difference is at the heart of 
scientific research, but it is an interplay, not a complete merger443. Technology is found throughout 
science, but what is its role in practice?
The first thing to note is that we must be cautious of assigning a singular essence to the technical. In 
a piece unpublished in his lifetime, Gilbert Simondon identifies two forms of technology that 
provide powerful “cognitive schemas” for thought: “technology manifests in successive waves a 
power of analogical interpretation that is sui generis; indeed, it is not hemmed in by the limits of 
repartition of essences or of domains of reality”444. Practice is technical, following this kind of 
analysis, where it exhibits a technical form. The first schema such technologies provide is that of the 
Cartesian mechanism:
“A building, stone upon stone, row upon row, in a transfer of the “certum quid et 
inconcussum”, – the resistance of the stone of the foundations – all the way to the top, 
through successive levels that each act as the foundation for the immediately following 
higher level. This intelligibility of the transfer without losses that mechanizes ideally and 
analogically (but also in reality, by virtue of the Cartesian conception of knowledge) all the 
modes of the real, applies not only to the RES EXTENSA but also to the RES COGITANS: 
the “long chains of reasons” carry out a “transport of evidence” from the premises to the 
conclusion, just like a chain carries out a transfer of forces from the anchoring point to the 
last link ”445.
Not only do machines provide the background of reliability against which scientific activity can 
make its mark, they also provide the resources for thinking of reliability in the first place, for 
thinking about consequence, transfer and repetition. But practices that are completely mechanically 
441 Ibid., 31–32.
442 Ibid., 31; see, for example, Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse; Law, Aircraft 
Stories; Hayles, Nanoculture.
443 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 79; cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition.
444 Simondon, ‘Technical Mentality’, 18.
445 Ibid.
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regular harbour little of the openness of research. Research is indeed highly regulated, but it is also 
excessive. It can take unpredictable twists and turns as the things in its domain manifest their 
capacities to take researchers off guard, to surprise them and lead them down fresh avenues446.
“We are confronted with a seeming paradox: the realm of the technical is a prerequisite of 
scientific research. On the other hand and at any time, the technical conditions tend to 
annihilate the scientific objects in the sense attributed to this notion. The solution to the 
paradox is that the interaction between scientific object and technical conditions is eminently 
nontechnical in its character. Scientists are, first and foremost, bricoleurs (tinkerers), not 
engineers. In its nontechnicality, the experimental ensemble of technical objects transcends 
the identity condition of its parts”447.
This passage needs some commentary. The bricoleur and engineer are figures from Levi-Strauss's 
famous essay The Science of the Concrete, in which he opposes mythical thought (the bricoleur/a 
tinkerer or handyman) to Western thought (the engineer). Levi-Strauss says:
“Mythical thought, that 'bricoleur', builds up structures by fitting together events, or rather 
the remains of events, while science, 'in operation' simply by virtue of coming into being, 
creates its means and results in the form of events, thanks to the structures which it is 
constantly elaborating and which are its hypotheses and theories”448.
Rheinberger swaps things around. For him, the scientist is the bricoleur, and it is bricolage that 
produces events449. The reason of science is not a rationalisation, an elaboration of structures. Nor is 
it a structure built from the empirical. It is a creative tinkering making space for novelty. Scientific 
work is indeed carried out through technical apparatuses, machines, data-readings, and all the 
regularities and repetitiveness of the mechanistic schema. But as bricolage, it subjects these many 
regularities to a procedure, a tinkering, a play, that breaks the repetition, concerned less with the 
extension of structures, but rather with creating a play between their many dimensions such that 
surprising and interesting results may be on the cards. 
The mechanism schema captures the efficacy of techniques and routines in the laboratory, 
procedures that can be “black-boxed” because they harbour little further interest. But we should not 
leave our discussion of the technical here. Science is technical not simply because it employs 
technologies. It is also technical because what is set in motion by practical processes of bricolage are 
systems for research, complex dynamic wholes of techniques and procedures that exhibit a kind of 
self-regulation. Here we start to tap into an image of technology that is much more contemporary: 
the cybernetic system.
“Cybernetics, which was born from the mathematisation of the automatic regulation 
apparatuses [dispositifs] – particularly useful for the construction of automatic equipment of 
airplanes in flight – introduces into this the recurring aim of information on a relay apparatus 
446 Latour, Aramis, 72.
447 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 32.
448 Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, 22.
449 See also Knorr, ‘Tinkering Toward Success’.
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as the basic schema that allows for an active adaptation to a spontaneous finality. This 
technical realization of a finalized conduct has served as a model of intelligibility for the 
study of a large number of regulations--or of regulation failures--in the living, both human 
and non-human, and of phenomena subject to becoming, such as the species equilibrium 
between predators and preys, or of geographical and meteorological phenomena: variations 
of the level of lakes, climatic regimes”450. 
While mechanism gave an image of regularity, cybernetic systems give an image of system-level 
relative regulation, extending to unstable and mutating systems that remain systematic insofar as 
they maintain relative coherence within a changing environment. Here, rather than being the 
mechanical return of the same, it is the interplay of stability and instability that is critical. Whereas 
the mechanism schema gave an image of complete transferral of forces, this system-based schema 
embraces the complexity and mess of the world, accounting for the ability of systems to maintain 
integrity despite changing pressures from the outside, or to shift as a result towards new regimes of 
stability. Here it is the system of research as a whole that has a self-reproducing rhythm, not any 
single constituent part. For Rheinberger, one of the key features of experimental systems is their self-
reproductive capacity, dynamic systems endowed of their own “intrinsic time”451. The schema is 
readily apparent in one of his most evocative passages:
“Basically, there is no all-encompassing theoretical framework, no overarching political 
program, no homogenizing social context effective enough to pervade and coordinate this 
universe of drifting, merging, and bifurcating [experimental] systems. Where the systems do 
get linked, the links do not form stable connections; rather, transient interfaces are generated 
by the differential reproduction of the systems and the constellation of their ages. There is no 
common ground, source, or principle of development from which they would all spring, no 
hierarchy in which they would all be encapsulated. The constitution and constellation of 
differently aged experimental systems as a whole is u-topic and a-chronic. It is a de-centred 
reticulum, a rhizomatic structure in which connecting capillaries and anastomoses constantly 
are formed and dissolved and where attractors permanently shift”452.
When we look at the overall self-reproduction of systems of research, we find no straightforward 
repetition of the same. While a stabilised piece of laboratory apparatus may provide a reliable 
measure every time it is used, the investigative milieu of which it is a part is much more dynamic. It 
self-regulates in response to many different kinds of influence and tends towards local regimes of 
stability. It own internal trajectories, novel results obtained in another laboratory, a political 
intervention or an industrial invention may well cause great ripples, as practices reorientate with 
respect to the new circumstance. But the coherence of their system is manifest in their eventual 
assimilation of the difference, finding its place within other constellations of concepts and 
techniques.
450 Simondon, ‘Technical Mentality’, 18.
451 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 180.
452 Ibid., 181.
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For Rheinberger the important thing about an experimental system is that it maintains itself in a 
region of metastability. The dynamics of research involve a fine balance between regularity and 
difference, and it is here, far from equilibrium, that we see the possibility of the crucial open future-
bound striving that is at the heart of science.
“To remain productive in an epistemic sense, an experimental arrangement must be 
sufficiently open to generating unprecedented events by incorporating new techniques, 
instruments, model compounds, and semiotic devices. At the same time it must be 
sufficiently closed to prevent a breakdown of its reproductive coherence. It has to be kept at 
the borderline of its breakdown”453. 
Productive research occurs in arrangements that are composed of well-studied elements, reliable 
techniques, results and methods, but which also incorporate some quotient of objects or processes 
that are in important respects unknown, or at least unexplored in some fundamental dimension, 
harbouring a constitutive lack, a precariousness that is a source of threat and promise in equal 
measure. “If we accept the thesis that research is the basic procedure of the modern sciences,” says 
Rheinberger, “we are invited to explore how research gets enacted at the frontiers between the 
known and the unknown”454. There is no need for us to get hung up on questions about the nature of 
knowledge here. The known and unknown manifest themselves in terms of the stable and the 
unstable, a play of presence and lack at the heart of practice.
  9.3 Taming unknowns: approximations
Setting up a productive research situation means carefully opening a space of lack, of non-
knowledge. Research takes place in circumstances where there is enough unknown, or only vaguely 
known, to create a potentiality for surprise, but not so much that research practice is threatened by 
chaos. This productive situation is “metastable”, a precarious region of relative stability existing 
between poles of order and disorder, in which the system of research is kept from descending into 
chaos by self-regulating processes455.
 Against popular misconceptions that scientists deal in proof and certainty, Keller asserts that 
“uncertainty and doubt are the daily diet of scientific researchers ”456. In numerical simulation this 
situation is maintained by a number of measures that incorporate and “tame” ignorance, that 
domesticate it so that it becomes calculable and manipulable, that the right balance of determinacy 
and indeterminacy. At the heart of this is a complex scaffold of approximation that goes into creating 
a modelling framework. These “tame” errors made in the course of modelling are crucial in the way 
that this kind of research creates a space for surprise. In this respect, this discussion aims to build on 
the foundation established in chapters 6 and 8, in which we saw the constant attention devoted to 
453 Ibid., 80.
454 Ibid., 25.
455 Cf. Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos.
456 Keller, ‘What Are Climate Scientists to Do?’, 21.
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dealing with “wild” errors, bugs which creep in and threaten everything with their unknown 
consequences for the project. Approximations are more deliberately introduced but they nevertheless 
require a great deal of work if they are to be kept manageable.
Computational science begins from a mathematical treatment of the systems being modelled. An 
ocean, or river, or industrial apparatus, is idealised to the extent that it is taken to embody the 
solution to a system of equations. But this idealisation is not a transfer to a mental realm; it occurs in 
the reciprocal embodiment of the system into a series of mathematical and computational systems, 
rendering it manipulable for the researcher. The constituent imprecisions in this process are readily 
apparent in the simulation of fluids, because of the coexistence of different mathematical 
frameworks (molecular mechanics, continuum mechanics and even potentially quantum mechanics). 
The continuum equations are known to be inaccurate on certain scales of motion. They are also 
generally analytically intractable. Numerical simulation, to put it simply, is the use of computational 
methods to gain good approximate solutions to intractable problems. In this sense, it is possible to 
claim that all continuum simulations are wrong457. 
“In a way, your fluid is made up of lots and lots of little molecules, so it is a discrete system. 
You could, if it was possible, model each of those on a computer but there are way too many. 
So you make an approximation that these molecules are acting like a continuum. And then 
again [when you discretise these equations for the computer] you are moving back into a 
discrete system. It is only on really small scales that the first approximation breaks down.” 
(AY)
“I think the pure way of looking at it is if you associate the model with being the pure idea, 
the pure theoretical model. And if we are talking about oceans or nuclear reactors that is 
typically your partial differential equations – your calculus – something described in terms 
of calculus and in terms of the continuum. Then we discretise that model into a numerical 
discrete model, where we have rewritten it in terms of some discretisation or quanta... which 
makes it amenable to being run on a computer, makes it finite and so on. By this stage you 
have already incurred lots of errors. Your new numerical model is therefore only valid over a 
limited degree of physics because you had to make some compromises, and that is the point 
where you can program directly.” (NK)
Approximating starts from the very beginning of modelling, not just in terms of how to solve the 
equations, but also in terms of which equations, which “bits of physics”, are deemed appropriate to 
the problem in question, and hence what needs to be approximated in the first place.
“There is a quotation from Einstein that a model should be as simple as possible but not too 
simple. You are never going to want to throw in all the physics. It doesn't make sense if you 
are looking at an ocean problem to throw in a quantum physics model. The point is that you 
start off with your simplest possible model and then you throw in additional terms.” (TT) 
457 Turkle, Simulation and Its Discontents, 81.
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This exercise in building up approximations is not just a matter of pre-empting what will be needed. 
There is an experimental dialectic at work between the implementation of the model and the 
measurement of its imprecisions that feeds back into a process of revision and extension.
“So you look at where are the biggest mistakes that you are making, then you introduce that 
bit of physics, so your are increasing your model incrementally, and with that your model 
becomes more complex and more expensive to execute. So there is a balance here between 
feasibility and what errors you are willing to tolerate. We are dealing with a finite machine: 
people say we never have enough computing. You are always adding in that extra bit of 
physics that you will still be able to compute on the machines that you have.” (TT)
The continuum model of the problem, already an idealisation, is a huge generator of unknowns, and 
the exploration of this space involves constructing computational models that themselves balance 
further unknowns against each other. Approximations are made in several distinct ways, and the 
estimation of the error involved in each is one of the major themes of the science of method. In 
essence, there is no point in gaining accuracy in one part of the process if it will only be eclipsed by 
the cumulative effect of another error from elsewhere. During the 2010 training course for Fluidity 
developers, the overall error was broken down into four constituent components:
1. Spatial discretisation error: the error consequent from the division of the continuum of space 
into a mesh of polyhedra. Having more, smaller polyhedra would be a way to reduce this 
error, but this of course will require additional computing time.
2. Temporal discretisation error: the error from the division of time into a series of discrete 
steps. Taking smaller steps would likewise be the initial way to reduce this error. Again, this 
places more demands on the available computing resources.
3. Geometric error: the error that derives from the approximation of structures in space by 
boundaries within the mesh. For example, the sea floor and coastline in oceans simulations 
are highly topographically complex, and will be imperfectly resolved. On the other hand, 
some kinds of simulations will have a very small geometric error, when for example the 
problem is already an idealised one (e.g. backwards facing step), or when the domain 
modelled is particularly amenable to geometric approximation, such as in the case of some 
kinds of industrial machinery. Reducing this error can be done by gaining a better fit to the 
geometry, but this may be constrained by the information available rather than by the 
capability of the mesh to accurately resolve the features.
4. Algebraic error: the simulation ultimately comes down to the solution of a massive set of 
linear equations. These often can be solved precisely, but because an exact solution at this 
point would itself be only an approximation, algorithms are used which save computer 
resources by providing an approximate solution. What degree of accuracy is required is a 
question balanced against the errors already present from the other three factors.
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The study of approximations is a science of technical practice, research into the methods used to 
build computational models. Everything is bound to the fundamental practical issue of limited 
computer power. The driving principle is not so much to gain as good an approximation as possible, 
but rather to gain a “good enough” approximation for as little computer power as possible. 
“Ultimately everything boils down to solving a matrix. All the difficulties are captured in the 
word “approximation”, with linear solvers solving a big set of simultaneous equations and 
each of those are representing a physical process. You need to prioritise which ones are 
important, which ones to focus on more. The computer is very good at solving a linear 
matrix of simultaneous equations so we need to find a way to bring it down to the set of 
simultaneous equations that we think is the fastest to solve.” (AY)
Figuring out exactly what kind of stresses a given problem places on the scaffold of approximations 
is one of the key processes in this kind of research.
With a wide aspect ratio problem it could be that some values are very large and others are 
very small. You can also end up trying to solve for values that are very close to each other so 
it is more important to do it accurately. Even in trying to solve simultaneous equations you 
are again trying to make an approximation because usually it is too expensive to solve it 
exactly, although you can solve it exactly. (AY)
Many different kinds of techniques have been created and subjected to wide ranging analysis for the 
role they can play in balancing speed and error.
There are multigrid methods – geometric multigrid where you coarsen the domain, solve 
over that and then use that information to solve the next level down, and then down and 
down. There is some question about how much you iterate each level and whether you go 
down and up again or down and down to the smallest level. Fluidity has an algebraic 
multigrid which is similar but not in the spatial domain – you coarsen the matrix: you just 
give the solver a matrix and it might take out all the large values and then use that as a 
precondition to solve the next level down” (AY)
The key thing that renders this kind of error manageable and manipulable is its quantification. When 
working with algorithms, the error can often be calculated purely on paper. Other errors can are 
identified through more “experimental manipulations” and can only be approached by running 
simulations and comparing their results with other data458. For example, it is very common to run the 
same simulation several times with different mesh resolutions: some with a very fine mesh and then 
with coarser and coarser elements. This yields a statistical measure of how much the spatial and 
geometric errors are contributing to the general mix, and allows the researcher to find a good balance 
of speed and accuracy for subsequent simulation runs. 
“There is a trade off between computational costs and error that I would allow. So I can say 
“at this very fine resolution I get 85% the same as this other result but if I use a coarser 
resolution I lose some of the accuracy but it runs in half a day so if I use that I can do all 
these other runs and therefore I have used this one, the coarser resolution.” There is no point 
458 Galison, ‘Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone’, 137.
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in running a model which is very accurate and produces the real world or whatever you want 
beyond the accuracy that you even need and takes three months run. That is no use to no-
one. Because after all you are modelling. It is a representation of a process rather than an 
actual process.” (AN)
Developing novel strategies for modelling is often a matter of finding new ways to reduce errors 
which are comparatively computationally cheap. AMCG's flagship discretisation scheme is 
P1DGP2, an element type which combines piecewise linear discontinuous functions for pressure 
with continuous quadratics for velocity.
“Even though you are approximating a continuous function, if it jumps on a level that is 
smaller than the grid scale, you can represent it better with a discontinuous function than 
with a linear interpollant. What you can do instead with discontinuous elements you can get 
a much better answer.” (KU)
Other examples of quantifying error can be found in validation, where data output is compared with 
some empirical data. But even this data carries along its own sources of error, which also need to be 
folded into the mix.
“The problem is that you have errors on the parameters in a lab, so you might turn on the fan 
at 1 m/s but how accurate is that? We are talking about little tweaks so you have got that 
source of error you have got to contend with” (QS)
“If you say “I am 1% out from the right answer,” people say “The right answer? What is the 
right answer?” because I am comparing to experiments which in turn have an error or other 
models which have an error.” (AN)
Processes for quantifying error themselves harbour their own sources of error. A quest for total 
stability would be led down an infinite regress. But the key thing is that the system of research be 
made relatively stable, that it be stable enough. It may still be vague. It may still be unruly, but it is a 
manageable unruliness, a productive unruliness ready to be set into practice.
There is, however, between stability and instability, a more fundamental, more profound lack that 
underlies the whole enterprise, that gives it its drive and its fortitude, that orients it towards the 
future of its own unfolding. This is not a lack in the sense of an unobtainable entity, but rather a 
present absence of the thing that focusses attention, that sets the wheels of investigation in motion, 
that thing whose power, whose potential to be other, drives forward the very exercise of research. 
This is what Rheinberger calls the “epistemic thing”.
  9.4 The epistemic thing
The epistemic thing is the embodiment of the unknown as a locus of concern and attention, the 
central pivot for a scientific project. While the unknowns addressed above are subjected to 
procedures of management and measurement, carefully balanced as part of the research's own self-
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regulatory action, here the unknown is embodied in a thing, which provides a window onto an open 
future, a thing which inspires, motivates and drives investigation onwards.
The epistemic thing may help fill a gap in practice theory; in the 1980s, Sherry Ortner wrote that a 
“theory of practice requires some sort of theory of motivation ”459. With the epistemic thing, we start 
to grasp practice as something that involves orientations within a field of techniques, bodies and 
signs, an affective dimension that speaks of the way in which research is driven somewhere, heading 
somewhere, kept dynamic and hopeful, motivation beyond the planning for the future, beyond 
intentionality and beyond interest. It is the absent centre of scientific practice, the seed for the 
crystallisation of concern. 
For Knorr-Cetina it is this orientation towards things, and the interaction of things and practices 
associated with them, that marks research apart from other kinds of work. “Research work seems to 
be particular in that the definition of things, the consciousness of problems, etc., is deliberately 
looped through objects and the reaction granted by them”460. In this respect, Rheinberger's theory of 
epistemic things participates in the “object turn” in contemporary theory461. 
The epistemic thing is the focus of research. It is this thing's occurrence within a structure of concern 
which orients practice. It is important to note, however, that what Rheinberger is interested in is not a 
present Cartesian object. One of the classic ways to displace such a concept and to open up a more 
subtle understanding, is to turn to Heidegger's philosophy.
An epistemic thing is not what Heidegger called a present-at-hand object462. It is not a spatio-
temporal object unambiguously present and available for scrutiny. Such an object is hardly going to 
embody the kind of potential for surprise that is interesting for scientists. It is epistemic insofar as its 
presence and coherence are only fleetingly guaranteed. It is a risky object. Its existence is manifest in 
the potentiality to gather the concern of researchers around it, to co-ordinate efforts around a 
promising but non or not yet present centre, the promise of an immanent future. It is less an object 
than a “thing” in the sense that Heidegger gave the term in one of his later essays:
“The Old German word thing or dinc, with its meaning of a gathering specifically for the 
purpose of dealing with a case or matter, is suited as no other word to translate properly the 
Roman word res, that which is pertinent, which has a bearing... In English “thing” has still 
preserved the full semantic power of the Roman word: “He knows his things,” he understand 
the matters that have a bearing on him; “He knows how to handle things,” he knows how to 
go about dealing with affairs, that is, with what matters from case to case; “That's a great 
thing,” that is something grand (fine, tremendous, splendid), something that comes of itself 
and bears upon man”463.
459 Ortner, ‘Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties’, 151.
460 Knorr-Cetina, ‘Objectual Practice’, 184.
461 See, for example, Marres, Material Participation; Lash and Lury, Global Culture Industry; Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Brown, 
‘Thing Theory’; Pels, Hetherington, and Vandenberghe, ‘The Status of the Object’; Preda, ‘The Turn to Things’.
462 Heidegger, Being and Time, 68–69, 99–102.
463 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 173.
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This displacement of the Cartesian object, as object of knowledge, of perception or experience, for 
something more entwined in the structures of an already constituted world, has been picked up by 
Latour, who opposes things (“matters of concern”) to objects (“matters of fact”)464. “What would 
happen, I wonder, if we tried to talk about the object of science and technology... as if it had the rich 
and complicated qualities of the celebrated Thing?”465 It is important to note that Heidegger believed 
that science only dealt with things as objects, as objects to be fixed in a knowing gaze, torn apart, 
charted, examined and depleted466. But he did not give scientific practice the same depth of attention 
he invested in artistic or architectural practices. It goes wholly against his intention to enlist his 
discussion of the thing into a theory of scientific research, but nevertheless I would maintain that this 
is where his philosophy can be put to the best use. But what is the relationship between these elusive 
things and the potential to surprise that is to important to the dynamics of research?
When he put forward his theory of the tacit dimension of scientific practice, Polanyi heralded it as 
the key to resolving Meno's paradox, a dilemma that had famously been posed by Plato467. Likewise, 
this paradox provides an excellent window into the theoretical function of the concept of the 
epistemic thing. How do you recognise a new productive problem that is deserving of your scientific 
attention? How do you find an avenue to explore worthy of concerted effort? Either the problem is 
recognisable, in which case it is trivial since being already known sufficiently to be recognised it is 
thus not authentically new, or the problem is unrecognisable, in which case it would be genuinely 
novel, but ungraspable in our present situation. How do you grasp an unknown as that thing towards 
which your project will strive to realise? In contrast to Plato's theory, in which he resolves the 
paradox by claiming that new knowledge is never really new because it is gained through anamnesis 
(literally “unforgetting”), Polanyi espouses a theory of embodied, tacit knowledge, “tacit 
foreknowledge of yet undiscovered things”468. There exists an informal, unspeakable side of practice 
resistant to being put into words, that nevertheless operates as the strongest of guides.
“The anticipation of discovery, like discovery itself, may turn out to be a delusion... To 
accept the pursuit of science as a reasonable and successful enterprise is to share the kind of 
commitments on which scientists enter by undertaking this enterprise. You cannot formalize 
the act of commitment, for you cannot express your commitment non-committally. To 
attempt this is to exercise the kind of lucidity which destroys its subject matter.”469
Rheinberger's theory of the epistemic thing does much of the same work as Polanyi's notion of tacit 
knowledge, with the important difference that while Polanyi is mainly concerned with embodiment, 
Rheinberger also wishes to stress the constitutive role of material practices: 
464 Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?’.
465 Ibid., 233.
466 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’.
467 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 22.
468 Ibid., 23; it is also worth noting that the anamnesia solution can still be accepted, in the work of Bernard Stiegler, for whom 
anamnesia captures precisely that manner in which large amounts of knowledge is implicitly stored in technical systems, which 
are for him, memory systems, tertiary retentions in the terms of Husserl: Stiegler, Technics and Time.
469 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 25.
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“It is in the fabric of properly “tuned” experimental systems that scientific events 
materialize. It is in the nature of an event that it cannot be anticipated. Novelties are always 
the result of spatiotemporal singularities. Experimental systems are precisely the 
arrangements that allow scientists to create spatiotemporal singularities. They allow 
researchers to arrive at unprecedented, surprising results”470. 
Rheinberger aims to capture this sense of temporal unfolding, of the scientists' relationship to the 
uncertain in the future of their investigations. He thus writes of epistemic things, scientific objects 
which “present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible vagueness. This vagueness is inevitable 
because, paradoxically, epistemic things embody what one does not yet know”471. He stresses the 
actual openness and vagueness of things. Lack of knowledge has long been considered a primary 
motivation for activities of model building472, but Rheinberger will extend this principle as 
something at the heart of research in general. 
The vagueness, or lack of presence of epistemic things is not the kind of vagueness that inhabits 
everyday experience. It is a particular vagueness that is the result of painstaking work in assembling 
systems of investigation around a common core, which concerns scientists in that it is suggestive of 
a door onto a future of new findings, new ways of doing things, new concerns. It draws attention in 
and motivates practice. Knorr-Cetina describes it as “a lack in completeness of being that takes away 
much of the wholeness, solidity, and the thing-like character they have in our everyday 
conception”473. This theory of epistemic things draws our attention to the nonplaces of research, the 
implicit foundation, the lack that serves as wellspring of exploration and experimentation474. It 
requires us to look at the plurality of practices in science, because epistemic things exist as such only 
inasmuch as a system of practice is assembled around them. We thus replace our understanding of 
the object of science as something objectified with an epistemic thing as a nexus of concern that by 
definition eludes objectification.
Epistemic things in applied modelling are constituted where computational science borders empirical 
studies and experimental practices. Oceanographic studies of ocean currents use global complexes of 
sensing apparatus to trace temperatures, velocities and salinities across the oceans. These provide an 
indication of the types and variations of currents and an indication of the mechanisms that drive 
them. Experimental studies also feed in to this area, although it is very difficult to scale down these 
kinds of phenomena such that they can be represented in a laboratory. Numerical simulations bring 
another, very different kind of approach to the table, conceptualising the ocean first and foremost as 
a mathematical system whose state space can be explored and probed through approximate solution 
on the computer. Epistemic things inhabit this between-space, this middle ground between practical 
systems of investigation that pose their object in very different manners and that probe it using very 
470 Rheinberger, ‘Experimental Complexity in Biology’, S246–S247.
471 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 28.
472 For example, Ehrenberg, ‘Models of Fact: Examples from Marketing’.
473 Knorr-Cetina, ‘Objectual Practice’, 190.
474 Cf. Bosteels, ‘Nonplaces’.
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different techniques. They embody the practical articulation of different kinds of research, the effect 
of which is a shared sense that despite differences, something exists in common between them. 
There is no privileged representation of the epistemic thing because none of the practices that are co-
ordinated around it has the authority to speak for all of them. Thus its curious non-presence that 
nevertheless motivates research.
Applied modelling, however, is not the only kind of research that gets done in computational 
physics. The other kind is what I called in section 2.14 a science of method, a science of modelling 
techniques. Here we see epistemic things emerge from technical conditions, and because these 
studies directly feed into the repository of modelling techniques, epistemic things often eventually 
return to the technical background. They are, however, like those in applied modelling, co-ordinated 
with other practices, with other kinds of modelling practice, with computer science, and with areas 
of applied mathematics such as linear algebra and graph theory.
In the research documented in this thesis, epistemic things exist where research practices assemble 
coherent systems of investigation around a focal point of concern. In computational science, this 
usually means bringing together and working on an assemblage of techniques within and outside the 
modelling framework, assembling data sets and qualitative descriptions of phenomena, mathematical 
results, hardware resources, supporting infrastructures, a group of scientists with relevant 
specialisms, and iterative systems of planning and management of the unfolding research. Epistemic 
things exist on many scales; they co-exist and interact. The investigation of the Severn Estuary that 
we encountered in chapter 4 opened onto an investigation of wetting and drying methods, and later 
turned into a study of optimisation techniques, eddies of “science of method” research that spun off 
from the central stream of research. This seems to be a very common feature of this kind of research, 
where the central focus point of work shifts as the investigation of the original problem reveals 
certain techniques to be crucial factors. These techniques, not yet reliable as mechanisms for the 
study of the original problems, invite exploration, and draw applied modelling into a science of 
method. Eventually, their productivity as a nexus of concern is on the wane and they can be 
concretised, “black-boxed”, their realisations in code becoming conditions for the exploration of 
further issues. Epistemic things may, as Rheinberger points out, “become obsolete as targets of 
research” but they may also “become transformed into stable, technical objects that may define the 
boundary conditions of further epistemic objects”475. The integration of what once offered open 
productive potential back into the circuits of the laboratory is an important process which keeps the 
systems of research dynamic. While it is very obvious that new computational methods will 
eventually become part of the technical background for further research, the same is also true of 
enterprises in applied modelling, which provide key test cases for grasping the effects (positive or 
negative) of future manipulations of the code, and which provide crucial validation resources, 
platforms of success to support the studies that follow. 
475 Rheinberger, ‘Reply to Bloor’, 407.
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At the very top level, almost all of the research at AMCG can be read as contributing, in one way or 
another, to an exploration of the Finite Element Method (FEM). In some scientific disciplines, 
particularly in structural engineering, this is one of the most well-established techniques available. 
Here it acts as a technical construction, routinely put to work to solve engineers' equations. It does 
not really harbour much mystery or potentiality. But research at AMCG transports this method in 
fluids applications, geophysical applications and radiation applications. Here it is much less certain 
what the effect of FEM will be. It remains to be seen what its effects will be when applied to many 
different problems. It is a nexus of hope to which all these scientists are committed, on which they 
stake their careers. We need to recognise that as much as it holds out promise, FEM equally harbours 
precariousness, the possibility that it turns out to have been a false hope, no longer interesting as a 
set of techniques. There may be fundamental obstacles that prevent it from living up to its heralding 
by scientists at AMCG as a “next generation” method. It may, alternatively, become uninteresting 
because it has been supplanted by other techniques. But more likely it will eventually become 
exhausted as an epistemic thing at the point where it has been extensively applied and studied, at 
which point it will continue to serve researchers but as a tool for studying other kinds of things. 
In giving us this thing-based theory of research orientation, Rheinberger is perhaps the best 
contemporary heir to the historical epistemologists' theories of “the open-ended future in which new 
objects and systems of concepts are developed”476. His theory is productively read as going beyond 
Bachelardian phenomenotechnique, because while Bachelard stressed the temporality of scientific 
practice in his philosophy of error, his was a largely backward-facing and negative theory. 
Rheinberger on the other hand directs us towards the hope embodied in scientific orientations. Like 
other post- or non-positivists, both thinkers disavow any idea of a pre-set destination for scientific 
research, but Rheinberger gives us the sense of the inspiration such an open future presents, and lets 
us understand something of the motivation that drives research onwards.
  9.5 Discerning error and event
The epistemic thing embodies the potentiality of the unexpected, the immanent future in research. In 
this respect, it gives us a thing-based theory of surprise. This idea of novelty is “social”, in the sense 
that it locates novelty outside the creative mind, in the wider domain of practice. It also therefore 
moves away from the idea of lone geniuses. But in being social, it attributes central importance to 
indeterminacy of practice itself, and refuses to explain novelties as an inevitable product of a 
historical moment477. 
However, there is nothing straightforward about surprise. Events may turn out as novelties openings 
doors to new lines of enquiry and new ways of doing things. But this is not the only thing that can 
happen. They may also manifest themselves as problematic disruptions of the research process, as 
476 Hyder, ‘Foucault, Cavaillès, and Husserl’, 123.
477 See Simonton, Creativity in Science, 3–13 for an interesting typology of perspectives on creativity.
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threats to its stability. This two-fold character has been one of the most important results to come out 
of what has become known as the “sociology of expectations”478. Michael, Wainwright and Williams 
identify the affective side of this negative possibility as, “in counterpoint to the hopes embodied in 
expectations, a wariness that one might be embroiled in hype”479. A novel result might turn out to 
have been an error all along, and thus nothing warranting getting excited about. Hope and wariness, 
inspiring novelty and destabilising error are two sides of a coin that at the point of the emergence of 
an event is still balanced on its edge.
There is no simple or straightforward mechanism for the discrimination between good and bad 
surprises. This has long been pointed out in science studies480. For Polanyi, one major aspect of 
laboratory routine is the suppression of surprising results, their interpretion as errors. If what 
Rheinberger calls “unprecedented events” are going to emerge, it must happen against the grain of 
this tendency.
“The process of explaining away deviations is in fact quite indispensable to the daily routine 
of research. In my laboratory I find the laws of nature formally contradicted at every hour, 
but I explain this away by the assumption of experimental error. I know that this may cause 
me one day to explain away a fundamentally new phenomenon and to miss a great 
discovery. Such things have often happened in the history of science”481.
In the next section I provide an example from AMCG, CE's study of discretisation schemes, in 
which we see the initial response to a surprising result being the assumption that this was a sign that 
something had gone wrong in the set-up of the simulation. Even with skill and experience the 
discrimination between events and errors is provisional and precarious. Hacking points to the role of 
practice in this context. He argues that this skill cannot be based on the scientist internalising an 
exhaustive theory of experiment. It cannot be explained by the idea that biologists, for instance, 
when they use microscopes, have a theory of optics that lets them see the artefacts as artefacts. 
“Hardly any biologists know enough optics to satisfy a physicist. Practice – and I mean in 
general doing, not looking – creates the ability to distinguish between visible artifacts of the 
preparation or the instrument, and the real structure that is seen with the microscope. This 
practical ability breeds conviction”482. 
The skill of distinguishing the two is not something that can be looked up in a rule book, or 
explained by reference to theoretical knowledge, but rather requires the kind of engagement with the 
environment that develops practical sensitivities. And these moments are always to some extent 
irreducibly tenuous, precarious, improvised. At the heart of Bloor's famous symmetry principle is 
precisely this injunction, to avoid assuming that there is any outside objective ground for discerning 
478 See, for example, Brown and Michael, ‘A Sociology of Expectations’; Borup et al., ‘The Sociology of Expectations in Science 
and Technology’.
479 Michael, Wainwright, and Williams, ‘Temporality and Prudence’, 377.
480 See, for example, Pickering, Constructing Quarks, 9.
481 Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, 31.
482 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 191.
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between error and event483. The fact that one surprise ended up being a motor of success and another 
swept under the carpet as an instance of equipmental error cannot be explained by the one being real 
and the other an artefact. Such a tactic would assume a retrospective position that begs the whole 
question of how, in the actual happening of research, the line between the two gets drawn. To 
explore this work of discrimination of event and error, and to look further into the management of 
error, we need to look at the immanent unfolding of practice.
  9.6 Surprising results in practice
“[S]urprising events in research are often something to which scientists aspire in their 
activities since it means a window to new and unexpected knowledge. Scientific methods 
thus should allow researchers to surprise themselves as well as their peers”484.
One of my informants' stories illustrates the role of surprise in practice nicely. CE is a member of the 
group who largely works on fundamental discretisation methods. While any narrative can be 
expected to fail in capturing the real indeterminacy of what happens in the research process, this 
account gives a glimpse of what could otherwise have been lost.
“The thing about the finite element method is that you represent the solution, so the wind, 
velocity, temperature, whatever, as some kind of way of interpolating between points. And 
then once you have described what you want these functions to look like, so whether they 
have jumps between edges or whether they are quadratic or linear or whatever degrees of 
freedom there are, after that it is all pretty much well defined and you just throw that into the 
computer and the very flexible code generates the matrices to actually implement the 
method. So the actual properties of whether it is a good or a bad choice [of discretisation] 
depends on analysing mathematically how those functions interact.” (CE)
He went on to describe a particular result that was significant for the unanticipated nature of its 
eventual outcome: “In this case CK chose a particular way of discretising the winds and the pressure 
that makes it particularly nice for geophysical applications, so oceans and atmosphere and things like 
that”. CK's choice was based on an unformalised intuition. Looking at the equations, a particular 
discretisation seemed to harbour the right kind of potentiality. “You look at terms and you want them 
to have a sort of similar representation. He had the intuition at that level” (CE).
Later on, CE collaborated with his colleague, WS, in order to investigate the method further. “WS 
and I did some numerical investigations... and it was working kind of unaccountably well” (CE). 
This was an instance of a method which works well, and it can be shown that it works well, but 
nobody has as yet investigated exactly why it is so good. This is the case for many of the methods 
used at AMCG, but as NK pointed out, this kind of empirical reliability can be open to question. But 
on the other hand, pressures to generate new applications often lead to these avenues being 
unexplored.
483 Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 177.
484 Gross, Ignorance and Surprise, 1.
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“When you are developing algorithms you could in principle go and prove why it works so 
well. So there is suspicion of methods that work well but its not clear why. If you have an 
algorithm and proved something you know it is true. If you develop an algorithm and you 
demonstrate that it works well on that problem all you have demonstrated is that it has 
worked well on that problem. You don't know if it will work as well on other problems. You 
could sit down for a year and work out and prove why. But that isn't going to push you 
forward, so there is a conflict there. We could stop working on fluidity now in terms of 
developing it and just analyse it, improve it, optimise it.” (NK)
In the case of CE's discretisation, it happened that he stumbled on a surprising phenomenon that led 
him towards a proof, one which would not require this year of working, leading him instead on a 
shorter route.
 “Then what happened was that a few years ago... I had a spare week and WS suggested 
some tests that I could run [on the new discretisation] and in these tests it should stay steady. 
Typically there will be some oscillations and how steady it stays is a measure of how good it 
is for atmosphere and ocean modelling. So I coded it up, ran it in this environment in which 
it is very easy to throw these things together...”
“I ran the code and nothing was happening at all. It was staying completely flat. Because it 
was so steady I actually called WS in Vienna [he was at a conference] and said “There is a 
bug in the code! Can you help me?” When we looked at it a bit more we realised it was 
actually completely steady. A few weeks later I was stuck [in a hospital waiting room] and 
had a pen and paper and managed to work out a proof of why it actually should be 
completely steady. So once we had that we were able to show a lot of other things about it 
and that led to getting the funding for a new postdoc”
The immediate response to the surprising steadiness of the result was to take it as a sign that the code 
was broken, but when it was investigated further this opened the door to a surprisingly neat 
mathematical treatment. 
“In general, if you are lucky you might be able to prove some sort of bound on the amount 
of jigglyness [of the line that should remain steady]. But these things are typically much 
much harder than if it happens to be absolutely perfect. It is easier thing to manipulate 
equals relations than inequalities [less than/more than]. Typically when you are working 
with methods you have to do a lot of messing around with inequalities. All the most famous 
proofs of this kind of thing are very difficult and involve a sequence of about fourteen 
inequalities.” (CE)
The new method was chosen because it seemed likely to produce some interesting results when 
investigated further. It embodied the right kind of lack of knowledge that gives research its 
momentum. The tests were chosen for their ability to open out this potentiality and put the method 
on display. The research created a surprising result, but as CE remarked, there is a fine line between 
success and failure. He was not over-reacting by immediately assuming that something had gone 
wrong. Bugs crop up regularly when it is the fundamentals of the code that are being manipulated. 
But rather than seeing this as a deficiency, we can regard precariousness as a necessary precondition 
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for the production of genuine novelties, events which break with any preconception of what will 
happen. If research is so stable that errors could be ruled out, little space for novel and interesting 
results remains.
  9.7 The philosophy of unanticipated events
Scientific practice occurs within a non-foreclosed space, one in which unexpected twists and turns 
are able to play out. As outlined in chapter 3, it is always possible to undermine novelty by reading 
backwards from the result and thus seeing its seed in the past. But in the real time of research, the 
surprising result is not present in embryonic form. Its potentiality is not the potentiality of any 
determinate occurrence. Rather than calling it a possibility, we could name it a virtuality, in the sense 
that Gilles Deleuze gave to the term, when he wrote that “the virtual is not opposed to the real; it 
possesses a full reality by itself”485. The virtual is supposed to free us from thinking in terms of 
identity and resemblance, and turn instead to difference and repetition.
Such is the the defect of the possible: a defect which serves to condemn it as produced after 
the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it. The actualisation of 
the virtual, on the contrary, always takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation. 
Actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a 
principle. Actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense, 
actualisation or differenciation is always a genuine creation”486.
The relationship between potential and actual has been a subject of philosophical debate at least 
since Aristotle. While Deleuze, following Bergson, injects creativity into reality itself487, many other 
thinkers wish to conceptualise the new as a radical singular irruption. Alain Badiou, for example, 
presents us with a picture in which the event is an ontological rupture, a revolutionary break with the 
completely foreclosed and structured present situation488. This kind of theory of the event is the heir 
to structuralism, which originally established itself as a synchronic theory of the coherence of 
structures. It thus displaced rival evolutionary perspectives on language, a displacement that was 
won, however, “at the high price of ahistoricity”489, says François Dosse, a detachment of structure 
and change “that led to aporias because the links between diachrony and synchrony were not set in 
any dialectical relationship”490. In contrast to this stark opposition between structure and revolution, 
with Deleuze, and with a theory of practice, we can think about temporality and change in more 
modest terms. For Foucault, too, it is as important to avoid overemphasising the radical irruption of 
events as it is to avoid overemphasising the coherence of structure. 
485 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 263.
486 Ibid., 263–264.
487 Cf. Bergson, Creative Evolution.
488 Badiou, Being and Event.
489 Dosse, History of Structuralism, Volume 1, 48.
490 Ibid.
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“One can agree that structuralism formed the most systematic effort to evacuate the concept 
of the event, not only from ethnology but from a whole series of other sciences and in the 
extreme case from history... The important thing is to avoid trying to do for the event what 
was previously done with the concept of structure. It's not a matter of locating everything on 
one level, that of the event, but of realising that there are actually a whole order of levels of 
different types of events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to 
produce effects”491.
From the point of view of practice, the situation of research is not one of a wholly fixed or structured 
world, but rather one full of mess, of complexity, of vagueness. It is a world that supports relative 
orderings through the practical subjection of certain aspects of it to strict scientific protocols, but 
which within productive research situations retains the capacity to surprise. Within the frame of 
practice, we can point not only to creative processes, but we can also talk of the affective 
significance of potentiality.
“A potential discovery may be thought to attract the mind which will reveal it – inflaming 
the scientist with creative desire and imparting to him intimations that guide him from clue 
to clue and from surmise to surmise. The testing hand, the straining eye, the ransacked brain, 
may all be thought to be labouring under the common spell of a potential discovery striving 
to emerge into actuality”492.
For Rheinberger, it is not quite right to call what will emerge “foreknowledge”. The potentiality in 
question is less a property of a researcher's subconscious, and more a property of the technical and 
practical arrangement of research systems. Researchers are inspired by the systems they assemble, 
but this inspiration does not amount to straightforward intentionality. 
“Unprecedented events are about things and concatenations not sought for. They come as a 
surprise but nevertheless do not just happen. They are made to happen through the inner 
workings of the experimental machinery for making the future. And yet they may commit 
experimenters to completely changing the direction of their research activities”493.
The things that are created and manipulated in these arrangements, like the methods that CE and WS 
were experimenting with, are epistemic because they harbour this kind of potentiality. Their reality is 
not assured because they agree with established categories of knowledge, but rather because they 
harbour future-bound efficacy. “The reality of epistemic things lies in their resistance, their capacity 
to turn around the (im)precisions of our foresight and understanding”494. Rheinberger's words recall 
those of Bachelard:
“For science, truth is nothing other than a historical corrective to a persistent error, and 
experiment is a corrective for common and primary illusions. The intellectual life of science 
depends dialectically on this differential of knowledge at the frontier of the unknown. The 
very essence of reflection is to understand that one did not understand before. The non-
491 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 114.
492 Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, 14.
493 Rheinberger, Epistemic Things, 134.
494 Ibid., 23.
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Baconian, non-Euclidean, and non-Cartesian philosophies are historical dialectics that grew 
out of the correction of an error, the extension of a system, or the completion of an idea”495.
It is the journey that is important. In terms that resonate with Heidegger's definition of truth as 
poesis496, truth for Bachelard is a process, not a static relation. We never arrive at truth, but rather set 
it in motion through practice. For Bachelard, the entry of a innovative element in a scientific field is 
what drives the process of revealing past and existing knowledge in the light of error, and pushes 
research forward according to its inner rational dynamic, of phenomenotechnique.
495 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 172, translation modified.
496 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’.
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  10.1 Revelation and invention
One of the key effects of a practice theoretical rationalism is the sense it gives to the potentiality of 
research beyond the straight-jacket of the concept of revelation. Traditional theories of science as 
well as prevalent popular intuitions would posit the unknown as existing in a hidden realm, a latent 
nature waiting to be brought to light, bit by bit, by scientific progress. In contrast, the novelty to 
which a practice theoretical perspective directs our attention is one which does not originate in a 
hidden realm. It is not just new “for us” but new “in itself”, an irruption that undermines the very 
distinction between the two. It is a novelty immanent to an unfolding research process. As 
Rheinberger argues, this requires us to abandon the concept of discovery.
“Science is an exploratory attitude toward knowledge about the world. Knowledge by 
revelation was the theological mode. When science emancipated itself from theology, it 
claimed—possibly it had to claim in order to do the job of secularization—to be the better 
revelator about nature. This is still reflected today in our mainstream theories of science, 
which are all about the “discovery” of “things.” Now I think it is time to stop conceiving of 
science in the borrowed mode of a secularized theology”497.
This final issue brings us back to the issue of abduction we encountered in chapter 3. It is about how 
we relate to events once they have already happened. Badiou notes that statements that refer to the 
coming into being of events are spoken in the “future anterior”: what “will have been” the case498. 
From the point of view of what eventually happened, present processes are known in terms of their 
results, and thus even the indeterminate present can be spoken of as the past of a hypothetical future 
in which the outcome will have stabilised into some objectifiable resolution. The effect of this 
abduction is that the new can very easily be taken as an index of a prior reality “not yet” discovered, 
and the incompleteness of our projects of discovery indicating human finitude and the 
incompleteness of History.
497 Rheinberger, ‘Reply to Bloor’, 409.
498 Badiou, Being and Event, 398.
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If one side of the positivist coin is the idea of a singular channel of scientific progress, the idea of 
discovery as revelation is the other side. In this view, all research is a matter of shifting the boundary 
between what is explicated, and what left latent. The result is a stratified ontology in which nature is 
a reserve, giving its “givens” but largely holding itself back from us, who patiently, according to our 
means and abilities, work to uncover its various domains499.
If, in contrast, we start to regard the real in terms of a process, a capacity to surprise, we are working 
with a very different vision, in which a grand ontological partition is no longer necessary. For 
Polanyi, “[r]eal is that which is expected to reveal itself indeterminately in the future”500. A similar 
view found expression in Bachelard's writings too:
“The philosophers, for their part, hold out to us the idea of communion with an all-
enveloping reality, to which the scientist can hope for nothing better than to return, as to a 
philosophy original and true. But if we really want to understand our intellectual evolution, 
wouldn't we do better instead to pay heed to the anxiety of thought, to its quest for an object, 
to its search for dialectical opportunities to escape from itself, for opportunities to burst free 
of its own limits? In a word, wouldn't we do better to focus on thought in the process of 
objectification? For if we do, we can hardly fail to conclude that such thought is creative”501.
These attempts to establish an alternative space for thinking about the creative unfolding of research 
resonate with some contemporary versions of non-representational realism in continental philosophy. 
Quentin Meillassoux, for example, has been pushing an intellectual project seeking to break out of 
the bounds of human finitude502. For him, we need to regard the capacity to turn out otherwise not as 
a sign of human inability to fully reveal nature, but rather as the primary reality of things. Using the 
concept of “facticity” to write of the lack of absolute foundation of situations of knowing, he asserts 
that we “must grasp in facticity not the inaccessibility of the absolute but the unveiling of the in-
itself and the eternal property of what is, as opposed to the mark of the perennial deficiency in the 
thought of what is”503. If we grasp, at the heart of research, the careful opening of a space for 
indeterminacy, we must in turn be careful to distinguish between a regressive interpretation that 
reads such a space as a space for the revision of human knowledge, and a radical interpretation in 
which it is a space for the actual production of new things, new effects, new phenomena, new 
configurations which themselves harbour the potentiality be otherwise, to drive practice onwards, 
towards an open future of further research. The creativity of practice is the creativity of things as 
much as it is the creativity of humans; in practice the two cannot be separated.
In disqualifying a realm of hidden reasons lying beneath, Meillassoux is thus giving us a new kind of 
radically immanent ontology in which we “put back into the thing itself what we mistakenly took to 
499 Cf. Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’.
500 Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, 10.
501 Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit, 176. Note, however, that Bachelard’s term ‘objectification’ does not have quite the same 
connotations that we have been giving it through Bourdieu.
502 Meillassoux, After Finitude.
503 Ibid., 52.
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be an incapacity in thought”504. It is only when the becoming other of epistemic things is taken as a 
sign of human deficiency, that it serves as an index of a latent domain from which the new emerged. 
If it is a property of the Real, we have no such problem, and there is no need to commit to a stratified 
ontology. This ontological reading of the real potentiality to be otherwise serves, therefore, as a 
principal candidate for a radical alternative to the secularised theology of positivism. What is at stake 
is a rendering of lack in a new way; rather than lack being a failure manifest at the disjuncture 
between two levels of reality, it becomes a generative kernel of difference manifest in a lack of 
closure, an opening, a dynamic real.
These questions are of course much older than positivism. The very notion of the inaccessibility of 
the “thing-in-itself” speaks of this fundamental ontological stratification between beings as they 
appear and beings as they are, a division that provides us with a view of the world in which 
simulation can only ever be subordinate to the “authentic” encounter with nature in experiment or 
empirical observation. This long echo of Plato's Republic is still with us. Throw the poets out of the 
Republic, for they deal in base imitations! The simulationists can follow them into exile, for all they 
do is create imperfect copies of the real thing. Nothing that is good and proper can follow from such 
pedallers of deceit, of appearances that fail to live up to the hidden reality beneath.
My account has aimed to shift such perceptions, to open a space for the appreciation of the creative 
dynamics of simulating, of modelling, of working with and among complex systems of software and 
data. Perhaps we should reverse the order of the issue, and ask: Given that simulating harbours a 
potentiality at least as profound as experimenting, what does this tell us about the nature of things? 
Does this indicate that reality is no hidden domain of the in-itself? That it is rather the capacity of 
things, in highly skilled circumstances of technical engagement, to be-other, a power of becoming 
that speaks of immanence not dualism? If so, practices of simulating may speak to the heart of 
Western culture and world-view, to its internal tensions and contradictions, its own resources to be 
other than what it seems.
  10.2 Reason and representation
The route we took through this thesis analysed scientific practice in terms of the open future 
embodied in the potentiality of epistemic things to lead the meandering path of research along 
unanticipated and interested avenues of enquiry. It showed the inherent dynamics of research, folded 
upon itself in phenomenotechnical practice, self-articulations which open a field of potentiality that 
renders practice future-bound and hopeful. There are in this view some modest normative 
dimensions available, ways to approach questions of science as good or bad, research as more or less 
efficacious. Scientific practice requires highly developed systems of materials, techniques and skills, 
and it requires the maintenance of these systems' coherence under conditions of their own production 
of anomalies and disturbances (bugs and social problems) and of external technical change (in 
504 Ibid., 53, emphasis removed.
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hardware, for example). We can talk about the workability of different practical systems of research, 
how flexible and amenable they are to play, whether they exhibit the right kinds of balance between 
stability and surprise. In none of these respects can we judge research according to what it is doing, 
or where it is going, but we can grasp something of the efficacy of its intrinsic movement.
I have argued that computational science is no more disembodied than experimental practice, that it 
involves forging new articulations of materials and technologies in epistemic situations. Scientific 
software is no idealised system. It is a set of technologies for research, which have characteristic 
materialities. Work with software is always going to be embodied and social. This is important for 
detaching discussions of simulation from discussions of formal theories, a connection which is made 
all too easily because of how amenable source code is to techniques of formalisation.
I also argued that it is necessary to see simulation in the wider frame of the research practice in 
which it is made and put to use, that it makes very little sense to stand a simulation on its own as an 
object of enquiry. To this extent the object of my study has been simulating, rather than simulation. 
Both philosophy of science and continental philosophy have had a tendency to isolate simulation 
from its context. It thus appears to them in terms of a single relationship of representation, rather 
than as an element in technical and epistemic practices. The sub-title could have been “beyond 
simulacra”.
Practice is the heir to post-positivism, but an heir which redefines itself in new terms, distanced from 
reactionary critique. It enables the unpacking of the greatest insights of the post- or non-Kantian 
tradition, a transcendental brought down to earth, inserted into the immanent unfoldings of material 
and bodily engagements that we call skilled work. Practice theory also enables us to speak again of 
terms once discarded for their association with the enlightenment: reason and representation.
We encountered a concept of reason that is immanent to the concrete unfolding of skilled 
engagements. Reason happens. Reason happens in constellations of bodies and things, in situations. 
This is a decentring of the human. The wider fields in which human existence plays out supplant the 
organism, subject, individual or soul as the locus for enquiry. The human is decentred but not 
rendered symmetrical in the manner of actor-network theory. This is still human reason, but human 
reason playing out in a milieu of people and things, reason that owes its efficacy to the disposition 
and distribution of that milieu.
Representation also shows itself as something that happens, as no master concept capable of 
capturing science in its scope, but as a feature of practical activities, of processes of modelling. It is 
revealed as a play of differences, a play of presence and absence in which source and target occupy 
the strange territory between Same and Other. Representation may well be one of the most important 
dimensions to the material practices of research, but representations are always more than 
representations. They are parts of complex fields of practice, and serve research in many ways, as 
substrates for its realisation, materials to work with, and reflections of its accomplishments.
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What we are toying with here is a basic idea of process as the primary stuff of science, and all 
objectifications of that process, such as representations and discursive descriptions, are themselves 
practical ways in which scientists attempt to get a grip on what it is that they have been doing, a grip 
on this sense of movement that carries their work forwards. Truth is not manifest in the 
representation, but in the manifest insufficiency of any capture of research in accounting 
apparatuses. If there is a meaning to the concept “truth”, then it too is one in which truth happens. 
“But how does truth happen?”505 Not as a question of correspondence. Truth cannot be revealed and 
left open, stored up and called upon when needed. Truth is the whole process of happening of 
creative research, of setting things in motion. If there is truth in science, it is here, in the intrinsic 
dynamics of skilled engagements.
  10.3 A changed world
Our world is one of massive connectivity, ubiquitous globalised media. The processes and transfers 
that occur among these circuits, however, are not transparent and frictionless. As we incorporate 
computational processes into fields of practice, they serve not only as accelerators or amplifiers, but 
as materials for doing things, as tangible stuff with a specificity wholly its own. The digital computer 
is a very particular apparatus incorporated into wider systems of action in highly specific ways.
The contemporary world is also a world of large-scale threats, of climatological and ecological 
systems of vast complexity, each with an interdependence, a precariousness that is hard to fathom, 
let alone measure and protect. The recognition of the complexity of interlinked physical, geological, 
biological and social processes has emerged alongside the stamping of the human mark across the 
world through our information systems and networks, and it is these systems that form an essential 
element of the front line of research into systemic threats.
Between the great extension of calculative capacity represented by computational media and the 
large scale efforts to grasp the connections between processes, is a common interplay between the 
opaque and the transparent, between the tenuousness of the practical grasp of scientific problems and 
of the practical grasp of technical apparatuses. What we need to recognise is that the instability and 
precariousness of research itself, like the differential precariousness of ecological and climatological 
systems, is not a mark of insufficiency. It is a mark of a fundamental dynamic, a real, a capacity to 
be-other, to become-other, to extend towards unforeseen areas, draw new materials in, create 
radically new configurations, and transform itself and thus the world of which it is a part. If the 
greatest existential demand for humans today is to change their situation, we could do well to look to 
science, not for the “answers” but for inspiration about how to think, do, and make things otherwise.
505 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, 54.
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